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Economies in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA) continue to experience slow growth, 
deteriorating living standards and quality of life in spite of considerable 
investment in the 1970s. These economies at independence compared 
reasonably well with other developing countries, yet despite attempts at 
structural transformation mainly through import substitution during the same 
period and reforms in macroeconomic, trade and sectoral policies in the late 
1980s and early 1990s, they have performed extremely poorly. 
The future of African countries such as Ghana, Nigeria looked bright in the 
1960s, while Botswana which is one of the fastest growing nations in SSA 
was one of the poorest and least developed economies in Africa in the early 
1960s. Between 1960-1973, growth in Africa was more rapid than in the first 
half of the century. Political self-determination in Africa and economic growth 
seemed to be proceeding hand-in-hand (Collier and Gunning, 1999). In the 
1960s the economic performance of most African economies were far better 
than that in south Asian economies. Until around 1970, the economic 
performance of Nigeria was broadly superior to that of Indonesia, but over the 
next quarter-century outcomes diverged markedly, despite the common 
experience for both countries of an oil boom in a predominantly agricultural 
economy. 
African economies are being left behind in the process of convergence in 
world income. Real per capita gross domestic product growth in sub-Saharan 
Africa has averaged about 0.2 percent annum over the last 25 years in 
contrast to an average of 2.5 percent of the rest of the developing economies 
(Easterly and Levine, 1993). What is even more disturbing is the extent of 
the deteriorating performance during the 1980s and early 1990s. The growth 
rate declined from an annual average of 1.91 during 1965-1980 to 1.7 in the 
1980s. 
Gains in health and education standards achieved in the 1970s have been 
threatened with reversal in the 1980s as investment and maintenance of 
social services were disproportionately starved of funding in order to restore 
fiscal balance. This deterioration is taking place in the face of the growing 
and very strong empirical evidence of the positive effects on growth from 
improvements in human capital in the form of educational attainment and 
health (Barro and Lee, 1993). 
The explanations behind this disturbing performance have focused on three 
main factors inadequate human, technological and institutional capacities, 
high vulnerability to exogenous shocks, and policy misdirection. In the 1960s 
and 1970s the focus was on structural transformation and provision of basic 
needs characterised by enthusiastic support for import substitution and social 
services programmes. To achieve the goals, emphasis was placed on 
investments in infrastructure and skill formation, as well as imported 
intermediate inputs most often inadequately supplied due to the lack of local 
resources. Equally absent during this period was concern for maintaining a 
stable macroeconomic environment and incentives to ensure high productivity 
from investment and a healthy export performance. Agriculture, the mainstay 
of African economies in terms of income generation, food supply, 
employment and export earnings, was starved of investment and heavily 
taxed to support import substitution (Ndulu, 1994). 
The crisis of the 1980s brought this initiative to a halt as sustainable resource 
gaps emerged, worsened by a deterioration in their terms of trade and a 
sharp rise in the real interest on external debt. The cost of stabilisation in 
terms of growth and its failure to close gaps on a sustainable basis were 
partly responsible for a broad adoption of the adjustment with growth 
approach which emphasised the importance of both financing and policy 
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reform in reviving growth and achieving macroeconomic stability on a 
sustainable basis. Where significant social costs to adjustment exist, both 
theory and experience suggest the need for adopting a longer time frame for 
the adjustment costs and a critical need for financing in order to partially 
alleviate poverty in the impetus for the development process in reviving 
growth on a sustainable basis. 
The economic structure of these countries is characterised by a high 
dependence 'on imports for investment, production and consumption on the 
one hand and on the undiversified basket of primary commodity exports 
which are subject to a continued weakening of world markets on the other. 
Another characteristic of these economies is the foreign exchange gap. It is 
considered to be the most constraining on growth and development in SSA, 
and one that would require more support to alleviate poverty in the process of 
transforming these economies to more sustainable structures over the long 
term. Foreign resources inflows are needed to support not only the 
expansion of productive capacity but also the utilisation of installed capacity 
and growth in the medium term. The lack of foreign exchange constrained 
growth in the 1980s as African economies found it increasingly difficult to 
raise funds from international capital markets and as increased debt servicing 
of their requirements absorbed a large proportion of their foreign exchange 
receipts (Ndulu, 1994). 
The continued deterioration and extreme volatility in the external terms of 
trade which led to losses in real income, exarcebated the foreign exchange 
gap via reduced real export earnings and caused significant managerial 
stresses on the development process as a result of such instability in 
earnings. Losses in real income arising from the deterioration in the external 
terms of trade averaged 3.1 percent of GDP annually in the past 25 years 
(Ndulu et ai, 1999). In addition, the large overhang of external debt in these 
economies diverted a large proportion of scarce resources from supporting 
current development efforts into debt servicing. All these factors made 
achieving external viability elusive which in turn affected the creditworthiness 
3 
of these economies to commercial lenders, reduced investment confidence 
locally and induced capital flight since a large debt stock prompts the 
anticipation of a future burden on private incomes through taxation-including 
inflation tax in order to service debt. 
The debtlGDP ratio of SSA as a whole has more than doubled from 42.1 
percent in the first half of the 1980s to 98 percent during 1986-91. For low-
income SSA this ratio increased by almost 170 percent over the 6 years 
(Ndulu, 1994). Moreover a worsening liquidity problem is also evident from 
the rising debt service to export ratio. This has tripled from 7.3 percent in 
1976-79 to 22.7 percent in 1986-91 for SSA as a whole and almost 
quadrupled from 6.4 percent to 24.1 percent for low-income countries of SSA 
over the same period. In Southern Africa, the development crisis that began 
in the 1970s intensified in the 1980s and presented a difficult challenge to the 
political leadership, policy advisers and the development community. It 
required policy measures to reverse the declining trends and place those 
economies on a path of sustainable growth and development (Hope and 
Kayira, 1997). There was a need to, among other things, arrest the 
deepening of poverty, reduce the socio-economic inequalities, lighten the 
external debt burden, reverse the brain drain, create new employment 
opportunities, improve the efficiency of the physical infrastructure, improve 
the balance of payments and narrow the fiscal deficits. 
The initial response to the crisis was that of closing the resource gaps at the 
. expense of growth through a reduction of imports and aggregate expenditure. 
This was buttressed by high conditionality for access to resources from the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank under stabilisation 
programmes (Structural Adjustment Programmes, SAPs). 
4 
1.2 Causes of the Crisis 1 
Since the early 1980s, two different views of the causes of the African crisis 
have emerged: the neoclassical and the structuralist. 
1.2.1 Neoclassical View 
Mkandawire (1988) noted that neoclassical interpretation is based on the 
theoretical and empirical corpus of work that essentially derived from a set of 
theories on the efficacy of the market system in resource allocation. The 
proponents of the inappropriate domestic policies behind the economic and 
agrarian crisis in Africa make use of solid neoclassical economic foundations 
with factor substitution possibilities and t.he power of the markets and price 
signals to efficiently allocate scare resources. They also believe in 
international trade based on comparative advantage and outward-oriented 
trade strategies. The vagaries of weather come and go and commodity price 
behaviour is more or less predictable. 
According to the neoclassical view, African governments have pursued 
inappropriate policies, which have seriously undermined overall economic 
performance in general, and in the agricultural sector in particular. The latter 
has been directly biased against in the following ways: . 
• Agricultural export commodities have been taxed at high rates and 
farmers have received lower prices for their products from inefficiently run 
state marketing boards; 
• The use of widespread import duties and quotas to conserve foreign 
exchange have forced farmers to pay higher prices for imported inputs or 
to purchase higher-cost domestic substitutes for agricultural inputs; 
• The protection of domestic industrial sector and import-substitution 
industries through import tariffs, quotas and licenses had led to relatively 
high prices for the products of these sectors and hence to a deterioration 
1 This section benefited from a survey by Elbadawi, Ghura and Uwajaren, 1992. 
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of the internal terms of trade for agriculture; 
• Since independence, governments have given agriculture low priority in 
their development strategy by allocating inadequate investment funds for 
agricultural research, construction of roads, marketing infrastructure and 
the provision of schools and health facilities in rural areas; 
• In many countries a direct policy of cheap food for the urban population 
has encouraged a preference for imported food and discouraged domestic 
food production. 
In addition to these direct effects, agriculture has been adversely affected by 
overvalued real exchange rates. 
1.2.2 Structural View 
The structuralists have identified a set of poor initial conditions and a set of 
structural bottlenecks to explain the economic malaise facing almost all 
African states. These poor initial conditions which are said to have provided 
SSA with an unfair departure at independence relative to other developing 
regions are the following: 
• At independence, there was an extreme scarcity of adequately trained 
local managers, scientists and other manpower who understood the 
resource base available for development and how to best use and 
manage that limited resource base for maximising welfare, 
• Many independent states were politically fragile due to the diversity of 
cultural background of the people. In many instances, the existing 
governments spent much of their scarce resources fighting for their 
political survival instead of focusing on development strategies to enhance 
welfare, 
• At independence, both the infrastructure and the institutions were very 
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weak to support development, 
• The colonial heritage left African states a legacy of heavy external 
dependence on one or two export crops for their economic survival. 
In addition to these poor initial conditions, a list of structural bottlenecks has 
been identified as: 
• Widespread subsistence farming and the predominance of subsistence 
activities, 
• Shortage of trained personnel and scarcity of entrepreneurial capabilities 
to spearhead and manage development, 
• Weak institutions, 
• Inappropriate technology and traditional production techniques marked by 
low levels of productivity, 
• Small and fragmented economies, 
• Weaknesses in the political structures of African countries in which the 
interests of the dominant class are served at the expense of the peasant 
masses, 
• Excessive dependence on the foreign sector rendering the African 
economies extremely susceptible to external shocks, 
• Poor weather and prolonged periods of drought, 
• Poor soil quality and a degraded environment 
• Poor physical infrastructure and transportation networks constraining the 
integration of various regions. 
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1.3 Research Problem 
During the 1980s there has been a considerable interest in the long-term 
growth theory in sub-Saharan Africa. This interest was stimulated partly by 
the poor economic performance of developing countries in sub-Saharan 
Africa. Furthermore, in southern Africa many countries have experienced 
political instability that resulted in economic instability. The purpose of this 
study was to examine the growth experience of a sub-set of these countries 
comprising the Southern African Customs Union (SACU), namely South 
Africa, Namibia, Lesoth02, Botswana and Swaziland. 
The Namibian economy is characterised by erratic up and down swings, 
which primarily results from Namibia's vulnerability to external shocks and 
adverse climatic conditions. Factors such as the severe drought Namibia 
experienced between 1992-1995, the world market recession for mineral 
products including the quota for diamonds imposed by the central selling and 
other external factors have been serious drawbacks to the Namibian 
economy. However, despite these problems, the country has not been 
subjected to Structural Adjustment Programmes like many other countries in 
sub-Saharan Africa. At independence in Namibia income distribution was 
highly skewed with limited access for the majority of Namibians to the 
mainstream of economic activities; high variation in social indicators with lack 
of access to health, education, housing and sanitary facilities for the majority 
of Namibians; a trade balance titled in favour of South Africa; concentration of 
. export markets and a non-diversified economy. As a result of these factors, 
the government launched the First National Development Plan (NDP1) 
covering the period 1995-2000. The focus of the development plan was on 
economic growth, job creation, reducing income equalities and poverty 
alleviation. 
In the Kingdom of Swaziland, economic growth was sluggish during the late 
1970s. During the late 1980s, the economy of Swaziland performed well , 
benefiting from a substantial increase in foreign direct investment inflows as 
2 Lesotho is the only country in the Southern African Customs Union that has entered into the 
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sanctions against South Africa tightened. However, during the early 1990s . 
macroeconomic performance deteriorated and real GDP growth remained 
substantially below the level consistent with non-increasing unemployment. 
The low level of growth in Swaziland 's economy has been dominated by a 
lack of manufacturing expansion, reflecting slow growth of inflows of foreign 
direct investment particularly from South Africa. The fiscal deficit worsened 
during 1992/93-1994/95, after experiencing a positive fiscal balance during 
1987/88-90/91 caused by a strong economic growth fuelled by increased 
foreign direct investment (IMF, 1997). Thus, the fiscal balance shifted from a 
surplus of 5 percent of GDP in 1991/92 to a deficit of 6 percent of GDP in 
1994/95. In addition to the slowdown in economic growth, the deterioration of 
the fiscal situation was due to an increase in government expenditure, 
particularly current outlays. 
The limited natural resource base, the unique geographical location of 
Lesotho, the difficult mountain terrain and the economic and political 
uncertainties in the sub-region during the late 1980s and early 1990s 
presented major constraints on the development of Lesotho. Lesotho faces 
severe drought conditions, continued retrenchment of 8asotho miners and 
uncertainties brought about by political and economic changes in South 
Africa. There has also been a growing imbalance between the domestic 
labour supply and the labour-absorptive capacity of the economy, resulting in 
greater dependence on remittances from workers in South Africa and rising 
unemployment at home (IMF, 1992). In the mid-1980s economic 
performance was characterised by low and uneven economic growth, 
widening budget deficits, and a substantial deterioration in the balance of 
payments. It was against this background that the authorities embarked on a 
medium-term economic and structural adjustment programme beginning in 
1988/89. It was aimed at increasing efficiency in the public sector, reforming 
the tax system and streamlining investment incentives. 
IMF's Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs). 
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In Botswana, the period under discussion was different from other countries in 
the sub-region. When Botswana gained Independence on September 30, 
1966, it was one of the poorest and least developed countries on earth. Per 
capita Gross National Product (GNP) was estimated at no more than US$69. 
British budgetary grants in aid and other grants to the tune of 57 percent 
financed the recurrent budget of the government. In terms of GDP growth, 
Botswana's performance has been better' than most African countries. The 
World Bank Atlas shows Botswana's per capita GNP as having grown by an 
average of 13.2 percent per annum in real terms between 1970 and 1978 
against South Africa's 0.7 percent, Zimbabwe's 1 percent, Zambia's 0.9 
percent, Nigeria's 4.4 percent, Tanzania's 1.7 percent and Zaire's 2.2 percent 
(Mogae, 1985). 
According to the National Development Plan (NDP) 1979-1985, GDP at 
market prices went from P43.8 million in 1967-1968 to P333.2 million in 1977-
1978 at the 1979 prices, thus increasing more than seven fold in ten years. 
The CSO estimate shows GDP for 1979-1980 at current prices of P670.9 
million as compared to P505.7 million for 1978-79. This is a nominal increase 
between these two years of 32.7 percent or 10.1 percent in real terms. 
Behind this impressive record of GDP performance there are structural 
weaknesses. The share of agriculture went down from 41 .8 percent in 1967-
1968 to 20 percent by 1977-1978 while that of mining rose from 1.6 percent in 
1967 -1968 to 14.9 percent ten years later. The other significant change in 
share of GDP occurred in the trade, hotels and restaurants that went up from 
, 11.4 percent in 1967-1968 to 21.4 percent in 1977-1978 (Ministry of Finance 
and Development Planning, 1988) as Botswana developed tourism. These 
structural changes reflect the rapid growth of the mining sector and to a less 
extent the fall in agricultural output. This impressive economic performance 
was due to a combination of sound economic management, unusually 
effective negotiating skills and leadership, a deeply entrenched commitment 
to consensual governance and a fair amount of luck (Harvey and Lewis, 
1990). 
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The South African economy had a mixture of growth rates. During the year 
ended June 1970, the South African economy achieved very high rates of 
growth as reflected in an increase of well over 12 percent in the gross 
domestic product, despite a shortage of labour and certain types of capital. 
The upswing in economic activity stemmed from a further substantial rise in 
total domestic demand, which exceeded the domestic supply of goods and 
services and exerted considerable pressure on resources, particularly on the 
supply of skilled and semi-skilled labour. The very high rate of growth in 
economic activity stemmed from substantial increases in all the major 
components of gross domestic expenditure, namely private and government 
expenditure, capital outlays by private and public sectors, and inventory 
investment (SARB, 1970). In 1975, it was generally agreed that the upper 
turning point of the business cycle in South Africa was reached in the 
beginning of the third quarter of 1974. The rate of increase in real domestic 
expenditure declined substantially from 11.5 percent in 1973174 to only 6 
percent in 1974/95, but was nevertheless still substantially higher than the 
growth rate in real gross domestic product. The lowest growth of real GDP 
amounted to a negative 1 percent in the recession year 1985. This low 
growth rate of real GDP was attributed to a low rate of increase in real private 
consumption expenditure, a small increase in real gross domestic fixed 
investment, a decline in gross domestic saving and sanctions imposed on 
South Africa as a result of the Apartheid policy (SARB, 1988). 
Currently South Africa's international competitiveness puts it amongst the top 
. 25 percent of countries. After about R50 billion of foreign capital left the 
country between 1985 and 1993, the pattern was reversed with the 
constitutional change and in the wake of the gradual abolition of exchange 
control. From 1994 to 1996 foreign capital to the tune of R27.4 billion flowed 
into the country. After 19 years of double-digit Inflation, annual price 
increases have been below 10 percent since 1993 (Calitz, 1997). For the first 
time large numbers of South Africans are gaining access to education, 
primary health care and running water. Against this background of conflicting 
evidence the South African government released its macroeconomic strategy 
for growth, employment and redistribution (GEAR) in 1996. Key goals are an 
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economic growth rate of 6 percent per annum and the creation of 409000 
jobs by the year 2000. The renewed interest in the theory of the determinants 
of long-term growth can be explained largely by the critical need to restart or 
assure growth in some of the economies experiencing such poor mixed 
economic performance. 
1.4. Objectives of the Study 
The specific objectives of this study are: 
• To investigate empirically the determinants of long-term growth in the 
SACU countries 
• To estimate the empirical relationship between export growth rates, 
population growth rates and long-term growth. 
In an attempt to provide a framework for understanding the determinants of 
long-term growth, a set of hypotheses have been tested. 
These hypotheses are: 
1. Government consumption, political instability and population growth 
rates contribute negatively to long-term growth; 
2. Improving terms of trade and human capital formation, a high savings 
ratio and financial development promote economic growth. 
1.5 Bottle-necks in the Data Used 
Professor Reginald H. Green who has been trying to collect and systematise 
data on Namibia over number of years made the following observation: 
"Basic data are hard to come by-building up a set is something of a 
cross between fitting a jigsaw puzzle and playing a detective game -
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except that the pieces do not all come from the same puzzle and some 
of the clues are disinformation, or some other cases.,,3 
The limitations have been recognized when compiling the data for the current 
study. The organization of the data has been influenced by its availability, but 
presented with a concern to confer the greatest possible observational 
credence on our analysis. Sometimes important . data is limited or lacking, 
inadequate data on employment, labour force, SACU's trading partners, black 
market premium, private sector and skills are not always available. Between 
1960 and 1970 economic data in some of the countries were not officially 
published. Some crucial information may be available for one or two periods 
but not for the length of the period we would have wished to compare namely 
1960-1998. This made the presentation and analysis in some cases to be on 
ad hoc basis. 
1.6 The Significance of the Study 
The study is important in that policymakers may use this information in 
formulating efficient resource allocation. As the sources of growth will be 
determined, the study may yield results that will assist in deciding on how 
resource allocation should be achieved between various sectors to stimulate 
growth. An empirical study of this nature is essential in ascertaining the main 
factors that have contributed to the SACU countries' economic performances. 
The results may also assist policy makers in setting up growth-oriented 
macroeconomic policies. 
A few words are appropriate about why this study focuses on the SACU 
countries. The economic structures of. these countries are similar, in respect 
that they are characterised by high dependence on imports for investment, 
production and consumption. These countries have a common external tariff 
against the rest of the world. Except for Botswana, the currencies are pegged 
to the South African at par because the countries are in a monetary 
agreement (Common Monetary Area, CMA). The fact that economic 
3 Quoted from Kaakunga E.M., 1990.9. 
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development is situated in relational processes raises the question: why do 
some experience this phenomenon at different times and at different speed 
than others, and why are the gains of growth unevenly distributed in some 
societies, both within themselves and in relation to others? Thus, a 
comparative analysis of growth determinants in the SACU countries is 
essential for policy makers. 
1.7 Outline of the Study 
The study embraces chapters structured in the following way: Chapter one 
contains the introduction, objectives and research problem of the study, 
followed by chapter two which looks at the Institutional Arrangements in 
Southern Africa. Chapter three discusses macroeconomic performance in 
Namibia. The growth, constraints and prospects in the leading sectors as well 
as the minor sectors are also discussed. Chapter four traces the pre-colonial 
modes of production and formation of economic policies in Lesotho. Chapter 
five highlights the performance of the economy in Swaziland. Chapter six 
looks at the overview of the performance of the South African economy. We 
trace some recent developments in macroeconomic policies. Chapter seven 
concentrates on economic performance in Botswana. The constraints to 
industrial development are also discussed in this chapter. Chapter eight 
surveys the theoretical and empirical literature review on growth 
determinants. Chapter nine considers the methodology and presents the 




2 INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter Two concentrates on the institutional arrangements in Southern 
Africa. Firstly, it sheds light on the SACU agreement, and highlights the costs 
and benefits of the CMA agreement for Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland 
(LNS) countries. The chapter concludes with the SADC Treaty and discusses 
whether convergence has occurred among the members of SADC. 
2.2 The 1969 SACU Agreement and its Objectives4 
The origin of the current Southern African Customs Union (SACU) dates back 
to 1889, when a custom union was established. In 1910, The Cape Colony, 
Natal, Orange Free State and Transvaal joined to form the Union of South 
Africa. A new Customs Union agreement was concluded between South 
Africa and the three High Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechnualand 
and Swaziland. In 1915, after South Africa's seizure of Namibia from German 
sovereignty the customs union was extended de facto to Namibia. After 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) received their independence in the 
1960s negotiations began to conclude a new customs union Agreement in 
response to the changed economic circumstances. The outcome was the 
1969 SACU agreement and the Secret Memorandum of Understanding 
(SMU) which is still in place. 
The objectives of the SACU are summarised from the preamble to the 
Agreement as: creation of a common customs area (CCA) with the 
application of a Common External Tariff (CET) and equivalent trade 
regulations for all commodities imported into the CCA; 
4 SACU Agree~ent and Maxwell Stamp (1994). unless stated otherwise. 
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1. free interchange of goods and services between the member countries 
in the CCA, 
2. economic development of the CCA and in particular of the less 
advanced members and the diversification of their economies, 
3. sharing equitable benefits among all members of the Customs Union. 
The main provision of the 1969 SACU Agreement relates to intra-SACU trade 
unrestricted either by tariffs or quantitative restrictions (Article 2 and 3): 
1. the setting of a Common External Tariff (CET) (Article 4) 
2. the establishment of a Common Revenue Pool (CRP) (Article 13) 
3. the arrangements for the allocation of the revenue (Article 14) 
4. non-discriminatory pricing of transport rates within the CCA (Article 15) 
5. restrictions on trade agreements with non-SACU members (Article 19) 
6. specific arrangements for the BLS countries (Articles 6 and 7) 
7. specific arrangements for the marketing of agricultural products (Article 
12) 
2.2.1 The Provision on External-SACU Trade 
The members of SACU constitute a common customs area or customs union. 
Under Articles 4 (i) and 10 the agreement stipulates clearly that the customs 
tariffs and excise duties respectively prevailing in South Africa shall apply to 
all members of the SACU. This makes it clear that South Africa is 
responsible for setting the CET. Further, all the customs, excise and other 
SACU duties collected in the CCA are paid into the Consolidated Revenue 
Fund of South Africa. Article 10 and the Secret Memorandum of 
Understanding (SMU) states that the BLNS countries are bound to apply the 
South Africa customs and excise legislation. 
Trade agreements with non-member states can be entered into if the 
provisions of such an arrangement do not conflict in any way with the SACU 
provisions. Article 19 (i) prohibits any individual SACU member entering into 
a trade agreement with a non-SACU member in terms of which concessions 
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on the duties in CCA are granted to that country. To the extent that any 
country enters into an agreement it will be responsible for remitting the 
forgone revenue to the Common Revenue Pool (CRP). 
2.2.2 Provisions on Intra-SACU Trade 
The SACU guarantees the free interchange of goods through Articles 2 and 3. 
To make this effective it is also necessary to guarantee freedom of access 
and non-discriminatory transport pricing (Articles 15 and 16). A country 
cannot operate a differential transport tariff for goods within its own area from 
those carried to or from other parts of the CCA. 
Notwithstanding the principle of the free interchange of goods there are a 
number of exceptions of which the most significant is agricultural commodities 
(Article 12). Each country is entitled to regulate the marketing of agricultural 
commodities although they have to apply such regulations on an equitable 
basis to products from the SACU members. Article 16 is concerned with the 
freedom of transit and stresses that a member country may take any 
measures necessary to protect its security interests. The agreement contains 
provision for a member to take protective action under Article 17 if: 
"As a result of unforeseen developments any product is being 
introduced into the area of one of the contracting parties from the 
area of another contracting party in such increased quantities and 
under such conditions as to cause or threaten serious injury to 
producers or manufacturers of like or directly competing products in 
the area into which such goods are introduced."5 
In the event that a member believes the above is occurring. it has have the 
right to request bilateral conSUltations with the objective of finding a mutually 
acceptable solution. The agreement does not allow the affected party 
(country) to temporarily close its borders. Indeed this is excluded under 
Article 11 (iii) which explicitly prohibits the banning or restriction of imports 
5 Quoted from Maxwell Stamp (1994). 
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from the CCA for the purpose of protecting its own industries producing such 
goods. The free interchange of goods is also dependent on adequate 
monetary arrangements for payment. The agreement specifies the South 
Africa Rand as the unit of account for all SACU trade. 
. 6 
2.2.3 Measures aimed at Development of the BLNS 
The agreement recognises the unequal levels of development within the 
SACU and aims to encourage the development of its less advantaged 
members. With this objective in mind the Agreement has a number of special 
provisions for the BLNS targeted at assisting industrial development. These 
include Articles 6 and 7, which relate to infant industry protection and to the 
BLNS countries' protection of industries that are of major importance to each 
respectively. Article 6 is only applicable to the BLNS and permits them to 
impose a tariff on imports into their areas, subject to the agreement of the 
other contracting parties, for new industries for up to a maximum of eight 
years. A new industry is defined as one which has not been established in 
the country for more than eight years. 
Although, Namibia has not used Article 6, it has been utilised infrequently by 
Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) (specifically Botswana). This is to 
be expected given the small and fragmented nature of the Namibian and the 
BLS markets . . For such additional protection to be justified, it should lead to a 
firm lowering its costs through achieving an increased market share. The 
evidence from developing countries does not support this view, with many 
infant industries continuing to require protection indefinitely because of an 
inability to compete (Stamp, 1994). In the case of the BLNS with their small 
and fragmented markets, the protected firm would account for a high 
percentage of domestic sales, which would imply mass consumption. Given 
the low income levels of a high proportion of the population it follows that the 
poor would have to pay higher prices. Thus on both efficiency and equity 
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grounds extensive use of Article 6 would appear to be in the interests of the 
BLNS. Article 7 provides for the BLNS to specify industries which are or are 
likely to be of major importance to its economy. The particular criteria for 
industries to qualify under Article 7 are listed in the SMU. 
2.2.4 The 1969 Revenue-Sharing Formula 
The 1969 revenue-sharing formula is described in Article 14 of the 
agreement. It is frequently described in the literature on the SACU and the 
following outline is based on Hudson (1981) and Maasdorp (1990). These 
Articles explain that all customs and excise duties are paid on a quarterly 
basis into the Consolidated Revenue Fund of South Africa and are referred to 
as the Common Revenue Pool (CRP). 
The SMU clarifies how the revenue sharing formula makes specific allowance 
for: 
(a) the price-raising effect of South Africa's import control measures 
(b) the price-raising effect of South Africa's policy of protection to industries 
by means of the customs tariff 
(c) the polarisation of development characteristic of a situation where less 
developed areas are linked to relatively much more developed areas in a 
customs union and 
(d) the loss to the other three states of fiscal discretion. 
The revenue-sharing formula for the Customs Union is given below 
R = (A+B+C/D+E+F+G)*(H)*(1.42) 
Where: 
- R is the revenue received by Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia or Swaziland 
6 Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia and Swaziland. 
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_ A is the total cif value at the border of all imports into Botswana, Lesotho, 
Namibia or Swaziland inclusive of all customs and excise duties 
_ B is the value of excible goods produced and consumed in Botswana, 
Lesotho, Namibia, or Swaziland 
_ C is the total value of excise duties paid in Botswana, Lesotho Namibia, or 
Swaziland 
- 0 is the total cif value of imports into the CCA inclusive of all customs and 
excise duties 
- E is the total value of all CCA excisable production and consumption 
- F is the value of excisable goods produced and consumed in the CCA 
- G is the total value of excise duties paid in the CCA 
- H is the Common Revenue Pool consisting of the sum of all customs and 
excise duties levied within the CCA. 
- 1.42 is the enhancement factor 
2.2.5 The Administration of the SACU 
Article 20 of the agreement established a Customs Union Commission (CUC) 
in which all members participate. The CUC must meet at least once a year 
. and has the mandate to discuss any part of the SACU Agreement. The CUC 
seeks to find mutually agreeable solutions. Each member country has the 
option of accepting or rejecting the proposed solutions. The CUC does not 
have a permanent secretariat, although it has appointed three committees to 
facilitate its work. The Customs Technical Liaison Committee formed in 
1970, the Trade and Industry Liaison Committee formed in 1973 and the 
Transport Liaison Committee formed in 1974. 
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2.3 Common Monetary Area 
The Common Monetary Area (CMA) 7 consists of South Africa, Namibia, 
Lesotho and Swaziland. Botswana was a member until 1976. The CMA is a 
hybrid of currency board and monetary union. It is a currency board because 
domestic currency issuance is backed by foreign assets (Tjirongo, 1995). 
The system does not allow the monetisation of fiscal deficits. However, unlike 
an orthodox currency board, the monetary systems in Lesotho, Namibia and 
Swaziland (LNS) are administered by the central banks. The central banks 
have the mandate to perform the normal functions ordinarily performed by 
such institutions, including the possibility of extending loans to their respective 
governments. 
In the CMA, the South African Rand is the dominant currency. Appendix 2 
(pp.342-345) gives the key aspects of the agreement. The CMA Agreement 
can be divided into three subdivisions: (i) definitional, (ii) operational, and (iii) 
economic. The definitional category provides the legal interpretations of the 
agreement. The second set of articles outline operational procedures such 
as the collection and exchange of monetary statistics (Articles 10 and 11). 
The economic provisions of the agreement deal with issues such as legal 
tender, intra-CMA transfers of funds, access to capital markets, foreign 
exchange transactions and compensatory payments for seigniorage foregone 
by the LNS countries for using Rand. 
2.3.1 Analysis of Costs and Benefits of CMA Memberships 
There are different forms and levels of monetary integration (see Tavlas, 
1993, Corden 1972). Cobham and Robson (1994) assert that while the costs 
for any form of monetary integration are the same (i.e. the loss of nominal 
exchange rate), the benefits are, however, substantially higher with higher 
, 7 Like SACU, the Common Monetary Area (CMA) , formerly the Rand Monetary Area, evolved 
from informal monetary integration of the BLS countries with South Africa. The four countries 
were at one stage ruled by Britain, using the pound sterling as their common currency, later 
replaced by the Rand. . 
B Tjirongo, (1995), unless stated otherwise. 
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forms of monetary integration. The earlier literature on optimum currency 
areas pointed to certain characteristics with respect to factor mobility, size, 
openness and degree of diversification to determine whether or not monetary 
integration is beneficial or not (Mundell, 1961, MacKinnon 1963 and Kenen 
1969)9. 
2.3.2 Benefits 
Benefits in participating in a currency union relevant to the CMA include 
efficiency gains from elimination of transactions costs, welfare gains from 
price stability, and less uncertainty in exchange rate movements between the 
national currencies and that of their major trading partner, South Africa. 
2.3.2(a) Efficiency Gains from Elimination of Transaction Costs 
Transactions costs involved in converting one currency into another, 
gathering and processing information regarding future exchange rate 
developments, represent a dead weight loss. Using a common currency as a 
medium of exchange reduces transaction costs. In the word of Tjirongo 1995, 
De Grauwe (1994) maintains that there are welfare gains to the society as a 
whole. The welfare gains to the LNS countries as a whole from the 
elimination of transaction costs are probably substantial because more than 
80 percent of LNS imports come from South Africa. 
2.3.2(b) Resource Savings on Foreign Exchange Reserves 
A large part of the LNS goods are exported to industrial countries, while 
nearly all their imports come from South Africa. The advantage of the CMA in 
this regard is that the payments imbalances within the CMA are settled in the 
same currency. 
9 Further discussion on the characteristics with respect to factor mobility, size, openness of 
the economy and the degree of diversification of the economy is beyond this chapter 
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2.3.2(c) Certainty of Exchange Rate and Price Stability 
A further benefit of the CMA is the elimination of uncertainty facing producers 
and consumers. lntra-CMA trade patterns reveal that LNS countries are net 
importers of goods and services from South Africa. With separate currencies, 
uncertainties faced both by South African producers as well as LNS 
producers and consumers will increase. In the CMA this uncertainty is 
avoided since payments imbalances are settled in the same currency. 
2.3.3 Costs 
Participation in a currency union involves some costs associated with loss of 
autonomy over monetary and exchange rate policy. The costs may be higher, 
especially in high inflation-prone countries where seigniorage constitutes a 
significant source of government revenue (see Dornbusch, 1992). Besides 
economic factors, political factors may influence a decision either to 
participate in a currency union or to maintain an independent currency. 
2.3.3(a) Potential Loss of Seigniorage 
Based on the experiences of developing countries, Cukierman, Edwards and 
Tabellini (1992) show that country reliance on seignorage Significantly 
increases with the share of agricultural output in an economy, with the degree 
of urbanisation, and with observed political polarisation and instability. 
Reliance on seigniorage declines with extent of industrialisation and 
dependence of an economy on . foreign trade. For LNS countries there is a 
heavy reliance on external tariffs or SACU transfers. Therefore, this may 
reduce the propensity to resort to money printing to extract inflation tax. 
2.3.3(b) Asymmetric Disturbances and Real Exchange Rates 
Even if a strong case for a monetary union can be made, relinquishing the 
exchange rate instrument may involve a cost when the country is faced with 
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external disturbances (Tjirongo, 1995). One central aspect is whether shocks 
are symmetric or asymmetric. Different industrial structures may imply that 
real shocks facing the CMA countries can have asymmetric effects. The 
second aspect concerns whether shocks are temporary or permanent. 
2.3.3{c) Differences in Regional Growth 
It is argued that because of relative ease of capital compared with labour 
migration, monetary integration is likely to result in an acceleration in 
economic distress and stagnation of certain regions or countries. Economic 
development of poorer countries and regions is a desirable feature of any 
monetary system, and it is thus important to question whether a currency 
union assists in the convergence of per capita income among the constituent 
parts (Masson and Taylor, 1993). 
2.3.3{d) Spill-over Effects of Fiscal and Monetary Policies in South 
Africa 
The hegemonic monetary arrangement whereby money supply and interest 
rates in the currency union are determined by actions of the Reserve Bank of 
South Africa, acting in the interest of South Africa alone, has a potential to 
raise conflict. When South Africa engages in expansionary monetary policy, 
the ensuing inflationary pressures are transmitted to LNS countries. In this 
respect, LNS countries lose not only their ability to conduct an independent 
monetary policy, but experience money supply effects that exacerbate the 
business cycle. 
2.4 Southern African Development Community 
Originally known as the Southern African Development Coordination 
Conference (SADCC) the organisation was formed by the nine founding 
members States in Lusaka, Zambia on April 1980, following the adoption of 
the Lusaka Declaration - Southern Africa: Towards Economic Liberation. In 
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July 1992, in Windhoek a declaration and treaty establishing the Southern 
African Development Community was signed which has replaced the 
Coordination Conference. 
2.4.1 The Objectives of the Community 
As stated in the treaty the objectives of SADC are: 
• Achieve development and economic growth, alleviate poverty, enhance 
the standard and quality of life of the peoples of Southern Africa, and 
support the socially disadvantaged through regional integration, 
• Evolve common political values, systems and institutions, 
• Promote and defend peace and security, 
• Promote self-sustaining development on the basis of collective self-
reliance, and the interdependence of member States, 
• Achieve complementarity between national and regional strategies and 
programmes, 
• Promote and maximise productive employment and utilisation of 
resources of the region, 
• Achieve sustainable utilisation of natural resources and effective 
protection of the environment and 
• Strengthen and consolidate the long-standing historical, social and cultural 
affinities and links among the peoples of the region. 
2.4.2 SADC Programme of Action 
The programme is made of all the programmes and projects approved by the 
Council of Ministers; The Programme of Action covers the following sectors: 
Transport and Communications 
Food, Agriculture and Natural Resources 





Human Resources Development 
Culture and Information 
Politics, Diplomacy, Peace, Defence and Security, Conflict Prevention, 
Management and Resolution. 
2.5 Convergence in Macroeconomic Stability Indicators 
According to Jenkins and Thomas (1996) convergence criteria were 
envisaged by those who drew up the Maastricht Treaty as a precondition for 
monetary union in Europe. This treaty set outs out the following requirements 
for eligibility: (i) inflation rates must converge close to the average rates 
achieved by the three countries with lowest inflation, (ii) long-term nominal 
interest rates on government debt must converge to a level close to the 
average of those achieved by three countries with lowest inflation, (iii) 
exchange rates must be stable for two years prior to European Monetary 
Union (EMU) without any measures to stop the free flow of foreign exchange, 
(iv) the deficit-to-GDP ratio must not exceed 3 percent and (v) the public debt-
to-GDP ratio must not exceed 60 percent. 
2.6 Convergence in SADC 
There is no a priori expectation of convergence amongSADC countries 
(Jenkins and Thomas, 1996). The main reason is that their economies 
generally, and labour markets are specifically rigid. These countries are 
primary commodity exporters, although some export minerals, others rely on 
tree crops, and others depend on other agricultural output to generate foreign 
exchange. In other words these countries will respond asymmetrically to 
external price shocks. Dividing the SADC into SACU and Non-SACU 
members, the following points have been noted: 
• Both fiscal and monetary policy stances appear to be more cautious on 
average among SACU members than non-SACU members, despite the 
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fact that all non-SACU members except Angola have engaged in 
structural adjustment under IMFlWorld Bank sponsorship; : 
• There is a greater degree of fiscal convergence among SACU countries, 
with the range of . deficit-to-GDP ratios being much closer to the average 
in 1993; 
• There is a greater degree of interest-rate convergence among SACU 
countries, with all five averaging positive real interest rates during the early 
1990s. This is inevitably the result of all but Botswana being members of 
a currency union, and Botswana's having a deliberate policy of the Pula's 
edging up marginally against the Rand; 
• The degree of openness to international trade is on average much higher 
among the SACU countries and 
• In almost all non- SACU members the government owns or part-owns at 
least one of the commercial banks. Some but by no means all state-
owned commercial banks have severe bad-debt problems and in some .· 
countries, but by no means all, banks experience interventions for non-
commercial purposes. 
However, our empirical results have shown similar results for SACU 
countries. Before controlling for the variables that explain the main growth 
determinants, the empirical results indicate no tendency . to unconditional 
convergence in the SACU countries. As indicated in Chapter 9, after 
controlling for variables that explain cross-country differences in the rate of 
technological progress, rates of output growth should converge. The 
empirical results show that growth rates of real GDP tend towards 
convergence after controlling for variables that explain growth determinants 10. 
10 For further explanation see chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
3 MACROECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN NAMIBIA 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims at discussing both the major and minor sectors in the 
Namibian economy. It also sheds light on macroeconomic policies in 
Namibia. Economists have long been interested in the factors which cause 
different countries to grow at different rates and achieve different levels of 
wealth . World Bank World Development Report (1991) highlights the scale of 
global poverty and the importance of economic growth in alleviating poverty in 
developing countries. High growth rates were experienced in East Asian 
countries, while sub-Saharan Africa has achieved low or no growth. In 
Namibia, the last two decades have been identified as decades of no hope to 
the Namibians as the economy was not only sluggish and at certain points in 
time experienced negative economic growth. Determining the reasons for this 
poor performance remains essentially a theoretical and empirical task. 
Namibia is a country of sharp contrasts. From many points of view .it is a 
prosperous middle-income country, its per capita income is nearly US$1200, 
its physical infrastructure is comparable to that of a Western European 
country, its telecommunications system is one of the most efficient and its 
public administration is highly developed (World Bank, 1991). From the other 
point of view, Namibia is a poor country. The majority of the population has a 
per capita income of about US$85 per year and live under primitive conditions 
without adequate housing, potable water, sewerage, health services, or 
education. At independence the Namibian Government has inherited an 
oversized public administration, as well as a budget that was too short on 
investment, excessively focused on a minority of the population and of 
questionable efficiency. The government has been facing four important 
economic challenges since independence: (a) reactivating growth, (b) 
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redirecting and restraining the growth of public expenditures (c) reducing 
poverty and (d) generating employment. 
3.2 Economic Growth, Constraints and Prospects 
Namibia's economy is characterised by its complex nature in that its 
economic activity ranges from traditional hunter-gatherer subsistence to the 
high technology of a modern industrialised sector. The economy's productive 
capacity is based mainly on the mining sector, agriculture and fishing. 
Generally, Namibia's economy has always been very open, the emphasis 
being on primary production for export, while the bulk of processed goods 
required for domestic market are imported from South Africa. Post-World I 
economic growth in Namibia was sluggish, with a downward fluctuating 
tendency prior to 1936, when the Great Depression shut the mines and 
severe drought cast farming into a throttle hold (Kaakunga, 1990). Over the 
period 1936-1962, the economy expanded at a real rate of growth of 8.1 per 
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Since the 1970s the real GDP has barely grown after growing 9 percent 
annually during the 1960s. GDP at factor cost declined steadily from 1980-
1985 and reaching a 20-year low in 1985. Since then, the economy has 
grown slowly and, although real GDP at factor cost in 1989 was 1 percent 
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higher than at the beginning of the decade per capita GDP fell about 21 
percent during the 1980s (World Bank, 1991). Although the slow growth of 
GDP cannot be attributed to a single cause, mining (Namibia's most important 
sector and its perennial engine of growth) performed abysmally during the 
1980s. Save for 1986 and 1988, mining output fell every year of the decade. 
By 1989 its output was some 4 percent lower than in 1980 (Ministry of 
Finance, 1994). 
Agriculture, another important sector, suffered a severe drought that lasted 
from 1982 to 1984. In these three years, agricultural output fell 43 percent 
and, despite a 28 percent increase in 1987, agricultural output in 1989 was 
some 6 percent lower in 1980. The economy began to grow in 1986 owing to 
the mining' sector's strong performance in that year. The growth of 1987 was 
in large measure due to the growth of 28 percent in agricultural production. In 
1989, the presence of the United Nations Transition Assistance Group 
(UNTAG) forces gave a strong push to demand and, save for mining, every 
sector expanded, with manufacturing leading the way. Nevertheless, 
because of the decline in the mining sector, overall GDP growth was only 0.2 
percent. 
It can be seen from figure 3.1 and Table 3.1 Namibia's GDP growth has been 
erratic since 1990, averaging 2.7 percent between 1990 and 1993. This 
reflects the vulnerability of the economy to external shocks because of its 
high degree of openness and its dependence on primary products. The 
opening of two mines in 1991 improved the mining sector's performance. 
With Independence and the concurrent extension and recognition of an 
exclusive 200 (nautical) mile fishing zone, real value-added in fishing 
increased by 23.4 percent 1992. 
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Table 3.1: Selected Macroeconomic Indicators Pre and Post 
I d d n epen ence 
Year GDP Total Interest Inflation Budget/surplus Terms of 
Growth Public Rates Rate as % ofGDP Trade 
Debt 
1987 3.5 794.9 9.50 12.6 -5.3 96.0 
1988 0.9 800.4 12.25 12.9 -6.8 110.8 
1989 1.8 893.6 17.00 15.1 0.8 111 .7 
1990 2.0 714.1 18.00 12.0 -3.8 100.0 
1991 8.2 859.5 17.00 11.9 -1.4 81.7 
1992 7.1 928.8 15.00 17.7 -8.6 80.7 
1993 -1 .7 1326.1 13.00 8.5 -5.8 77.3 
1994 6.6 2026.5 13.00 10.8 -4.9 86.4 
1995 3.3 2556 15.00 10.0 -4.4 86.8 
1996 2.5 3243.2 17.00 8.0 -6.3 89.1 
1997 1.4 2868.7 16.00 8.8 -4.3 79.7 
Sources: NEPRU. (1998) and BoN various issues. 
The growth of general government services surged with the change in 
administration. While fishing and fish processing continued to perform well in 
1993 (growing by 37.3 percent and 20 percent respectively), a precipitous 
decline in mining slowed the economy (a decline of -2.2 percent). This was 
the direct result of a slump in diamond markets, a continued fall in uranium 
prices, and the weak world economy. Mining's poor performance offset the 
increase in real value added of fishing and agriculture. Given a population 
growth rate of about 3 percent, per capita GDP was stagnant between 1990-
93. During 1994 and 1995, GDP expanded strongly by 6.6 percent and 3.3 
respectively, due to a recovery in the international market which boosted 
mining output, particularly of diamonds and uranium. The agricultural sector 
also performed remarkably well in 1994, but output declined significantly in 
1995. In 1996 and 1997, the economy was sluggish, with low growth rates of 
2.5 percent and 1.4 percent respectively. This poor economic performance 
was attributed to a substantially lower increase in diamond production and 
high negative growth rates in other areas such as fishing processing, and 
electricity and water (BoN, 1998). The increase in interest rates towards the 
end of 1996 adversely affected construction activities, as well as on the retail 
trade sector with the higher interest rates dampening growth in consumption. 
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3.2.1 Revenues 
In the early to mid-80s, revenues averaged about 26-28 percent of GDP. 
Payments from the RSA in lieu of customs and excise duties (Le. SACU 
receipts) accounted for the bulk of the Central Authority's revenues. Other 
sources (mainly company tax, special diamond taxes, and administrative fees 
and charges) contributed , on average, less than one-half of the total. In the 
second half of the 1980s, revenues relative to GDP rose by about 8 points to 
38.7 percent (World Bank, 1994). Small declines in SACU receipts were 
more than offset by successive hikes in the sales tax rate, the recovery of the 
mining sector, and higher receipts from taxes on income and profits. Since 
independence, the government has maintained a relatively consistent level of 
total revenue which, expressed as a ratio of gross domestic product (at 
market prices), has ranged between 35 percent and 40 p~rcent. These 
trends in revenue therefore show little evidence of a heightened or lessened 
tax burden. Namibia, like Lesotho and Swaziland relies on revenue from the 
SACU Common Pool, which contributed around 33 percent to total revenue 
for the fiscal years 1995/96 and 1996/1997. 
Table 3.2: Sources of Government Revenue (1994/95 -1998/99) (N$ 
Million) 
199419 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 1998/99 
5 
Tax Revenue 3105.1 3607 4114.0 4536.4 5382.5 
Direct Taxes 1016.2 1088.8 1353.9 1365.7 1785.5 
Indirect Taxes 2059.4 2482.8 2723.8 2723.6 3556.7 
(including SACU 
Receipts) 
Other Taxes 29.5 36.1 36.4 42.0 40.0 
Non-Taxes Revenue 513.5 496.1 498.0 538.4 561.2 
Return on Capital 10.7 7.0 14.0 59.8 28.6 
Grants 34.2 33.0 33.0 64.0 45.7 
Total 3663.2 4143.8 4658.9 5198.6 6107.8 
Source. BoN, 1999. 
3.2.2 Financing the deficit 
During the first half of the 19805, the government deficit averaged about 20 
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percent of GDP, most of it financed through support from the Republic of 
South Africa (RSA). Commercial Banks' borrowing (with RSA guarantee) 
financed about 6 percent of GDP, and as a result, Namibia's public debt rose 
from less than 6 percent of GDP in 1980/81 to 32.7 percent of GDP in 
1983/84. In the second half of the decade, a significant reduction in budget 
support from the RSA forced a sharp decline in the overall deficit to an 
average of 9 percent of GDP, roughly equal to the volume of transfers 
received . The reduction in the deficit was achieved through an average 
increase in revenues equivalent to 8 percent of GDP and an average 
reduction in expenditures of about 3 percent of GDP (World Bank, 1994). 
The external debt ratio has varied between 10-14 percent of GDP with the 
highest level of 14.3 percent in 1992, which steadily declined to 10.4 percent 
in 1996. However, total Government debt in relation to GDP has risen from 
13 percent at the end of 1995/96 fiscal year to 21 percent at the end of 
1997/98. The government deficit ratio has displayed mixed levels during the 
1990s. It recorded 5.9 percent in 1992/93, reducing to 2.4 percent in 1993/94 
and even further to around 2 percent for 1994/95 and 1995/96 before jumping 
to 6.3 percent in 1996/97. The main methods of financing the government 
debt have been local borrowing in the form of treasury bills and government 
stocks. 
At the end of 1996, total outstanding public debt stood at N$3.2 billion, 
representing a 26.7 percent growth, compared with 26.1 percent in 1995. As 
a percentage of GDP, total public debt increased from 21.0 percent in 1995 to 
23.3 percent in 1996. The share of public external debt in total public debt 
continued to decline. It decreased from 19.4 percent in 1995 to 15.0 percent 
in 1996. In 1990 it stood at 94.9 percent. The total public debt situation 
significantly improved in 1997 owing to the cancellation of Namibia's pre-
independence debt of N$1.6 billion owed to South Africa. This led to a 55 
percent decrease in the government's external debt accounted for reducing 
the burden to 10.3 percent of the total outstanding debt of N$2803.1 million. 
Foreign public debt increased by 54 percent to N$545 million in 1998 
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compared with a 25 percent decline in 1997. This significant increase in 1998 
was brought about by disbursements on existing loans as well as new 
borrowing. Accordingly, the share of foreign debt in total public debt rose 
from 12 percent in 1997 to 14 percent in 1998, and, as a ratio of GDP, from 
2.3 percent to 3.3 percent over the same period. 
3.2.3 Investment and Savings 
Increased propensity to consume mirrored a reduction in the willingness to 
invest. Gross fixed investment fell from 27.9 percent of GDP to 16.1 percent 
in 1989, after bottoming at 13.8 percent in 1985, while public investment 
declined steadily throughout the decade to slightly more than a third of its 
level in 1980. Beginning in 1986, private investment recovered mildly, but still 
ended the decade at only half the level of 1980.Since independence, there 
has been a slight change in this trend. During the late 1980s the gross 
domestic savings as a percentage of GDP was very low, falling to 11-12 
percent of 1988/89 from 38-39 percent in 1980/81 . 
Table 3.3: Investment and Savings (N$ Million) 
Public Investment Private Investment Savings, net 
1989 382 685 284 
1990 498 792 1174 
1991 467 530 541 
1992 656 738 752 
1993 556 916 505 
1994 648 991 1375 
1995 603 1093 1455 
1996 661 1173 1504 
1997 720 773 871 
Source: CSB. 1998. 
After Independence the savings/GDP ratio improved substantially, rising to 
20-22 percent. On aggregate, savings in the economy has exceeded 
investments every year since 1981 which resulted in an annual net outflow of 
savings to finance foreign investments. Until recently these funds had to be 
invested within the Common Monetary Area (CMA), comprising Lesotho, 
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Namibia, Swaziland and South Africa. The borrowing of the excess of saving 
over investment since Independence can be attributed to a combination of 
factors including the local investment stipulation for pension funds and long-
term insurers, an increase in private sector investment opportunities, and 
slightly higher levels of public investments and investments by parastatal 
companies. The composition of gross fixed capital formation has been 
dominated by private investments taking in 1996 63.9 percent of total 
investments. The percentage in total investment increased shortly after 
independence, growing at high 40 percent between 1991-1992. But this 
reversed in 1993 and the change in total investment was -19 percent 
attributed to a sharp decline in the private investment. 
3.3 Expenditure on GDP 
3.3.1 Consumption 
Despite stagnant income, private and public consumption rose as a 
proportion of GDP (a striking feature of economic development in Namibia 
during the early 1980s). As a proportion of GDP, private consumption grew 
from 45.9 percent in 1980 to 67.3 percent in 1983, ending the decade at 56.2 
percent. After independence, private consumption as a proportion of GDP 
rose from 52.3 percent in 1994 to 54.9 in 1997. Government consumption 
followed a similar pattern, increasing from 16.5 percent of GDP in 1980 to 
30.8 percent in 1984, before falling to 28.4 percent 1989. In the 1990s, 
government consumption increased to 30.9 percent and 32.0 percent in 1994 
and 1997 respectively. 
3.3.2 Balance of Payments 
During the 1980s the current account of Namibia's balance of payments 
moved from a small deficit in the initial years (1.0 to 4.0 percent of GDP) to 
progressively larger surpluses. These peaked in 1986, when they reached 
N$ 561 million (18 percent of GDP). The balance on the current account 
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contracted after 1986, as the government of South Africa reduced its financial 
transfers to Namibia. By 1988, the current account again showed a negative 
balance equivalent to 4 percent of GDP. The balance of goods and non-
factor services has been negative most years, indicating that Namibia has 
been absorbing real resources from the rest of the world. Towards the end of 
the 1980s, the balance on goods and non-factor services ranged between 5 
and 10 percent of GDP. 
Exports and imports of goods stagnated during the early 1980s but grew 
rapidly late in the decade. Exports ranged from N$940-N$1,100 million in 
1980-1984, to approximately N$2,700 million in 1989, prodded by a 
substantial rise in the price of diamonds. Although imports followed a similar 
pattern, growth during the second half of the decade was less rapid; from 
N$900-N$1,100 million in 1980-1983, they increased to about N$2 billion by 
the end of the decade (BoN, 1992). 
The current account has consistently been in surplus though fluctuating 
between a high 5.2 percent to a low 0.9 percent of GDP during the period 
after Independence. The balance of trade in goods has been positive in most 
years, though in 1995 imports exceeded exports, recovering to a slight 
surplus on the trade in goods account in 1996. The trade in services 
produced a negative balance of considerable magnitude. In 1996, this deficit 
was nearly 20 percent of the total value of imported goods. The balance on 
primary incomes has been increasingly positive mainly due to expanding 
earnings on portfolio investment abroad. Finally, the net current transfers 
largely represent Namibia's share out of the SACU Common Revenue Pool. 
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Table 3.4: Balance of Payments Main Ag~ regates 1991 -1996) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Balance on current 372 247 246 472 113 35 
account 
Balance on merchandise 248 210 426 230 -405 107 
trade fob 
Merchandise exports fob 3376 3825 4221 4794 5076 5801 
Merchandise imports fob -3092 3615 -3975 -4564 -5481 5908 
Net services -938 -976 -823 -774 -922 -
1084 
Net income 268 47 216 237 432 419 
Net current transfers 758 966 785 779 1008 1131 
Balance on capital and -468 -169 -40 -282 -88 -238 
financial account 
Excluding reserves 
Net capital transfers 80 91 88 154 146 85 
Direct investment, net 315 342 152 369 429 584 
Portfolio investment, net -70 45 255 157 393 108 
Other long-term -712 -801 -774 -1224 -1267 -955 
investment, net 
Pension funds -404 -578 -659 -645 -904 -748 
Life assurance -433 -270 -105 -488 -479 -439 
Other 125 47 -10 -91 116 232 
Other short-term -81 154 239 262 211 -60 
investment, net 
Balancing item (net errors 62 -97 -86 76 62 -23 
& omissions) 
Overall balance -34 -19 298 266 87 98 
Change in reserves 34 19 -298 -266 -87 -96 
(In percent of GDP) 
Current account 5.2 2.9 4.7 4.3 0.9 2.6 
Overall balance -0.5 -0.2 3.3 2.4 0.7 0.7 
Source: BoN, Annual Report (1997). 
The capital account shows a consistent net outflow of savings. Namibia 
continues to be an exporter of long-term capital (pension funds and life and 
other long-term insurance), mainly to South Africa this is attributed to the 
limited investment opportunities in Namibia. It is too early to determine the 
extent of the impact of the domestic asset requirements for pension and life 
insurance companies introduced in 1994 on the capital account transactions. 
A net inflow of capital transfers, foreign direct investment (FDI) and portfolio 
investments further typify the capital account. The increasing portion of the 
total capital account is taken by foreign direct investment. The introduction of 
the Namibia dollar and a positive net overall surplus on the balance of 
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payments has built up the foreign reserves to about 6-7 weeks of import cover 
(Van Der Linden et ai, 1998). 
Table 3.5: Namibia: Gross Domestic Product and Expenditure, 1980 -
1997 (Percentages) 
1980 1984 1989 1994 1997 
Private consumption 45.9 65.1 56.2 52.3 54.9 
Government consumption 16.5 30.8 28.4 30.9 32.0 
GDFI 28.0 15.4 14.8 17.6 19.8 
Change in inventories 5.2 1.8 2.5 2.3 1.4 
Exports of GNFS 73.6 54.2 53.9 53.2 52.7 
Imports of GNFS 69.2 67.3 52.7 56.4 60.8 
Source: CBS, (1997). 
The share of both exports and imports to GDP declined throughout the 1980s 
and early 1990s, exports from 73.6 percent to 53.2 percent, and imports from 
69.2 percent to 56.4 percent. The sum of exports and imports relative to 
GDP, a frequently used indicator of the degree of openness of an economy, 
declined from 143 percent in 1980 to 110 percent in the early 1990s. In 1997, 
this indicator increased to 113.5 percent. This indicator suggests a "closing" 
of the Namibian economy in response to the international sanctions against 
the RSA. Classifying the productive sectors into tradable-producing 
(agriculture, mining, and manufacturing), and non-tradable-producing, the 
former bore the brunt of the contraction in output during the first half of the 
1980s, declining by a cumulative 25 percent in 1985. After a marginal 
recovery in 1989 tradable sectors had reached 80 percent of their 1980 
output. The non-tradable-producing sectors, on the other hand, expanded 
their output throughout the decade increasing to 30.8 percent by 1989. 
The preceding analysis suggests two important differences between the 
economy of Namibia in 1997, compared to 1980, (i) Namibians, as in most 
sub-Saharan African economies, consume substantially more and invest 
considerably less of their income now, (ii) Namibians now sell a lower 
proportion of their production abroad and also import a lower proportion of 
what they consume. A sustainable economic recovery will require higher 
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investment rates and a more dynamic external sector. Namibians will invest 
more in their own country if the policy environment is favourable to private 
sector productivity. 
3.4 Monetary Policy11 
Namibia's monetary policy objective has been to support the fixed exchange 
rate between the Namibia dollar and the South African Rand. This policy has 
been effective in attaining the ultimate monetary policy objective of price 
stability, as reflected in a single digit inflation recorded in Namibia over the 
year 1996. The low inflation achieved in Namibia is a reflection of the 
restrictive monetary policy pursued by the SARB to achieve price stability, 
which is transmitted to Namibia via the fixed exchange rate. Namibia's 
membership of the Common Monetary Area (CMA), which has on the whole 
proved beneficial to the country, necessitates a monetary policy that supports 
the fixed exchange rate between the Namibian dollar and the South African 
Rand. 
3.4.1 Money Supply 
The national currency, Namibia Dollar (NAD) was introduced in September 
1993. The Bank of Namibia uses two main aggregates, M1 and M2, to track 
monetary developments. With an average growth rate of 20.2 percent, M1 
was the major driving force behind the increase in broad money supply during 
. 1996 (BoN, 1997). The monetary base consisting of bankers' reserves plus 
currency in circulation increased significantly by 22.5 percent in 1996 
compared with an increase of 10.8 percent in 1995. This growth reflects both 
the increase in currency in circulation and bankers' reserves at the Central 
Bank. These components increased by N$43 million to N$283 million and 
N$49 million to N$214 million. 
1\ Bank of Namibia, unless stated otherwise. 
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The rate of growth in monetary aggregates, which accelerated in the first half 
of 1997, showed signs of substantial abatement in the second half. The year-
on-year growth rate of broadmoney (M2) rose by an average of 23.9 percent 
over the first six months of 1997, compared with an average increase of 18.5 
percent in 1996 (BoN, 1998). In the second half of 1997, the rate of increase 
slowed to an average of 17.0 percent compared with an average increase of 
19.1 percent in the corresponding period of 1996. At the end of 1997, money 
supply increased by a twelve months' rate of 7.6 percent compared with an 
increase of 24.3 percent in 1996. Monetary expansion in the first half of 1997 
was brought about by a faster growth in net credit to government and a 
substantial increase in net foreign assets of the banking system. These 
expansionary forces were offset by a decline in credit to the private sector. 
The abatement in money supply was primarily the result of the banking 
system, partly offset by acceleration in credit to private sector and to 
government. However, from the third quarter of 1998, money supply started 
to pick up again and at the end of December broad money stood at N$8.0 
billion, representing an increase of 10.7 percent over the year compared with 
the growth rate of 7.6 percent 1997. Narrow money supply (M1), i.e. currency 
in circulation and demand deposit, rose by 30.1 percent while quasi-money 
remained more or less of M2 unchanged during the same period 
3.4.2 Exchange Rate Developments 
The value of the NAD, which is pegged to the South African Rand, has been 
relatively stable since its introduction in 1993. The major changes came in 
February 1996, when the value of the NAD depreciated against major 
currencies. The NAD averaged at N$3.66 against the US Dollar during the 
last quarter of 1995, then depreciated to 3.85 in June of 1996 and weakened 
further to N$4.45 at the end of 1996. This depreciation was attributed to 
uncertainty regarding political stability in South Africa. However, continued 
weakening of the NAD in the second half of 1996 was a reflection of poor 
economic fundamentals in South Africa, as indicated in the worsening of the 
current account, higher inflation rates relative to its major trading partners and 
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uncertainty over the exchange control liberalisation. During 1996, the NAD 
weakened from N$6.00 to N$7.79 against the British pound. 
Over 1997, the NAD weakened against the US Dollar by 6.7 percent to an 
average of N$4.61. Against the German Mark (DEM), the NAD strengthened 
over the first three quarters of 1997, which largely reflected the depreciation 
of the mark against US Dollar. However, as a result of a rise in interest rates 
in Germany and a reduction of interest rates in South Africa towards the end 
of the third quarter, the NAD lost momentum against the DEM in the fourth 
quarter of 1997. During 1997, the NAD strengthened by 17.3 percent against 
the DEM. The movements of the NAD against the British pound mostly 
followed the movements of NAD/US Dollar in 1997. Over the year, the NAD 
declined by 11 percent against the pound (BoN, 1997). Reflecting the 
fortunes of the Rand, the Namibia dollar depreciated against the US dollar by 
22.9 percent between December 1997 and August 1998. As capital outflows 
slowed and international market conditions improved, the currency 
appreciated to N$5.89 to the USA dollar by December. This represented a 
year-on-year depreciation of 17.2 percent. The Namibia dollar also 
depreciated by 18.6 percent and 220.0 to the German mark and Japanese 
yen, year -on-year respectively. It weakened by 11.0 percent against the 
British pound. 
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3.4.3 Exchange Controls 
In the mid-1990s, the exchange control regime in Namibia was characterised 
by a continuous liberalisation process, which included divesting greater 
authority to authorised dealers. This move was clearly in conformity with the 
Bank of Namibia's objective of transforming from a regulatory to a monitoring 
authority. To this end, the liberalisation process was initially designed to 
address the South African Financial Rand system, which was abolished 
during 1995. The second phase of the liberalisation process allowed 
institutional investors to acquire foreign assets by way of asset swaps. In 
addition, direct investment abroad by Namibian corporations was also 
sanctioned. 
As a further liberalisation measure, with effect from 20 September 1996 
Namibia acceded to Article VIII, Sections 3 and 4 of the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) Articles of Agreement. IMF members accepting the 
obligations of Article VIII are required to refrain from imposing restrictions on 
payments transfers from current international transactions. Following on this, 
during 1997, the Bank of Namibia (BoN) virtually abolished all quantitative 
limits applicable to international payments for goods and services. The BoN 
has also decided to allow private individuals resident in Namibia to operate 
Foreign Currency Accounts with local authorised dealers or alternatively, 
invest abroad up to a maximum limit of N$350000 . 
. Further, Namibian corporations have been allowed to invest substantial 
amounts in member countries of SADC, dual listing of companies on the 
Namibia Stock Exchange (NSE) and other SADC stock exchanges. To allow 
broader investment by private individuals offshore and to facilitate a greater 
flow of funds, in line with the liberalization process taking place in the CMA, 
the maximum allowable foreign investment by private Namibian residents 
abroad was increased from N$350 000 to N$500 000 during 1999. Long-term 
insurers, pension funds, unit trust management companies and funs 
managers are allowed to acquire foreign portfolio investments by way of 
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assets swaps, of up to maximum of 15 percent of their total Namibian assets. 
Further liberalization continued was for travel allowance and study allowances 
for students studying outside the CMA. The allowance for resident traveling 
aboard was increased to a maximum of N$120 000 per person of 12 years or 
older and N$35 000 per child per calendar year. These limits were N$100 
000 and N$30 000 during 1998 respectively. Study allowances have 
increased from N$100 000 to N$120 000 per annum for a single student and 
from N$200 000 to N$240 000 for a student accompanied by a spouse who is 
not studying. 
3.4.4 Inflation and Interest Rates 
Namibia's inflation rate is largely determined by price developments in its 
imports over 80 percent of which are sourced from South Africa. The inflation 
rate has come down considerably to reach a single digit of 8.7 percent in 
1997 (see figure 3.3). The reduced inflation rate has significantly improved 
the real interest rate, which for the first time since independence in 1996 
reached the two-digit benchmark. In Namibia, the central bank closely follows 
the bank rate set by its South African counterpart. This approach is 
consistent with Namibia's membership of the Common Monetary Area, which 
allows for the free flow of capital between its members. In 1996, however, the 
nominal bank rate diverged from the South African rate by 0.25 percent, when 
the Bank of Namibia took the decision not to follow the increase of 1 
percentage point introduced by the South African Reserve Bank. 
3.5 Social Service Sectors 
3.5.1 Education 
Like in South Africa, education in Namibia has also been in crisis for many 
years. This was due to the spillover of apartheid into Namibia, as Namibia 
was run as the fifth (neglected) province of the former minority white regime in 
South Africa. The budgetary allocations to various education authorities were 
done according to the apartheid policy. The white education authority 
received the largest share in the education budget. Very shortly after coming 
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into the office in 1990 the new government pledged to provide equitable 
access to schooling and from the first year of independence overall enrolment 
increased by 10 percent, which indicated unfulfilled demand for education. 
The number of children in primary school grew at an annual rate of 3.5 
percent between 1989-90. In secondary education, the increase in enrolment 
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The ministry of education is now the largest spending ministry, accounting for 
one-quarter of public expenditure in 1993/94. Public education accounted for 
10 percent of GNP in 1994 (Kaakunga, 1997). The education ministry also 
absorbs a large proportion of public revenue as the result of rapid growth in 
education expenditure since independence. The priority given to primary 
education is reflected in the share of primary education in the ministry of 
education's budget, which has risen from under 40 percent of the total 
expenditure to over 50 percent in 1990. The share of secondary and tertiary 
education fell between 1990 and 1993. Learners in tertiary education receive 
the largest public subsidy (N$ 13080 per student in 1993/94). The public 
subsidy per secondary school learner was N$2830 and N$1370 per primary 
school learner (World Bank, 1995). 
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From Figure 3.3 it can be seen that the expenditure on education has been 
very low from 1980-1983, and has increased from 17.4 percent in 1984/85 to 
27.3 percent 1994/95. Education expenditures averaged at 7 percent in the 
early 80s, increased to an average of 18 percent in the late 1980s, and rose 
again to an average of 25 percent in the 1990s. 
h Table 3.6: Se 00 an !9 er uealon d H' h Ed f E t 1994 nro men s, 
Primary schools (grade 1-7) 367300 
Secondary schools 
Grade 8-10 77800 
Grade 11-12 23900 
Total 469000 
School teachers 15600 
University students 1800 
Polytechnic students 600 
Technical institutes/other colleges 1900 
Source: EIU, 1998/99. 
3.5.2 Health 
The health sector before independence, like education primary health care 
focused by providing high quality curative care access to the minority white 
population to the neglect of the majority of the black population. From figure 
3.4 it can be seen that expenditure averaged 5 percent of GDP in the early 
1980s, and rose to an average of 12 percent in the late 1980s, and 
decreased to an average of 11 percent in the early 1990s. In the early 1990s, 
Namibia has spent about 6 percent of its GNP on public health. Public 
spending on health was increased substantially after independence but has 
stayed level in real terms for the past three years. In 1998/99 the N$713 
million allocated to health (excluding social services) accounted for 11 
percent of total expenditure. But almost 60 percent is absorbed by personnel 
costs, leaving insufficient money for hospital maintenance, medical equipment 
and supplies (EIU, 1998/99). 
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Separating out health care rose from 43.5 percent of the health budget in the 
first year 1990/91 of independence to 56.7 percent in 1993/94. The budgeted 
share slips back to 51.3 percent in 1994/95, although the ministry consistently 
overspends, and, the outturn in 1994/95 could show a continued rise in the 
share of community health. Specialised health care grew at a slower rate 
than community health care, and its share of health services fell from 51.7 
percent at independence to 39.9 percent by 1993/94. The elimination of the 
segmentation of health provision by race, and creation of a unified national 
health system, has reduced the administrative costs of health care. 
Personnel costs as a proportion of the ministry's budget for health services 
have risen from 57 percent in 1990/91 to 62 percent in 1993/94. The rise in 
the share of personnel costs is mainly due to a rise in the number of staff 
working in primary health care, including an increased number of trainees. 
Expenditure on pharmaceuticals has fallen to about N$15 million in 1993/94 
from N$16.2 million in 1991/92, following the adoption of an essential drugs 
policy. Community health based care is a labour-intensive activity, 
particularly trainee nurses contributed to the rise in personnel expenditures in 
the community health services budget from N$43 million in 1990/91 to N$93 
million in 1993/94 and a budgeted N$103 million for 1994/95. The share of 
personnel costs in the community health services budget has risen from 48 
percent in 1990/91 to 51 percent in 1993/94 (EIU, 1996/97). 
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Table 3 7" Health Facilities December 1993 " " , 
Southern Central North-west North-east Total 
Hospitals 19 10 8 5 42 
State 12 8 4 3 27 
Others 7 2 4 2 15 
Clinics 52 36 79 59 226 
State 44 36 77 53 210 
Others 8 0 2 6 16 
Health Centres 9 2 12 10 33 
State 6 2 8 2 18 
Others 3 0 4 8 15 
Total 80 48 99 74 31 
Population served 371 237 676 221 1505 
(,1000) 
Bed capacity 4284 1379 3204 1017 10774 
Bed per '000 11 .5 5.8 4.7 4.6 7.2 
Bed occupancy 37 26 49 55 42 
Source: EIU, 1998/99. 
As of 1993 hospital bed availability averaged seven per 1000 people, and the 
doctor: patient ratio 1 :3,600. However, marked regional disparities remain 
and there is no national insurance provision for Namibians not covered by 
private medical schemes. The incidence of AIDS has increased rapidly since 
the first victims were identified in 1986, and the latest World Health 
Organisation report of November 1998 estimates that 150,000 Namibians -
almost 10 percent of the population is infected with the HIV virus. The current 
five-year national strategic plan of action against HIV/AIDS says the epidemic 
should be treated as a national emergency because of its projected socio-
economic impact, through better integration of regional and local-level 
preventive activities (EIU, 1998/99) . Health services increase the quality of 
human resources both now and in the future. Health expenditures also 
increase the quantity of human resources in the future by lengthening the 
expected working life. Health improvement has one effect that could be 
considered a social cost: by reducing the death rate it increases population 
growth which adversely affects the growth of the economy. 
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3.6 PERFORMANCE OF THE LEADING SECTORS 
3.6.1 Agriculture Growth, Constraints and Prospects 
Agriculture is the largest employer, supporting directly or indirectly some 70 
percent of the population. It is also the second most important sector in terms 
of contribution to exports with a 12 percent share. Extensive stock farming is 
the dominant agricultural activity, accounting for 65 percent of the total annual 
beef output of 77,000 tonnes that is exported mostly to the Republic of South 
Africa (World Bank, 1991). Agriculture and rural development only account 
for a modest proportion of total public expenditure in Namibia. However, it is 
important to consider this expenditure and it's effectiveness because of the 
importance of the sector to the economy, and the dependence of so many of 
the poorest citizens of Namibia on agriculture. 
Agricultural exports (mainly live animals, hides, skins and WOOl) account for 
about 7-8 percent of the total value of merchandise exports and 15 percent 
meat and meat products are added. The contribution of the agricultural 
sector to Namibia's GDP remains, however, relatively modest at only about 8 
percent. Because of improved climatic conditions and firmer prices during 
1993, the real value added in total agriculture grew by 2.9 percent, compared 
with a growth rate of 3.5 percent in 1992. The 2.9 percent growth in 1993 is a 
combination of a 3 percent expansion in commercial agricultural output and 
an estimated 2.5 percent increase in subsistence agricultural output. Due to 
. the drought in 1992, the real value-added growth rate in that year was, of 
course somewhat boosted by emergency marketing and also by 
government's drought assistance (Economic Review, 1994). 
In 1992, probably in an attempt to recuperate the herd after the drought, both 
cattle and small-stock marketing showed strong increases in response to the 
drought, with respective volume increases of 9 and 23 percent. Initially the 
result of late rains necessitated enhanced marketing, which saw a firmer 
marketing effort, and total numbers rose by almost 10 percent. However, 
during the latter half of 1993 it was primarily reflected by stronger average 
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export prices (Economic Review, 1994). In the mid-1990s, agricultural output 
continued to be dominated by the commercial sector, which contributed 66.5 
percent to the total output in 1996, while subsistence farming contributed 31.5 
percent. Its contribution to GDP in 1996 stood at 9.4 percent. This was 
primarily due to livestock producers rebuilding their herds after the serious 
droughts of 1994/95 and 1995/96. It can be seen from figure 3.4 that the 
agricultural contribution to was fairly stable during the 1980s and 1990s. 
Figure 3.4: Agriculture contribution to GDP 
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Land of good quality is a major growth constraint to agriculture, at least with 
present technological knowledge. Although vast and relatively unpopulated, 
two major deserts flank Namibia and the land between them is not prime 
agricultural land. Water is the other major growth constraint. Irrigation 
potential is probably limited to about 32,000 hectares, of which 18,000 
hectares are in communal areas. Owing to evaporation, surface water is 
extremely limited, and the underground water is dropping. Communal 
agriculture, which contributes only 15.4 percent to overall sectoral output and 
which has grown slowly, offers more hope. Extreme inequalities in the 
distribution of resources and access to marketing channels and services, 
have marginalised the vast majority of communal farmers and their potential 
contribution to sectoral output and sectoral growth (World Bank, 1991). 
Key actions to realise these prospects may include the following (i) integrating 
the northern farmers into the national market by opening distribution channels 
in the north and providing extension, and veterinary services to communal 
farmers, (ii) improving the road network in the north for transporting inputs 
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and produce to and from the communal areas, (Hi) relaxing transport 
regulations and (iv) emphasising the production of high-value crops. 
3.6.2 Fisheries Growth, Constraints and Prospects 
Fisheries is the second most important industry in Namibia after mining. It 
reached its peak in 1968 and 1969 with a total catch of fish meal 45,000 
tonnes of fish oil and 4 million cases of canned fish. The fishing industry's 
contribution to GDP expressed in terms of constant (1975) prices dropped 
continuously from N$8.1 million in 1978 to N$7.2 million in 1979 and to N$6.8 
million in 1980. The sector is currently the major contributor to economic 
growth (i) the value of exports of fish is growing at over 20 percent annually, 
(ii) the contribution of fisheries to GDP is increasing, having doubled from 3.9 
percent in 1991 to 7.6 percent in 1994, (iii) the sector has generated around 
6000 new jobs since 1991. After a relatively moderate increase of 5 percent 
in real value added in fishing during 1991, a notable improvement was 
recorded during 1992 with real value added increasing by an impressive 38 
percent. This is ascribed to the greatly enhanced catches of pelagic fish 
species together with a considerable increase in the landings of hake 
(Economic Review, 1993). 
The real value added of the fishing industry continued to make considerable 
progress during 1993, with the growth rate increasing from 23 percent in 1992 
to 37 percent in 1993. The higher growth in fishing in 1993 than 1992 was 
. the result of improved catches of both pelagic and demersal fish species, 
whose respective volumes were 8 and 11 percent above the level in 1992. 
Foreign trawlers in Namibian waters that led to collapse of the pilchard have 
illegally exploited the resources. While there were several peripheral factors, 
two major setbacks can be identified. The first was the licenSing by the South 
African government of two fish meal factory ships in the late 1960s. The 
second was an abrupt cessation of research at a critical moment in the mid-
1970s. The main product of this exploitation, the very dense pelts, were 
exported to China, Europe and Northern America (Kaakunga, 1990). 
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After the near collapse of the pilchard resources in 1980/81 and the closure of 
the four fish processing factories. a very strict and conservative policy was 
initiated with regard to the utilisation of the marine resources. including 
adherence to a six-month catching season. This brought about a slow but 
steady recovery of the resources with a Total Allowable Catch (TAC) set in 
1982 at 30.000 metric tonnes. Special opportunities exist in taking advantage 
of the qualities of the labour at Walvis Bay in serving fishing vessels and the 
fisheries sector generally. a position enhanced by the reintegration of Walvis 
Bay into Namibia. Walvis Bay is developing into the most important fishing 
base in the South East Atlantic. It is one of the biggest fishing processing 
centres in the world in a way that seems likely to make it increasingly 
favoured as a base for vessels operating beyond Namibia and for processing 
catches from waters outside the Namibian Exclusive Economic Zone. 
Figure 3.5: Fisheries contribution to GDP 
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After good improvements in fishing output between 1991-993. the growth in 
has slowed markedly. and in 1996 fish processing output actually shrunk. 
The total catch had fallen to 495,000 tonnes. the lowest since 1990, and with 
virtually no pilchards caught the onshore canning industry was forced to lay 
off half its workforce. However, although white fish activities have continued 
to expand in 1996 hake catches fell by 10 percent to 117.000 tonnes. Since 
1994 export of mainly semi-processed hake to the principal market, Spain 
have exceeded the value of canned fish exports. The industry faces 
continuing problems in the short term owing to unfavourable conditions, which 
caused the virtual disappearance of the pilchard from Namibian waters in 
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1995-1996. The government slashed the pilchard T AC by more than two-
thirds to catch fish in Angolan waters. But in 1996 the T AC was halved to 
20,000 tonnes. In terms of contribution to GDP, it can be seen from figure 
3.5, that the sector's share in GDP in the 1990s has been increasing and 
reached a high level of N$361 million in 1998 from N$129 million in 1991. 
In 1997, oceanic conditions improved and surveys showed a strong recovery 
in stocks, with the exception of mackerel. This enabled the government to 
raise TACs for pilchard and hake sizeably for 1998, and a 25 percent 
increase in hake landings was recorded during the early part of 1998 season 
over 1997. 
Table 3.8: Total Allowable Catches, 1997 -1998 (tonnes) 
Species 1997 1998 % Change 
Pilchard 25000 40000 60.0 
Hake 130000 165000 26.9 
Horse mackerel 3500000 300000 -14.3 
Crab 2500 2000 -20.0 
Rock lobster 260 260 0.0 
Source: EIU. 1998-99. 
At independence the government had proclaimed a 200-km exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ), and banned fishing by foreign trawlers except for those 
chartered by Namibian quota-holding companies. The government maintains 
a strict conservation regime by setting annual total allowable catches (TACs) 
for the main species- pilchard, hake mackerel, crab and rock lobster in line 
with regular fish biomass surveys. New exploitation rights providing 
entitlement to annual quotas by licensees were awarded in 1994, with most of 
the formerly South African-controlled companies being restructured to bring in 
Namibian partners. The sector continues to be attractive to investors over 
400 applications which were received for replacement four-year rights at the 
end of 1997, although only 20-25 were to be awarded. 
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3.6.3 Mining Growth, Constraints and Prospects 
Mining is the backbone of the Namibian economy. Over the past 15 years on 
average it has accounted for: 
76 percent of export earnings 
38 percent of tax revenues 
31 percent of GDP 
18 percent of cash wage earning 
18 percent of gross domestic fixed investment (World Bank, 1995) 
Real value added in the mining and quarrying sector declined during most of 
the 1980s, falling about 27 percent in that period. Mining's relative 
contribution to GDP also decreased, from 43.6 percent in 1980 to 31.7 
percent in 1989, principally as a result of two factors: depletion of high-grade 
diamond deposits - which affected the production of diamonds and the 
imposition of economic sanctions against the Republic of South Africa - which 
affected the demand for uranium. As a result of diamond depletion, the 
average carats content fell from 9 to 5 carats per 100 tonnes. Consequently, 
overall carat production fell by 50 percent, from 1.6 million in 1980 to 0.8 
million in 1990 (World Bank, 1991). 
The mining sector also experienced a sharp decline in its contribution to 
Gross Domestic Fixed Investment. At 1980 prices, investment dropped from 
N$112.4 million in 1980 to N$70.6 million in 1989. During 1982-1986, 
investment in the sector was only N$15 to N$ 40 million a year. The drop in 
. investment activity resulted principally from depressed mineral prices and 
economic uncertainty. The 1988-1989 turnaround was caused by an 
improvement in the prices for minerals/metals. The industry's combined real 
value added rose by 1.6 percent during 1992, markedly lower than the 
increase of 8.3 percent recorded during 1991 . Although a cut in the diamond 
export quota was introduced during September 1992, diamond production for 
the year as whole was still almost 22 percent above that of 1991, which 
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During 1993 the real value added by the mining industry fell by almost 20 
percent, with the output of diamonds alone registering a decrease of 28 
percent. The background to the slump in diamond output is the reduction in 
producers' delivery quota towards the end of 1992 in response to the 
recession in the world diamond market, which in turn led to the downscaling 
of production at the beginning of 1993. In spite of heavy production losses in 
1991 and 1993, precipitated by an oversupplied market from Eastern Europe, 
uranium output held up quite well with only a mild output decrease of less 
than 1 percent being recorded during 1993. Copper, iead and zinc output fell 
by about 5.1 and 25 percent respectively, while in the precious category the 
output of gold and silver was respectively 6 and 18 below their 1992 levels 
(Economic Review, 1994). 
Mining output rose at a reduced rate of 4 percent in 1996 from 5.8 percent in 
1995. This growth was achieved because other mining and quarrying activity 
increased by 6.7 percent, while diamond output rose by only 2.9 percent. 
Compared with the previous two years, growth in the mining industry slowed 
down considerably, declining from 10.5 percent in 1994 to 4 percent in 1996. 
The mining sector recorded a decline in output in 1998. The sector's 
production declined by an estimated 4 percent. The major contributing 
reasons were adverse external factors and the closure of the Tsumeb 
Corporation Limited (TCL) mines. 
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Table 3.9: Production of Ke~ Minerals, 1997 ltonnesl 
Output % Change on Value (US$m) % Change 
1996 on 1996 
Diamonds 1415 2.0 552 1.8 
Uranium oxide 3425 18.7 115 16.2 
Gold (kg) 2433 11 .1 27 0.0 
Silver 43 2.4 6 -14.3 
Copper, blister 22000 6.3 42 16.7 
Zinc, 745600 7 25 47.1 
concentrates 
Source: EIU, 1998-99. 
Prospecting expenditure increased to N$118m in 1996 but fell back to N$97m 
in 1997. Offshore diamonds, gold and base metals are the main exploration 
targets. Diamonds, of which over 95 percent are exceptionally fine gem 
quality, are mined onshore in Diamonds Area One, north of Oranjemund and 
inland along the Orange River by Namdeb Diamond Corporation, in which 
government and De Beers Centenary became equal partners under a 1994 
agreement which also rationalised the diamond tax system (EIU, 1998/99) . 
The development of proven underwater mining technology, mainly, but not 
exclusively by De Beers, and the diamond industry's high profitability in the 
past decade, have made extracting stones from the middle continental shelf 
carats and although the stones are smaller between 0.30 and 0.50 carats, 
they are dominantly gem. By 2000 output was projected to be more than 
double to 2.25m carats annually, mostly from an expansion in De Beers 
Marine's (DBM) large-scale operation at depths of over 100 metres in a 600-
sq-km area mined under contract to Namdeb. This alone would boost annual 
export earnings by some US$200m. However, overall diamond employment 
will decline, as offshore operations are far less labour-intensive than onshore 
extraction. 
After almost halving in 1991-1992 because of weak prices, uranium 
production from the large but low-grade Rossing mine recovered in 1996/97 
to around 70 percent of the operation's 4500 tonnes rated capacity to meet 
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higher delivery commitment. However, renewed price falls led to the delaying 
of further output increases. Another setback to the sector was the decision in 
April 1998 by Gold Fields Namibia (GFN) to liquidate Tsumeb Corporation, (a 
wholly owned subsidiary and a major base metals producer which operates 
Namibia's only copper and lead smelter) owing to accumulated losses. The 
mining activities have expanded into the offshore diamond riches. De Beers 
Marine (DBM) carries out this expansion's large-scale operation. Given the 
95 percent gem content of offshore output, additional export value of at least 
US$150 million is expected (EIU, 1999). 
However, overall diamond employment is expected to decline, as offshore 
operations are far less labour-intensive than onshore extraction. Total 
offshore reserves are estimated at 1.5bn-3bn carats and the high quality of 
stones more than offsets a low average ore grade and small size between 
0.30 and 0.50 carats. De Beers has spent over US$500m on developing 
deep-water mining technology since confirming the presence of large 
deposits on the middle continental shelf at depths of over 100 metres in the 
earlier 1990s. 
As deposits are generally small and widely scattered, some cannot be readily 
exploited. The opening of new mining priorities calls for the most up-tO-date 
technologies and vast amounts of risk capital, while water, power, labour and 
transport facilities must be secured. The political uncertainties that have 
persisted for many years have acted as further constraints. The present 
. policies already provide the economic environment to attract the high-risk 
investment capital required to find and develop new mines. It would help, 
however, if the government were to undertake a marketing programme to 
"sell" the country to outside investors. A key element of this marketing effort 
would be the formation of a private sector-oriented policy, which inter alia, will 
include a clear investment code guaranteeing the safety of foreign direct 
investment and a reasonable inducement package (s). 
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3.7 PERFORMANCE OF THE MINOR SECTORS 
3.7.1 Manufacturing Growth, Constraints and Prospects 
The contribution of the manufacturing sector to GDP for Namibia averaged 7 
percent for the period 1946-1960, 5 percent during 1970-1974 and again 5 
percent for the period 1975-1983. This 1960-1974 contribution is much lower 
than for neighbouring countries (Kaakunga, 1990). The secondary sector is 
dominated on one hand by the processing of minerals, meat and other 
agricultural products, and by enterprises such as breweries, bakeries, 
engineering works, and repair shops, mainly serving local markets on the 
other. 
Manufacturing contributed a mere 4.7 percent to GDP in 1988. However, 
since it employed 9442 people, industry was responsible for about 5.1 
percent of total employment in the formal sector. The real value added of the 
combined manufacturing sector grew by 3.9 percent during 1992, after having 
shown a decrease of 3.1 percent in 1991. Because of the improved pelagic 
fish and hake catches, the canning, reduction and filleting plants of the fish 
processing sector improved their output considerably during 1992. As a 
result, real value added in fishing expanded by almost 10 percent, which 
compares well with the 39 percent decrease recorded during 1991 due largely 
to poor pelagic fish catches. Mainly as a result of a production boost in the 
meat processing industry and moderate increases in other food and beverage 
industries, the rest of the manufacturing sector continued to display a steady 
rate of expansion (Economic Review, 1994). 
During 1992 real value added in the meat processing sub-sector increased by 
3.1 percent, which followed a 5.2 percent increase in 1991 . During 1993 the 
real value added of manufacturing expanded by 10 percent which was 
represented by a 20 percent increase in the output of fish products and an 
almost 5 percent increase in all other manufacturing sectors. The fish 
processing sector was particularly boosted by improvement in the pelagic fish 
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species. The white fish plants also experienced higher output results in 1993 
than in 1992, but the rate of increase was slightly lower. The contribution to 
GDP has been fairly stable during the late 1980S and 1990s, as it can be 
seen from figure 3.7. 
Figure 3.7: Manufacturing contribution to GDP 
Source: World Bank, 1999. 
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In 1995, fish manufacturing output shrank by 43 percent. On the other hand 
meat processing and other manufacturing activity expanded by 3 and 4 
percent respectively, supported by the increase in the sale of cattle by 
commercial farmers during the same year. During 1996, the performance of 
the manufacturing sector has largely been dictated by the growth in fish 
processing output, as meat processing and other manufacturing activities 
have remained fairly stable since 1990. In 1991, when value added in 
processing fell by 34 percent, total manufacturing output contracted by 6 
percent. When processing activity rose by 54 percent in the following year, 
the overall output increased by 16 percent. Likewise, total manufacturing 
. output declined markedly when processing output decreased sharply by 43 
percent in 1996. A 1994/95 census of manufacturing establishments 
identified 280 firms and total employment of over 21000 in the sector. About 
half were employed in the food industry, with metal wood and furniture 
enterprises each employing some 10 percent. At constant prices 
manufacturing's employment rose from 11 percent to 13 percent in 1991 and 
in 1997 respectively (BoN, 1998). 
The manufacturing sector's contribution to total export earnings increased by 
two percentage points to 27.5 percent in 1997 (NEPRU, 1999). This was 
58 
attributed to an increase in the export of prepared and preserved fish by the 
same amount. Fish products constituted 62.9 percent of all manufactured 
exports in 1997, a slight rise compared to 1996. The increased demand 
abroad for other Namibian manufactured products, particularly beer and 
beverages in the South African and Angolan markets, strengthened the 
sector's significance as a foreign exchange earner. The manufacturing 
sector's share of gross fixed capital formation reached 4.6 percent in 1997, 
only very slightly above the previous year's level. The surge at the beginning 
of the nineties was based on investment in fish processing activities. 
Numerous internal and external factors, notably (i) the facts of geography and 
the small, scattered population (the limited domestic market); (ii) lack of 
skilled manpower; (iii) a generally poor resource endowment; (iv) its small 
domestic market, Namibia's manufactured goods cannot compete in general 
with those from the large South African producers (scale economies); and 
membership of the Southern African Customs Union has limited Namibian 
access to low-cost imports from overseas markets, while the country's inability 
to restrict imports of South Africa manufacturing impedes the development of 
the local industry. 
The government has tried to increase the sector's contribution through its 
industrial policy. Legislation has provided special incentives for 
manufacturers and exporters, in particular through the Foreign Investment Act 
of 1990 and the Export ProceSSing Act of 1995. These poliCies are aimed at 
enhancing the sector's role in the economy by diversifying its base. The 
sector is dominated by the food and beverages sub-sector, which is mainly 
dependent on agro-based inputs. 
On the basis of available data, a conscious policy of integrating the 
manufacturing sector with the rest of the sectors in the economy is required. 
Its further development must necessarily be based on expanding upon the 
country's natural endowment, through increased domestic processing of the 
varied natural resources, in order to enhance the value-added content 
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accruing nationally. Other industrial policy issues are likely to be important, 
such as the managerial and technical support for the development of small 
industries, the possible establishment of credit guarantee schemes for small-
scale industries, the regional distribution of industry, training of labour and 
management. 
3.7.2 Tourism Growth, Constraints and Prospects 
Tourism has been identified as one of the fastest-growing industries in the 
world, and contributes more than 9 percent to global GDP. In Namibia, 
tourism is the third largest contributor to GDP. During the early 1990s, the 
sector's contribution to GDP has improved, averaged at 5 percent in 1997 . . It 
is also the third largest foreign exchange earner, after mining and 
manufactured products. Tourism receipts have been valued at approximately 
N$800 million for 1996. The sector contributes more to employment than the 
mining sector with over 15000 direct jobs (Kaakunga, 1999). 





9;)'0 9;)OJ P.><;:) P.>" P.>t'(, P.>" P.>~ P.>~ p.>CO ~ p'>'O 
"C!l "C!l "Cl) "Cl) "Cl) "Cl) "Cl) "Cl) "Cl) "Cl) "Cl) 
Year 
Source: Central Bureau of Statistics, 1999. 
--+- Hotels and restaurants' 
share in GDP 
The sector's contribution to GDP as it can be seen from figure 3.8 has been 
increasing since 1990. It has increased from a low level of N$94 million in 
1992 to a high level of N$171 million in 1998. 
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3.7.2(a) Tourist Arrivals 12 
As a result of political stability, which was brought by independence, the 
number of visiting tourists has increased. The boost has also been 
influenced by the depreciation of the Namibian dollar against world major 
currencies. Most of the foreign tourists come from South Africa, although this 
proportion declined from 60.8 percent in 1993 to 46.2 percent in 1996, while 
the proportion of tourists from Europe increased significantly from 19.8 








Figure 3.9: Tourist Arrivals 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Year 
Source: Ministry of Environment and Tourism, various issues. 
I ~ Tourists Arrivals I 
As cited above, there has been a steady growth in tourist arrivals since 1991, 
a year after Namibia gained independence in 1990. Tourist arrivals stood at 
92000 in 1990 and increased to 190500 by 1991 (see figure 3.9). By 1994, 
the figure reached to 360576, that is almost four times the level attained in 
1990. It can be seen from the diagram that positive growth rates were 
recorded from 1990 to 1997. 
3.7.2(b) 
Revenue 
The Contribution of the Tourism Sector to Government 
Tourism's contribution to government revenue stems mainly from the 
following sources: 
12 This section has benefited from my earlier work on Tourism Sector in Namibia: Potential, 
Constraints and Policy Options, unpublished. 
61 
• Registration and licences of hotels, restaurants and travel agents and 
professional hunters 
• Personal/employment and income taxes 
• Indirect taxes on direct import to the tourism sector 
• Entertainment duty 13 
The airport passenger charges have been introduced for the first time in 
1997. Only the international passengers paid these charges. However, since 
the beginning of 1999, this applies to all passengers. The amount has 
doubled between 1997 and 1998. It is also expected to increase due to the 
wider coverage of passengers for this charge. A second important source of 
tourism-related revenue generation can be found in the hotels and restaurant 
service. The single most important source of revenue in the tourism industry 
is the corporate tax on the accommodation sub-sector. Total estimated tax 
revenue was N$8110795 million for 1991. It increased to N$9972646 in 
1994. Total government revenue increased from 40.5 percent in 1991 to 71.4 
percent in 1994. The estimated revenue stood at N$22242266 in 1997. 
New investments have been undertaken in the tourism sector. Consideration 
has been given to the development of new tourist sites and accommodation in 
Namibia in order to diversify the flow of tourists. Namibia is also focussing on 
a new market sector, namely, that of lUxury tourism, with the Desert Train 
connecting Windhoek and Swakopmund three times a week. This train was 
launched in April 1998. New hotels have been constructed in Oshakati and 
Luderitz. A five star hotel in the City centre of Windhoek is at the design 
stage. The approximately N$200 million project could boost the ailing 
construction sector and also attract more conferences to Windhoek. In 1997, 
the sector was negatively affected by incidents such as the fire at Mokuti 
Lodge, which was reopened following reconstruction and extension work in 
1998. At Okaukuejo rest camp and Etosha Pan National Park, there were 
strikes. 
13 Due to the accounting practice of lumping many taxes together by some of the 
establishments it is difficult to assess the impact of tax categories separately. However, a 
partial assessment can at least be undertaken on tourism activities with reliable data. This 
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3.7.2(c) Community -Based Tourism Development in Namibia 
The community-based tourism development coincides with the worldwide 
expansion of the social approach embracing the concept of community-based 
tourism. It is regarded as a tool for natural resource conservation and 
sustainable community development in the country. Many communities on 
communal land have established or are interested in running tourism 
enterprises. Eco-tourism has potential to be both if it is managed properly. 
Table 310: Tourist Arrivals, 1997 ('000 unless otherwise indicated 
Country of origin Number % of Total 
South Africa 188 37.5 
Angola/ Botswana/Zambia 183 36.5 
Other Africa 13 2.6 
Germany 55 11.0 
UK 13 2.6 
Other Europe 33 6.6 
Others 17 3.4 
Total 502 1000 
. . 
Source: Ministry of Environment and Tourism, 1998. 
Table 3 11: Number of Tourism Establishments ('000 unless otherwise 
indicated) 
Category 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 
Hotels 79 81 84 77 82 
Pensions 18 22 22 19 19 
Rest camps 42 47 55 61 66 
Guest farms 77 93 99 109 118 
Total 216 243 260 266 285 
. . 
Source. MInistry of Environment and Tourism, various Issues . 
limited approach is being applied in this study to examine the various fiscal issues i~ industry. 
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3.7.2(d) Constraints on Tourism Development 
The problem of limited accessibility to the financial markets for investable 
funds constitutes the most critical bottleneck to the industry development. 
The other constraints include the following: 
1. Limited confidence among domestic and foreign investors in making the 
required investment in tourism development especially on a long-term 
basis, 
2. Limited promotion of tourism both internally and internationally, 
3. Need for public and industry education on government policies for 
tourism development, 
4. Piracy of skilled labour from existing tourism enterprises by newly 
established businesses, 
5. Limited co-operation within the industry and 
6. Very limited statistical data on key variables and parameters for detailed 
research on tourism. 
Despite the limitations of data, it has been amply demonstrated in this chapter 
that the tourism industry has been playing an active role in the growth of the 
Namibian economy. Economic benefits, which have been accruing over the 
years, include, inter alia, employment and income generation, foreign 
exchange earnings and revenue accruals. It is obvious that very effort must 
be made by government to educate destination communities as to both the 
socio-economic costs and benefits, which must be minimised and maximised 
respectively in order to accelerate development. There is also overwhelming 
consensus, both private and public, that the sector needs to be adequately 
capitalised in terms of infrastructural facilities and promotional activities in 
order for it to survive the competition,which is likely to emerge in the 21 st 
century. 
Good access roads, water, electricity and public sanitary facilities are primary 
requirements if existing and potential destination is to play effective roles in 
the socio-economic development of the country. Enhancement of inter-
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sectoral linkages, especially development of tourism support industries, must 
be pursued because of their employment and income generation potential 
and the minimisation of foreign exchange leakages. Cases in point will 
include agro-based items (food), high quality beverages and exotic light 
industrial items specially geared towards tourists' demand. An enabling 
investment and marketing environment based on social, political and legal 
considerations or conditions is very important. Economic stability is identified 
as the engine for accelerated investment in the industry. In this regard, 




4 MACROECONOMIC POLICIES IN LESOTHO 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of chapter four is to look at the macroeconomic performance 
and macroeconomic policies in the Kingdom of Lesotho. The chapter also 
examines the impact of the Structural Adjustment Programme policies on 
production relations, and economic growth in Lesotho since its inception in 
1988. The structural adjustment programme is implemented with the support 
from the IMF and World Bank. Was it progressive or retrogressive? The 
chapter also highlights the constraints on the economy of Lesotho. 
4.1.1 Background 
The kingdom of Lesotho is a small and landlocked state entirely surrounded 
by South Africa. The land of the kingdom consists of four topographical 
areas: highlands, foothills, lowlands and the Senqu River valley. About 80 
percent of the population lives in the lowlands and foothills and the productive 
land is found in these two topographical areas. The land in the highland and 
Senqu River valley is suitable primarily for grazing and has low population 
densities. Lesotho is one of the world's poorest countries. The main source 
of national income remains remittances by migrants working in the South 
African mines (WTO, 1998). Lesotho's economic prospects are, however, 
being transformed by exploitation of its rivers to sell water and hydroelectric 
power to South Africa. Agriculture is a declining sector, which has suffered 
from serious droughts in the 1980s and early 1990s. 
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Figure 4.1: Economic Growth in Lesotho 
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Source: Central Bank of Lesotho, 1992; EIU, various issues . 
Since independence the economic performance of Lesotho has been 
severely hampered by three factors: (i) domestic and regional pOlitical 
instability (the latter associated with South Africa's apartheid destabilisation). 
(ii) structural constraints such as poor agricultural performance compounded 
by soil erosion , poor farming systems and low productivity and (iii) poor 
economic and financial management. In the 1970s GNP grew rapidly, at 
annual real rate of 9 percent, due largely to increases in the wages and thus 
the remittances of migrant mine workers. In the 1980s GDP growth slowed 
or average to the same rate as population growth rate (2.6 percent), though 
growth performance has been highly variable during this period (EIU, 
1989/90) . Real contractions were recorded in the early 1980s due to drought, 
closure of the Letseng Diamond Mine and a decline in capital formation due 
to constrained government spending and aid receipts falling in real terms. 
Growth performance during 1988/89, the first year of the Structural 
Adjustment Facility (SAF) supported programme was very encouraging, 
facilitated by favourable weather conditions for agriculture and the 
implementation of the early phase of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project 
(LHWP). In contrast, despite rapid growth in exports, the external current 
account deficit worsened as the programme's fiscal deficit target was not met, 
and domestic credit limit was exceeded. However, in the two subs'equent 
years under the SAF-supported programme, Lesotho achieved notable 
improvements in its economic and financial performance (IMF, 1992). Real 





in the preparatory phase of LHWP, and to continued strength in the 
manufacturing sector, and substantial fiscal and balance of payments 
adjustment was attained . On the supply side, considerable progress was 
made during the three years through 1990/91 . In agriculture, irrigation 
facilities were expanded, while agricultural production and exports were 
encouraged by the introduction of a revolving fund, financed by the United 
Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF), to provide short and long-term 
credit to farmers through the commercial banks. 
From figure 4.1 it can be seen that in 1994, GDP grew by 11 .9 percent in real 
terms. This growth rate was twice that of 1993 and the highest since 1989. 
Also in 1994, net factor income from abroad went up, due to a 9 percent 
increase in mine wages in South Africa. This offset the negative impact of the 
falling number of Basotho migrants as a result of retrenchments and other 
socio-political factors. In 1995, real GDP grew 8.9 percent, while GNP grew 
at 7.4 percent over the previous year. It grew at 10.9 percent and 10.5 
percent in 1996 and 1997 respectively (WTO, 1998 and Central Bank of 
Lesotho, 1997). 
I 
The main determinants of this sustained economic performance were growth 
in manufacturing and construction activities, as well as recovery in agriculture. 
The construction sector was buoyant due to the building of government 
offices, work on the Oxbow-Mokhotlong road and the Mohale access road, 
and the peak activities at both the Katse dam and the Muela Hydropower 
plant. The strong performance of the manufacturing sector, which produces 
primarily for the export markets, can be partly attributed to the depreciation of 
the Rand against major currencies and resulting improved export 
competitiveness. The good rains during the 1995/96 agricultural season 
resulted in a recovery of agricultural output of about 8 percent (Ministry of 
Agriculture, 1997). 
The industrial sector is dominated by manufacturing and construction 
activities. The value added in this sector has been impressive since 
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independence, at which time Lesotho had virtually no industrial base. 
However, while growth in the medium and large scale foreign-owned 
m~mufacturing sector has occurred, there has been no commensurate growth 
in the small-scale sector. Potential backward or forward linkages between the 
foreign and local sectors (e.g. manufacture of packing materials, labels, and 
zippers for the clothing industry) have not materialised (WTO, 1998). 
4.2 Sectoral Performance 
4.2.1 Agricultural Sector 
The agricultural sector continued to be significant and its performance 
fluctuated during the 1980s and 1990s. Agricultural processing expanded 
rapidly in the 1980s with the opening for example, of flour and maize mills and 
a vegetable cannery. The vegetable cannery's output is for export while the 
others chiefly serve the domestic market. The excellent rainfall during the 
1987/88 agricultural year helped to produce good harvest in 1988. Thus, the 
contribution of the agricultural sub-sector of the primary sector to real 
unadjusted aggregate GDP growth at factor cost during 1988 was significantly 
high at 30.9 percent compared with 10.9 percent in 1987 (Central Bank of 
Lesotho, 1989). In 1989, the contribution of agriculture to the growth of total 
GDP in real terms was negative. Estimates show that real value added by 
agriculture declined by 12.3 percent during the year in contrast to a sharp 
increase of 21.4 percent in 1988. 
During the period 1980-1989, real valued added by agriculture is estimated to 
have declined annually by a small proportion on average. The largest drop in 
the value added by agriculture 20.0 percent occurred in 1982 and the second 
largest fall was in 1989. Agricultural production was adversely affected by the 
prolonged drought in 1982 while in 1989 the adverse effect were caused by 
excessive summer rains, early frost, winter drought and cutworm epidemic 
during the 1988/89 crop year (Central Bank of Lesotho, 1989). During 
1990/91 agricultural year output of the five main crops declined in volume 
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terms. This implies in the volume of food imports or a decline in overall staple 
cereal domestic supply, and hence a deterioration in self-sufficiency 
performance. Domestic food production constituted less than 50 percent of 
staple food requirements . Commercial food imports and food aid bridged this 
shortage (Central Bank of Lesotho, 1993). 
Despite the fact that the majority of population reside in rural areas and about 
50 percent depend on crop and livestock activities for their livelihood, the 
contribution of the sector to GDP declined from around 20 percent in 1980 to 
an average of 12.5 percent in the 1990s, with 40 percent attributed to crops, 
although this has fallen significantly (Ministry of Agriculture, 1996a) As a 
result of soil erosion, Lesotho's arable land has contracted from 13 percent of 
the total area in the 1960s to 9 percent in 1997. It is estimated that Lesotho's 
population density per square kilometre of arable land increased from 442 in 
1976 to 740 in 1994. With high dependency on agriculture, especially in 
relation to crop production and declining output in the sector, Lesotho is 
unable to satisfy its domestic food requirements . 
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Food crop production in 1990/91 fell back because of the impact of drought 
and fell further to an estimated 81000 tonnes in 1991/92 when rains generally 
failed. Some limited efforts have been made to diversify into high value yield 
crops for export. Lesotho now produces small amounts of quality asparagus 
and strawberries. 
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Despite the fact that Lesotho is an importer of fruit and vegetable, this 
agricultural sub-sector shows promise both in terms of qualities and 
quantities. The sub-sector has suffered from distortions introduced by 
policies that encouraged cereal growing to the detriment of higher-value fresh 
produce even on marginal lands. Marketing of fruit and vegetables in Lesotho 
has been hampered by various factors such as seasonal variations, lack of 
water and irrigation, poor marketing facilities , inconsistent pricing and 
perceived competition from cheaper products from South Africa. Domestic 
vegetable production is highly seasonal due to the variations in both rainfall 
and temperature. The vegetables both imported and produced for 
consumption are cabbage, which accounts for approximately 50 percent of 
domestic consumption of imports, followed by potatoes, with beetroot, carrots 
and tomatoes also comprising a substantial portion of imports (Ministry of 
Economic Planning and Manpower Development, 1996b). 


























1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 
91.8 149.1 63.4 
nla 8.2 6.9 
8.1 12.0 10.6 
52.0 60.7 6.4 
nla 3.7 4.7 
1.6 2.7 4.5 
0.9 1.4 1.1 
Nearly 60 percent of Lesotho's cultivated land is devoted to the production of 
maize, 20 percent to sorghum and 10 percent to wheat. Farming in Lesotho 
is rain-fed and therefore extremely vulnerable to drought conditions. Lesotho 
has a structural wheat and maize domestic deficit due to growing demand 
and stagnant productivity. The average production of maize over the last ten 
years (103,300 tonnes) has not increased. Cereals are by far the most 
regulated products in Lesotho. Regulations spanning the last three decades 
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gave sole buying, importing and exporting rights to maize, wheat, beans and 
peas to the Produce Marketing Corporation. Prices were set above South 
African prices that themselves were inflated above world prices and which 
until the late 1980s for all grains, beans and peas. Again these regulations 
have been amended in recent years so that now only a reference price is 
gazetted for pulses. The price fixing for cereals was revoked in 1996 ryvTO, 
1998). 
Table 4.2: Estimated Livestock Numbers J'OOOl 
1991 1994 1995 1996 
Cattle 550 600 580 590 
Sheep 1450 1200 1131 1200 
Goats 880 750 749 750 
Pigs 62 60 66 70 
Horses 113 120 120 120 
Donkeys 152 152 152 152 
Source: EIU, 1998/99. 
Livestock herds in Lesotho have not shown any significant increase, as a 
result of the drought of the early 1980s that saw the herd decline to 611000 in 
1983 from about 658000 in 1980. From table 4.2 it can be seen that livestock 
herds increased to 60000 in 1994 from 550000 in 1991. In 1996, livestocl 
herds recorded a figure of 590000. Natural factors including low birth 
weights, low and stagnant production rates, high mortality, and low carcass 
and fleece weights have generally influenced the size and quality of livestock 
in Lesotho. With the easing of drought, however, mortality levels declined 
and the national herd recovered in mid 1990s. 
4.2.2 Mining Sector 
The exploration for minerals has been directed at diamonds, semi-precious 
stones, dimension stone for production of building sandstone, and ceramic 
clays. Mineral output has been very limited in Lesotho. There has been a 
sharp decline in the contribution of the sub-sector to export earnings and 
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government revenue due to the closure of the Lesotho's large-scale mine by 
De Beers in 1982. The revenue from diamond exports duty accounts for 
about 15 percent of total revenue. Diamonds are the principal minerals of 
commercial value. Until 1976 production, largely from small-scale diggings, 
averaged 9000 carats a year. In 1977, the Letseng-Ia-Terae open cast mine 
was opened, involving an investment of M36 million by De Beers. In 1980 
output mostly of large high-quality gem stones reached 105200 carats. In that 
year 55 percent of Lesotho's exports were from the sale of these diamonds 
(EIU, 1998/99) . 
However, operations ceased in 1982, when falling world diamond prices 
rendered the Lesotho mine uneconomic. Some low-grade diamonds 
continued to be recovered by digging corporations in the areas of Lemphane 
and Liqhobong. The diggings produce an average of 500 carats a month and 
employ up to 1400 due to the highly labour-intensive method used. In 1990, 
estimated production was 11400 carats with an export value of M6.3 million. 
In 1994, the mining sector accounted for 0.3 percent of GDP. 
4.2.3 Energy 
Lesotho's energy is imported with oil in a refined form carried from Durban by 
rail and most electricity being supplied by Eskom in South Africa. In value 
terms, energy accounts for 6-8 percent of total imports. It is noted that the 
government is pursuing a policy to exploit Lesotho's largely untapped 
hydroelectric potential to achieve self-sufficiency in energy (EIU, 1996/97). 
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Table 4.3: PrimarY Ene~ Balance, 1995 J m tonnes equivalent) 
Oil Gas Coal Electricity Other Total 
Production 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.35 0.35 
Imports 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.00 0.30 
Exports 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Primary supply 0.13 0.00 .0.06 0.11 0.35 0.65 
Net transformation 0,00 0.00 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08 
Final consumption 0.13 0.00 0.06 0.03 0.35 0.57 
Source: EIU. 1996/97. 
The principal hydroelectric project is the Highland Water Scheme, a joint 
venture with South Africa, whose total cost was originally estimated at US$4 
billion. Water is impounded by the Katse Dam, which started to fill in October 
1995. Construction of access roads and other infrastructure was completed 
in 1991. Major benefits to drive this project include 3700 new jobs, improved 
rural infrastructure in the project area under royalty payments from water 
sales, which are expected eventually to be equivalent in real terms to present 
levels of the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) revenue (EIU, 
1996/97). 
4.2.4 Manufacturing Sector 
Lesotho has a limited natural resource base and, therefore, the development 
. of the manufacturing sector depends on the establishment of labour-intensive 
and export of oriented manufacturing and assembly operations. The 
government has committed itself to creating a framework conducive to the 
growth of the sector, namely, by the pursuit of an aggressive programme of 
industrialisation through private sector investment by local and foreign 
companies. The sector grew at about 1 percent per year in real terms in the 
1970s and at a higher rate from 1981 . Growth in real value added averaged 
12 percent over 1985-1989. In 1991 and 1992, the sector accounted for 15.1 
percent and 15.8 percent of GDP respectively. Total sector employment was 
18000 in 1991 and 12800 in 1992. The sector's contribution to GDP 
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remained stagnant between 1995 and 1996 at 16 percent, although the 
sector's employment rose to 25000 in 1996 (EIU, 1997/98). 
Figure 4.3: Manufacturing contribution to GDP 
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The contribution of textiles, clothing and leatherwear to total value added in 
manufacturing rose to an estimated 35 percent in 1992 from 15 percent in 
1991 and 33 percent in 1993. About 70 percent of all manufacturing jobs are 
in these three sub-sectors. Other companies are involved in the production 
for export of handicrafts, furniture, poultry and tapes-ries or import substitution 
for products such as bricks, candles, beer and beverage, canned foods and 
bread and milk products (EIU, 1997/98). 
Table 4.4: Value Added by Manufacturing Subsector (% of total) 
1990 1991 1992 1993 
Food and averages 55.8 49.8 39.5 50.9 
Textiles, clothing & leather 29.0 36.1 49.9 34.8 
Furniture and fixtures 1.5 1.4 1.6 2.4 
Printing and publishing 2.3 2.2 1.7 2.4 
Chemicals products 2.5 2.7 1.9 2.4 
Non-metallic goods 4.8 4.3 2.9 3.8 
Iron and steel products 1.9 1.4 1.1 1.4 
Others 2.3 2.0 1.5 1.9 
Source. EIU, 1998/99. 
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4.2.5 The Tourism Industry 
Lesotho mainly attracts South African tourists, for which it faces increasing 
competition from other African destinations. The Lesotho National 
Development Corporation (LNDC) has been promoting tourism actively and a . 
number of hotels, mountain lodges and a national park have been developed. 
There were 417000 visitors in 1992. There has been an over-capacity in 
Maseru since the construction of the government-financed Lesotho Hilton. 
The occupancy rate was 30 percent in 1992, compared with 20 percent in the 
1980s (EIU, 1996/97). 
4.3 Social Services Sectors 
4.3.1 Education 
At the end of 1990 Lesotho had 1181 primary schools and 171 secondary 
schools, 6 technical and vocational schools, 1 teacher-training college and a 
University. Most schools are operated by religious missions but receive 
government subsidies. In 1990 nearly 35000 children were in primary schools 
and approximately 45000 were in secondary schools. Students at University 
were about 1000 in 1990 (Ministry of Economic Planning and Manpower 
Development, 1994). 
Figure 4.4: Education Activities in Lesotho 
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The quality of education in Lesotho has been on the decline due mainly to the 
unfavourable learning environment, characterised by severe overcrowding, 
especially in the lowest standards in primary schools caused mainly by severe 
shortages of teachers and classrooms 1990. The pupil/teacher ratio has 
increased from 48: 1 in 1980 to 55: 1 in 1990 but considered significantly 
higher than the ratio believed by the government to provide manageable 
education (Ministry of Economic Planning and Manpower Development, 
1994). The pupil/teacher ratios are even higher in the lowest standards 
where rates of wastage (dropouts and repetition) are highest and where the 
least qualified teachers tend to be assigned. The pupil/classroom ratios 
reflect an even worse situation with the average number of about 67 students 
sharing a classroom. Education and healthcare combined accounted for an 
estimated 36 percent of total recurrent expenditure in 1996/97 compared with 
31 percent in 1991/92 (EIU, 1998/99). 
4.3.2 Health 
While Lesotho remains free from diseases that are common in tropical Africa, 
e.g. malaria, and schistosomiasis, diseases associated with poverty, poor 
sanitation, lack of safe drinking water and general ignorance are widespread. 
Tuberculous remains the main cause of death amongst adult patients while 
diarrhoea associated with gastro-enteritis has been the main cause of death 
among children under five years of age. A world wide epidemic of Aids is the 
latest killer disease. Changing trends in the traditional social support system 
have in the recent past resulted in an increase in the volume, scope and 
complexity of social problems (Ministry of Economic Planning and Manpower 
Development, 1994). There is one doctor for every 14000 inhabitants and a 
nurse for very 3000 people. Life expectancy at birth is 54 for men and 58 for 
women. The country's crude birth rate per 1000 is 38 while the crude death 
rate per 1000 is 12. 
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4.4 Macroeconomic Policies 
4.4.1 Fiscal Policy 
The government's financial position has deteriorated since 1980/81, with a 
substantial increase in short-term borrowings to finance the deficit. . The 
budget deficit (M250 million, net of grants) rose to 35 percent of GDP in 
1986/87, due to some rather optimistic assumptions of the completion of the 
Highland Water Scheme. First estimates of the outturn suggest that the 
capital expenditure figure was some M200 million under budget, and the 
deficit closer to M120 million or 17 percent of GDP. The tax rate was raised 
from 6 percent to 8 percent in 1985/86, but total revenue from the tax was 
expected to fall in the future with the introduction of exemptions on basic 
commodities in October 1987. While current revenue has fallen in real terms, 
recurrent expenditure has continued to increase rapidly due to increased 
allocations for security and defence. Estimates for 1983/84 and 1984/85 for 
capital spending were respectively M137 million and M119 million, with 
respective outturns at M64 million and M93 million. This was due to over 
estimations of the government's implementation capacity, and the flow of 








Figure 4.5: Government Budget 
Year 
-+- Overall Budget (% of 
GDP) 
Source: World Bank, 1999. 
Disbursed public external debt nearly trebled between 1980 and 1986, 
reaching US$182.1 million equivalent to about 30 percent of GNP. Public 
external debt service rose almost fivefold in two years, from US$4.4 million in 
1981 to US$21 million in 1983, but the debt service remained low at 4.5 
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percent due to the high proportion of concessional loans - 70 percent of 
disbursed long-term public external debt in 1983. In 1985 and 1986 debt 
service declined (Government of Lesotho, 1996). In the latter year US$14 
million was paid in principal and interest, and the debt service ratio stood at 
just 4.2 percent. In 1997, the debt in loti terms increased sharply from M659 
million to M924 million in 1990. Despite the indebtedness of Lesotho during 
the 1980s, the debt service ratio was low at 2.4 percent in 1990. 
The macroeconomic improvements recorded in recent years have been 
spearheaded by improved fiscal discipline. The 1988 adjustment programme 
was originally triggered by the fiscal imbalance caused mainly by a rise in 
military expenditure that assisted to push to 20 percent of GDP (10 percent of 
GNP). The scope for corrective exchange rate and monetary policies was 
limited given Lesotho's membership in the regional customs and monetary 
unions. The only significant short-term means of correcting the imbalance 
was reducing public expenditure and increasing revenue. In that respect, the 
stabilisation measures were successful and the fiscal deficit turned into a 
surplus during the 1990s (see figure 4.5). 
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Table 4.5: Government Budgetary Operations, 1992 - 1997 (Maloti 
Million) 
92/93 93/94 94/95 95/96 96/97 
Total receipts 1161.4 1400.3 1844.8 2036 2235.8 
Revenue 1019.6 1262.9 1438.5 1861.6 2044.1 
Customs 
Qrants 
547.7 746.9 840.9 906.5 1006 
141 .8 137.4 143.6 163.2 191.7 
Total expenditure 1085.2 1250.7 1432.8 1736.5 2282.9 
recurrent 723.9 842.1 994.1 118.1 1367.6 
capital 
361 .3 408.6 438.7 618.34 915.3 
Overall balance (incl. 76.2 149.6 149.3 108.3 -47.1 
Grants) 
Government savings 285.7 420.8 444.4 563.5 676.3 
financing -76.2 -149.6 -149.3 -108.3 47.1 
foreign 140.8 167.7 103.2 211 .2 185.2 
domestic, net -217 -317.3 -252.5 -319.5 -138.1 
bank finance -262.6 -328.2 -277 -309.7 -175 
other 45.6 10.9 24.5 -9.8 -16 
As percentaQe of GNP 
Total receipts 35.0 36.8 36.9 38.2 30.7 
Total expenditure 32.7 32.8 33.4 35.9 37.1 
Government savings 8.9 11.0 10.4 11.7 11.0 
Source: WTO, 1998. 
Like other SACU members, Lesotho relies on SACU as a source of budgetary 
revenue. During the 1990s SACU receipts have accounted for more than 50 
percent of Lesotho's total budgetary revenue, and more than 70 percent of 
recurrent expenditure. These SACU revenues to Lesotho have been 
significantly influenced by LHWP-related imports. In terms of tax revenue, 
. the share of SACU receipts in Lesotho is the highest among all the SACU 
members. This situation is not obviously sustainable. SACU revenues are 
likely to decline as SACU lowers its customs duties under its committed 
programme of trade reforms, any change in the revenue formula, and in the 
compensation to the BLNS countries is a central issue in the ongoing SACU 
renegotiations. However, Lesotho is expected to raise more revenue the 
export of water. From Table 4.5, total receipts as a share of GDP has been 
fairly stable at 35.5 percent between 1992 and 1997. While total expenditure 
as a share of GDP has averaged at 34.4 percent during the same period. 
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Government saving as a share of GDP was 8.9 percent and 11 percent in 
1992/93 and 1996/97 respectively. 
Recent fiscal policies have focused on boosting non-customs revenues in 
order to absorb the impact of the expected declining SACU receipts. The 
external debt rose from about M1 billion to almost M1.9 billion in the period 
1991 to 1995, largely because of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project 
(LHWP). Its overall public debt has been financed through external and 
domestic sources. Concessional loans constituted 84 percent of the external 
public debt in 1991, rising to 88 percent in 1995. 
4.4.2 Monetary Policy 
Lesotho is a member of the Common Monetary Area (CMA), therefore, her 
currency the loti is pegged to the South African Rand at par. The Central 
Bank of Lesotho (CBL) is responsible for monetary policy and with the 
Reserve Bank of South Africa determines exchange rate policy for the 10tL 
The Central Bank also controls external currency transactions and delegates 
to commercial banks the authority to approve certain types of current 
payments up to set limits. It also issues licences to financial institutions 
accepting deposits, insurance companies, brokers and agents. 
4.4.2(a) Money Supply 
The monetary aggregates increased considerably less quickly in 1983 than 
they had done in 1982. Money, which comprises Maloti with the public and 
demand call deposits with commercial banks, rose by M9.2 million or 11 .9 
percent during 1983. At the end of 1983 Maloti with the public amounted to 
M23.1 million or 29.8 percent higher than 1982. Quasi-money grew by M24.7 
million during 1983, a rate of increase of 22.8 percent per annum. Money 
supply, which covers quasi-money plus money, increased by M33.9 million in 
1985 an annual rate of growth of 18.3 percent (Central Bank of Lesotho, 
1986). In 1989 money supply increased by M65.8 million or 13.4 percent to 
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M555.8 compared with 26.6 percent rise observed in 1988. Currency in 
circulation (excluding Rand) increased by M11.5 million or 27.4 percent to 








Figure 4.6: Money Supply 
1988 19891990 1991 1992 19931994 19951996 1997 
Year 
Source: World Bank. 1999. 
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Money supply (M2) in 1990 increased by 8.4 percent to M602.6 million, 
significantly lower than the growth of 13.4 percent recorded in 1989. The 
deceleration was mainly a result of a slowdown in the rate of growth of 
deposits coupled with an even slower rate of growth in Maloti in circulation. 
Compared with the rate of inflation measured by the mean annual growth rate 
in money supply, the growth was 3.1 percentage points below the inflation 
rate (Central Bank of Lesotho, 1990). In 1992, money supply (M2) continued 
to demonstrate an upward trend. At the end of the year M2 stood at M741.7 
million representing an annual increase of M63.3 million or 9.3 percent. This 
is compared with an annual rise of 9.6 percent in 1991 and 11.1 percent in 
1990. 
4.4.2(b) Prices 
Imports from South Africa make up more than 70 percent of the basket of 
goods and services from which Lesotho's consumer price index (CPI) is 
compiled. Therefore, price developments follow more or less the trend in 
South Africa. Nevertheless, divergence may occur because differences in the 
weighting of goods in Lesotho's CPI is biased towards basic commodities , 
such as food, while in South Africa's CPI is weighted favour of manufactures. 
Therefore, during periods of drought, food prices escalate and Lesotho's CPI 
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rises above that of South Africa; the opposite occurs when good rains allow 
for good ag ricultural harvest. 
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Figure 4.7: Consumer Prices in Lesotho 
1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Year 
\-+-Inflation Rate \ 
Source: World Bank, 1999. 
During the late 1980s there was a substantial abatement of the inflation rate, 
particularly between 1987 and 1988 compared with 1986. The annual 
average inflation rate declined from 18.1 percent to 12.2 percent in 1987, and 
increased to 12.5 percent in 1988. The rapid decline in the rate of inflation 
was largely due to the exemption of basic commodities from the sales tax 
(Central Bank of Lesotho, 1988). However, it climbed back to 14.9 percent in 
1989. In 1992 it reached a highest level of '16.4 percent but started to decline 
in 1993 and reached single digits in 1994. 
4.4.2(c) Interest Rates 
Interest rates in Lesotho move in line with those in the Common Monetary 
Area (CMA), particularly in the South African markets. The general pattern of 
interest rate changes in 1983 was characterised by a sharp decline in the first 
quarter, followed by a riSing trend during the rest of the year. This pattern 
matched that of South African interest rates which have greater impact on 
interest rates in Lesotho (Central Bank of Lesotho, 1983). The Central 
Bank's call deposit rate increased by 3.3 percentage points to 16.8 percent in 
1989. At this level it was about three percentage points lower than the 
corresponding rate in South Africa. During 1992 and 1993, the domestic 
money market rates declined in line with the developments in the South 
African money markets. The domestic prime rate was reduced twice by 1 
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percentage point on each occasion in February and November to close at 14 
percent at the end of 1993. Therefore, the domestic prime rate was 1.25 
percentage pOints below the corresponding South African rate. In response 
to these changes the commercial banks reduced their lending rates. 
Figure 4.8: Interest R~tes 
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Source: Quarterly Review, various issues, Central Bank of Lesotho. 
In 1996, in line with developments in South Africa, the Central Bank raised its 
rates on surplus funds by between 1.35 and 2.75 percentage points. Thus, 
the call and the 31day deposit rates were raised to 13.75 percent and 14.20 
percent respectively. Similarly, the commercial bank interest rates were also 
adjusted upwards. In the last quarter of 1999, the money market interest 
rates continued on the declining trend. This was made possible by favourable 
macroeconomic developments in Lesotho and the rest of the region. Prime 
lending rates fell by 0.66 percentage point to 17.67 percent point compared to 
a 1.00 percentage point in South African rates. Central Bank's rates also 
showed a declining during this period, with the call rate falling from 9.38 
percent to 8.88 percent (Central Bank of Lesotho, 1999). 
4.4.2(d) Exchange Rate Movements and Trade 
There has been a progressive increase in Lesotho's non-Rand foreign 
exchange transactions, with a growing deficit since 1992 as a result of an 
increase in flows associated with the Lesotho Highlands Water Project 
(LHWP). Receipts peaked at M86.2 million in 1990 and dropped to M76.7 
million in 1995. Export receipts recorded accounted for 31 .3 percent in 1995, 
significantly higher than the shares of 14.1 percent and 7.5 percent in 1994 
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and 1993 respectively. Foreign exchange payments have been growing 
steadily since 1989. 
Table 4.6: Summary of Non-Rand Transactions, 1991 - 1996 (Maloti 
Million) 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Receipts 74.1 82.7 77.7 81 .8 76.7 152.0 
Export 2.4 1.7 5.8 11 .5 24.0 54.7 
Other 71.7 81 .0 71 .9 70.3 52.7 97.3 
Payments 99.2 97.3 141 .6 157.7 170.2 225.9 
Imports 16.4 28.6 85.6 89.2 81 .7 132.8 
Other 82.8 68.7 56.0 68.5 88.5 123.1 
Surplus/Deficit -25.1 -14.6 -63.9 -75.9 -93.5 -103.9 
Source: WTO, 1998. 
The loti has depreciated considerably against the US dollar since 1992; there 
was a deceleration in the depreciation rate over 1994/95, but there was again 
a sharp fall in 1996. The depreciation of the loti has probably been a factor in 
the growth of manufacturing. The sector, particular clothing, footwear and 
consumer electronics, has been the fastest growing of the economy. Its 
contribution to GDP rose from 7 percent in 1983 to 14 percent in 1994. 
These sub-sectors' contribution to total merchandise exports increased from 
60 percent in 1993 to more than 86 percent in 1994 (Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development, 1996). 
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4.5 Foreign Trade and Investment 
Since the 1960s, the pattern of merchandise trade has been stable with 
imports considerably outweighing exports. The economy is highly import-
dependent, with respect to both consumer goods and production inputs. 
Total imports were 120 percent of GDP in 1995. The merchandise exports 
have been dominated by food and live animals, crude materials and 
manufactured goods. Diamond exports were relatively significant until the 
closure of the Letseng-Ia-Terai mine in 1982. Exports of miscellaneous 
manufactured products, especially textiles, clothing and footwear, steadily 
expanded from M129.3 million in 1991 to M583 million in 1996 to dominate 
Lesotho's merchandise exports. 
Figure 4.10: Exports in Lesotho 
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Source: World Bank, 1999. 
The merchandise trade has remained unchanged over the past five years. In 
exports, the largest share goes to Africa, especially to the SACU market. In 
. 1995, exports to Africa constituted 53 percent of total exports, with most going 
to SACU. Over the period 1991-1995 exports to Europe peaked in 1993 at 
M82.6 million but fell to M53.2 million in 1994. The increase in 1995 was 
M1.1 million. Foreign investment originates primarily from South Africa and 
East Asia. Most of the South African investment is aimed to serve the South 
African market, while the bulk of Asian investment goes to light manufacturing 
activities targeted at extra-SACU markets. Over the last decade, the stock of 
inward foreign direct investment (FDI) has grown faster in percentage terms in 
Lesotho than in other BLNS (Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland) 
countries. 
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4.6 Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) 
As response to the economic crisis of the 1980s, the government of Lesotho 
with the support of the IMF, launched a structural adjustment programme 
(SAPs) in 1988 which sought to increase the efficiency of the public sector 
and improve opportunities through tax reform and streamlined investment 
incentives. Structural adjustment policies are designed to address the long-
term growth issues through better supply responses to market liberalisation 
and efficient macroeconomic management. In their institutional form, the 
SAPs are aimed at achieving three major objectives. These are: 
• Macroeconomic stability 
• The need for prices to reflect relative scarcities and 
• On reduction in the role of government in economic affairs (Demery, 1994) 
To achieve the objectives of SAPs, the primary policy instruments employed 
are: 
1. Exchange rate adjustment, primarily devaluation 
2. Control of the money supply and credit ceilings 
3. Interest rate policy, allowing interest rates to respond to market forces 
4. Debt scheduling 
5. Fiscal policy including measures to reduce public expenditure and 
mobilise resources 
6. Deregulation of prices of goods, services and factor inputs 
7. Liberalisation of trade and payment arrangements; and 
8. The reform of institutions with an emphasis on building capacity for policy 
analysis for implementing public investment and privatisation of public 
assets 
But Lesotho launched Comprehensive Adjustment Programmes, which 
include the following policies 
• Deregulation of prices of goods, services and factor inputs 
87 
• Fiscal policy including measures to reduce public expenditure and 
mobilise resources 
• The reform of institutions with an emphasis on building capacity for policy 
analysis, for implementing public investments and privatisation of public 
assets. 
In 1992, the Southern African region experienced considerable drought 
which, combined with the world recession, resulted in a marginal or negative 
growth rate in some countries. In 1993, there was a marked improvement in 
performance with Lesotho achieving , growth rates of more than 6 percent. 
Large fiscal deficits indicate the extent of government failures to achieve fiscal 
balance. There have been improvements in the economic situation 
compared to the pre-adjustment period. Between the mid-1980s and 1993, 
Lesotho showed major improvements in her fiscal performance. Lesotho's 
fiscal deficit declined from 30 percent of GDP in 1987 to almost a balanced 
budget by 1993. 
The impact of SAPs on the fiscal deficit is determined through a set of 
conditions, including the reduction of government spending. It has also been 
increasingly recognised that unless the role of government is limited to those 
activities where market failures predominate, growth of the private sector 
could be crowded out and stifled. Apart from the reductions in government 
expenditures, maintaining a healthy fiscal balance also necessitates 
measures to increase revenues. Lesotho has experienced modest increases 
in revenues during the adjustment period. There have been serious attempts 
to reduce the rates of inflation. However, the degree of success has varied 
from one country to another. The inflation rate has been reduced in Lesotho 
during the adjustment period and has reached a single digit of 9 percent in 
1995 and 1996. 
Increasing investment in the productive capacity of any country is considered 
central to long-term economic transformation and sustainable growth. During 
the adjustment period, Lesotho had the highest share of gross domestic 
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investment in GDP in the world, which had risen from approximately 49 
percent in 1988 to approximately 76 percent by 1993. This has been 
attributed to massive investment in the Lesotho High Water Project 
(Peterson, 1993). In Lesotho, the terms of trade started to deteriorate around 
the mid-eighties and continued through to the early nineties. Promoting 
growth and diversifying exports have been central to SAPs. Lesotho has also 
experienced rapid growth in the value of its exports. 
In sum, the overall economic and financial performance of Lesotho under the 
SAPs has been satisfactory. Real GDP growth averaged 5.5 percent during 
the period 1988-95, while real GNP averaged only 2.1 percent as a result of a 
decline in remittances by Basotho migrant workers in South Africa. Gross 
domestic investment rose to about 38 percent of GNP in 1993/94 mainly as a 
result of investments related to the Lesotho Highland Water Project (LHWP) 
and those made in the manufacturing sector by private investors. The current 
account deficit declined to 2 percent of GNP in 1993/94, and foreign 
exchange reserves rose from one month of imports in 1988/89 to 45 months 
at the end of 1993/94 (WTO, 1998). External factors such as favourable 
climatic conditions or the impact of the Lesotho Highlands Water Project 
(LHWP) are obviously more important factors of this performance. 
Conversely, progress in the restructuring of the state owned industrial and 
banking sectors has been very slow. 
The Kingdom has maintained the SAP during 1995/96-1997/98 with the aim 
of achieving a current deficit not exceeding 2 percent of GNP as well as 
maintaining the momentum already achieved in increasing official foreign 
exchange reserves. In addition, investment as a share of GNP is being 
maintained at the level of 5.5 percent of which 20.9 percent is related to 
LHWP activities. It was also projected that the national savings ratio will 
average 37.8 percent of GNP, thus narrowing the gap between investment 
and savings. 
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4.7 Constraints on Economic Transformation 
The pattern of Lesotho's economic transformation is constrained by certain 
weaknesses, which have placed a strain on domestic human and institutional 
capacity. Lesotho is in need of entrepreneurs as well as of technical and 
managerial manpower. The general lack of an entrepreneurial class has 
meant that the manufacturing sector is almost entirely foreign owned and 
characterised by weak linkages with the rest of the economy (Central Bank of 
Lesotho, 1996a). The shortage of adequate managerial and technical 
personnel in the public sector has affected the quality of administration, 
absorptive capacity and ability of the sector to initiate, plan, implement and 
monitor projects (Government of Lesotho, 1995). On the other hand, the 
shortage of technical and scientific manpower has resulted in limited 
implementation of engineering projects and consequent absence of capacity 
to support the agricultural sector with the necessary inputs, and the industrial 
and service sectors with appropriate technical know-how. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
5 ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN SWAZILAND 
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to shed light on the performance of the 
economy in the Kingdom of Swaziland. Chapter five begins with a review of 
various sectoral performances and their contribution to the country's 
economic performance. Recent developments in macroeconomic policies are 
also discussed in this chapter. The chapter concludes with a discussion on 
the constraints facing the economy of Swaziland. 
5.1.1 Background 
Swaziland is a small landlocked country bordered by South Africa and 
Mozambique, with a population of just below 1 million and a per capita GNP 
of US$840. A feature of the economy at independence was the close 
linkages to South Africa. Whilst most exports went outside the region, nearly 
all imports came from South Africa (91 percent in 1968). Of great 
significance was the fact that Swaziland was a member of the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) and the Rand Monetary Area (RMA) which 
was formalised only in 1975, what later became the Common Monetary Area 
(CMA). Although there were undoubted advantages from this association, 
membership prevented Swaziland from developing its own monetary policy 
and trade policies so it was not possible to protect potential domestic 
industries or follow an independent exchange rate policy. 
Prospects for economic growth at independence were for a significant 
slowdown after rapid rates of the early 1960s. No major new investments had 
been identified and the water resources were not sufficiently documented to 
enable the planning of new irrigation schemes to commence. Despite 
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Figure 5.2: Agriculture contribution to GDP 
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Source: World Bank, 1999. 
5.2.1 (a) Sugar 
Commercial farmers primarily produce the country's major export earner on 
TDL. The rapid growth of the value of exports in the late 1970s prompted the 
establishment of a third mill. After 1981, however, the persistence of high 
world stocks depressed prices throughout the mid-1980s. The industry 
benefited from the bumper crop of 1986, when production reached a record 
506,349 tonnes. In subsequent seasons production has established a new 
average level of some 437,000. By 1991, sugar cane output was still below 
the record 506,349 metric tonnes reached in 1986. About a third of total 
output is exported, mainly under contractual terms, to the EC - under the 
Lome Convention - Canada and the USA (EIU, 1998/99). 
Sugar production for 1997/98 remained at the previous year's level, recording 
475727 metric tonnes. Despite the good rains, which improved water levels 
in dams, the industry failed at full capacity (500 000 metric tonnes). This was 
due to the February mass stayaway which affected sugar cane production. 
Local sales volumes for 1997/98 show an increase of 15.6 percent compared 
to the previous year. Industrial users attribute this increase to high demand 
for refined sugar. A new customer in the blending industry entered the 
market thereby increasing demand for sugar and Cadbury, a sweets 
manufacturer, expanded its operations. Concurrently demand by domestic 
users decreased by 9.7 percent. The decrease was due to the narrowing 
price differential between the South African and Swaziland sugar. The 
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narrow price differential reduced the incentive to buy sugar for resale in South 
Africa. 
bl 51 S P d f d Sales 1992 1998 Ta e . ugar ro uc Ion an -.. 
1992193 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
Production 495750 457268 485151 421997 
Sales volume 
Exports 
Canada 55721 29400 14700 na 
E.U. 122340 120690 135610 120000 
Portugal 38350 na 26000 60000 
U.S.A. 17525 14650 19270 16500 
Other exports 134270 145220 96288 60000 
Total exports 368206 309960 291868 256500 
Local sales 80475 102311 173446 182272 
Domestic use na na 38531 49289 
Industrial use na na 134915 132983 
Total 448681 412271 465314 438772 
. . 
Source: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1998 . 













The volume of exports increased by 12.7 percent from the 1996/97 figure. 
This was mainly because of an increased demand by the USA and regional 
markets. Sales into the region increased due to the revival of the South 
African market. During the year, South Africa suffered production shortfalls, 
which resulted in some imports by Tongaat Hulet, a major South African 
sugar producer. Despite a strong campaign by the labour unions in the 
United States of America to impose sanctions on Swaziland's exports under 
the Generalised Systems of Preference (GSP), sales to the USA increased to 
record 27642 metric tonnes. This was mainly a result of failure by other 
countries to supply their sugar quota to the U.S.A. Sales to Canada 
continued to be suspended due to the high demand from the domestic market 
and better price offers from other markets (Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development, 1998). 
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The European Union continues to be the main market taking the largest share 
of total international exports. Sales to the Special Preferential Sugar market, 
which includes Portugal and Finland, decreased by 25 percent as a result of a 
fall in demand by refineries in these countries. However, the depreciation of 
the rand increased sugar earnings thus offsetting the negative effects of lower 
export volumes. Major developments in the sugar industry in 1997 include the 
take-over of Lonrho at Ubombo Ranches by lIIovo, South Africa's largest 
sugar producer. This change of ownership is expected to have a great impact 
on the regional sugar industry since lIIovo's control stretches to include 
Malawi, Mozambique and Mauritius. 
5.2.1(b) Maize 
The main crop on Swazi Nation Land (SNL) is maize, accounting for about 80 
percent of cultivated area. Productivity has been generally low and 
production has been characterised by extreme fluctuations . caused by 
weather shocks. The drought of the early 1980s, although not as severe as 
elsewhere in the sub-region, exacerbated an existing trend of falling food self-
sufficiency. During 1981-1983 there were large increases in food imports as 
the maize crop, most which is produced by peasant farmers on Swazi Nation 
Land (SNL), fell. The importation of unpopular yellow maize prompted maize 
producers to plough early and increase the area under cultivation in 1983/84 
and they were rewarded by good harvests as the drought ended. SNL 
production rose from 45000 to 110170 tonnes. The country continues, 
however, to import maize. This is partly attributable to poor storage and 
marketing facilities. In 1987/88 the crop was hit by poor rains and drought, 
production on Swazi Nation Lands (SNL) was 102481 tonnes and the national 
crop reached an estimated 135000 but late rains and hail reduced output in 
1989/90 (EIU, 1992/93). 
Since 1988, output grew steadily because of favourable rain patterns, 
reaching 153000 metric tonnes by 1991. However output fell by 50 percent in 
1992 because of the drought. Cotton is cultivated on both Title Deed Land 
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(TDL) and Swazi Nation Lands (SNL). Production reached a peak of 32538 
metric tonnes in the 1988/89 season and fell thereafter mainly because of the 
erratic rainfall, although a modest increase was recorded in 1990/91. As 
consequence, production falls significantly during years of drought and 
increases remarkably during wet seasons. When the drought began in 
1991/92, production of cotton fell drastically from 153000 metric tonnes in 
1990/91 to 45000 metric tonnes. Thereafter production remained at low 
levels until 1995/96 when it reached an estimated 135000 metric tonnes due 
to favourable rains. 
Maize production in 1996/97 is estimated at 85125 metric tonnes, which is 
significantly below the previous year's output. Inadequate rains, reduced area 
planted, pests and poor harvest conditions influenced the performance of the 
1996/97 crop. Rains came late in November and the amounts received in the 
main maize producing areas were less than usual. As a result, the area 
planted in the traditionally maize growing areas was reduced. Towards the 
end of the planting season excessive rains were experienced which resulted 
in waterlogging and destroyed the crop. Other problems were poor 
germination which resulted . in spare plant population, isolated but severe 
cases of hailstorms in the highveld and middleveld, and pests i.e. witchweed, 
stalkborer, and cutworm which were brought under control. 
The price of maize for the marketing year 1997/98 has been maintained at 
the previous year's level of E43.74 per kg. The maintenance of the price at 
that level is in preparation for the wide ranging reforms in maize marketing 
which are primarily aimed at partial deregulation in the industry. The price 
has been always regulated by Government and did not reflect market 
conditions. As a result, the secondary market emerged quoting substantially 
high prices (MEPD, 1998). 
The Swaziland government has undertaken a restructuring exercise of the 
National Maize Corporation with the aim of partially liberalising the maize 
industry. Part of the liberalisation process of the local maize market involves 
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separating the roles of procurement, storage and sale of the grain from that of 
milling and marketing of the grain products. The process is unlikely to 
improve food security or to promote commercial farming among smallholder 
farmers because NMC no longer will determine the floor price of maize. 
Swaziland has never been self-sufficient in maize production. The shortfall in 
consumption needs have always been satisfied by commercial imports. 
Higher producer prices result in higher mealie-meal prices especially in rural 
areas where the prices are even higher than the gazetted amount. Such high 
prices have an adverse effect on food security because the majority of rural 
households are deficit producers and have fewer sources of income. 
5.2.1{c) Citrus 
Citrus fruit is the second largest crop on TDL. After the bumper crop of 1986, 
it has declined continuously partly due to lower harvested area. In a normal 
year, the industry produces approximately 4 million cartons of citrus fruit, i.e. 
grapefruits, oranges, soft citrus and lemone. About 60 percent of the fruit is 
exported. Production in 1997 is estimated at around 5.2 million cartons, 
showing a 6 percent increase from the 1996 production level. The increase is 
attributed to the good rains received during the year and the low incidence of 
hailstorms. Exports sales outside Southern Africa were 2.72 million cartons, 
representing a decline of 10 percent from the previous year's figure. This was 
mainly a result of stiff competition from major world producers. The incidence 
of hailstorms, which destroyed the fruit also contributed to the decline in 
export volumes. The competition came mainly from Israel and the United 
States of America, in particular Florida. 
Fruit sold for local processing went up substantially (about 67 percent) in 
1997. This was mainly a result of an increased volume of fruit that could not 
meet export standards and the stiff competition in international markets. The 
high volumes of local sales consequently led to many growers recording lower 
sales receipts because of the high price differential between the local and 
export market. 
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Table 5.2: Pineapple Purchase an d F . C rUlt annmg ro uClon -P d f 1993 1997 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Pineapple purchase (tonnes) from 
Swazican 21114 17583 10638 11202 8438 
Outside Qrowers na na na 1030 1433 
Settlement 2491 1913 502 624 408 
Natal 974 854 1329 718 500 
Total 24579 20350 12469 13574 10779 
Pineapple cost/tonne 206 155 250 300 301 
Production volume (metric tonnes) 
Pineapple fresh 4545 4033 2503 3438 2885 
Pineapple juice 2131 2356 2776 2737 1885 
Citrus seQments 3185 3400 4221 5666 4717 
Citrus juice 2073 4017 2770 3261 8747 
Jam na 1885 2105 1506 1527 
Source: MEPD, 1998. 
From Table 5.2, pineapple production by Swazican is estimated at around 
8438 tonnes for the year 1997, which shows a decrease of 24.6 percent from 
the 1996 figure. The company has been reducing the area under cultivation 
and promoting private participation as part of its restructuring programme. 
Output from privatised farms showed an increase recording 1433 tonnes as 
the company opened up for more private participation whilst production by 
settlement farmers went down by 34.6 percent to 408 tonnes. Processing of 
citrus fruit showed a substantial improvement, since the company 
experienced a decline of 16.7 percent from the previous year's figure. The 
main markets for the segments are Europe and Asia. Citrus juice production 
increased significantly 168.2 percent in 1997. This was mainly a result of 
growers selling all the fruit they could not export, to Swazican. 
Timber plantations cover 6 percent of the total land area including the Sutu 
forest, which, at 65000 ha, is among the largest manmade forests in the 
world. Exports of wood and wood products earned E144 million in 1987, and 
accounted for 18 percent of all exports. The larger part of exports by value is 
in the form of woodpulp produced by the Usutu Pulp Company. In 1988 
exports of unbleached kraft were 175564 tonnes and earned E164 million. 
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Table 5.3: Agro-Industry (tonnes unless otherwise indicated) 
1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 
Woodpulp 
Production 176477 170846 164734 170857 115045 
Export volume 156870 178578 174909 160296 130635 
Export fob (Em) 171.2 169.9 252.9 440.7 240.1 
Canned fruit 
Production 15256 12674 13733 14897 16993 
Exports 13144 9495 20817 15933 14668 
Domestic sales 36 15 55 200 200 
Export fob (Em) 45.9 34.7 47.5 49.6 53.7 
Meat 
Production 1.0 3.1 3.7 3.7 3.3 
Exports 4.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 
Domestic sales 0.3 1.1 3.1 1.9 2.9 
Export fob (Em) 4.0 14.1 13.6 13.9 15.4 
Source: Central Bank of Swazlland. 1998. 
5.2.1{d) Cotton 
The cotton industry experienced a further recovery in 1996/97 following 
reasonable rainfall at the beginning of the crop season and the area planted 
increased to 31000 hectares. Total production increased from 14000 metric 
tonnes in 1995/96 to 16197 metric tonnes in 1996/97. Even though the yield 
improved significantly because of the good rains at the start of the season, a 
number of problems affected the cotton crop. There were not enough tractors 
to do land preparation, and the wet conditions experienced during the growing 
season encouraged shedding of squares as well as the spread of pests and 
disease. Furthermore, as the rains continued, farmers faced serious 
problems of weed and experienced difficulties in putting it under control 
(Central Bank of Swaziland, 1998). 
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Table 54" Seed Cotton Production " " 
Production Volume (metric tonnes) 
Large-scale growers Small-scale growers 
Tonnes Percentage Tonnes Percentage Total 
Tonnes 
1986 10757 54 9164 46 19921 
1987 9294 62 5697 38 14991 
1989 16269 50 16269 50 32538 
1990 13029 50 13029 50 26058 
1991 12643 48 13698 52 26341 
1992 2822 48 3057 52 5879 
1993 4000 40 6000 60 10000 
1994 3000 40 4500 60 7500 
1995 2480 40 3720 60 6200 
1996 5600 40 8400 60 14000 
1997 6480 40 9717 60 16197 
Source: MEPD, 1998. 
From Table 5.4, the impact of the serious drought of 1991/92 has reduced 
total production to 5879 metric tonnes from 26341 metric tonnes in 1990/91 
crop season. In the 1990s the production of cotton was not high as in the 
1980s; this is due to the factors that affected cotton production cited above. 
Following the crop financing package of E9 million was made available by the 
Cotton Board and the rest made available by the ginneries, the number of 
participating farmers increased during the1996/97 crop season. The money 
was used for land preparation and purchase of fertilisers. Government also 
made available a grant of E2.08 million, which was used to buy seeds and 
were made available for free to all the cotton farmers. The price for the 
1997/98 marketing year increased by 0.9 percent from E2.20 to E2.40. Over 




Livestock production is a major activity in the rural sector. It consists of 
rearing cattle, chickens, pigs and small ruminants, i.e., sheep and goats. 
About 77 percent of the total cattle population is owned by SNL farmers. The 
cattle population numbers for 1996 indicate a decline of 6 percent; however, 
the numbers have been increasing steadily since 1994 reflecting the desire by 
farmers to rebuild their herds. The significance of livestock is mainly social 
whilst its contribution to the economy is negligible. In 1996 livestock 
contributed approximately 1.2 percent to GDP. It has recently received a 
boost through the intensified efforts of expanding the piggery sub-sector. 
Farmers are provided with the breeding stock and Simunye provides the 
market when they are ready for slaughter. While on other hand livestock has 
seen the contraction of the ostrich SUb-sector. The sub-sector had a market 
in Europe and South Africa, which saw an expansion in 1995 only to take a 
significant decline in 1997 following a congo fever scare, which hit RSA, and it 
has fortunately levelled off (EIU, 1998/99) . 
T bl 55 N f I L' t k PI' 1992 96 a e . . a Iona Ives oc opu alion ·19 
Number 
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 
Cattle 752775 607041 626356 641979 656484 
Goats 409819 421679 459195 435080 403664 
Sheep 27756 26708 26967 24282 20311 
Poultry 992343 819249 680268 975170 1239587 
Pigs 31035 29946 37945 29950 34935 
Source: MEPD, 1998. 
Although Swaziland has a quota to export 2363 metric tonnes of beef to the 
EU, she only managed to export 381.2 metric tonnes in 1996. The country is 
failing to meet the quota because one of the conditions is that the beef should 
be produced from Swazi cattle whereas the cattle are not available in the 
numbers and condition required . The farmers are reluctant to sell good 
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quality cattle unless forced by economic or climatic conditions; as a result, 
importation of cattle has continued to increase over the years. The 
improvement of rangelands was significant towards the end of 1997 because 
of the rains. The rains in 1997 caused an outbreak of redwater disease in 
some areas especially in the highveld and middleveld. The number of cattle 
deaths remained high in 1996 with a mortality rate of 5.5 percent compared to 
5.3 percent in 1995. The highest number of deaths occurred on SNL and that 
was expected because of the cattle condition. Farmers have been gradually 
releasing their stock to the market as indicated by the slight increase of 3.2 
percent in slaughters in 1996. About 40 percent were for commercial purpose 
while the rest were for household purposes. 
5.2.2 Manufacturing Sector 
The manufacturing sector has grown steadily since independence. During 
the 1970s and 1980s, this growth slowed down. In 1982/83, manufacturing 
contributed 23.4 percent to GDP compared with 7.9 percent in 1960. Until the 
mid-1980s agro-industries and wood processing accounted for about 80 
percent of manufacturing, which itself accounted for 20 percent of GDP in 
1986 (EIU, 1989/90). Commercial agro-processing involves mainly sugar, 
woodpulp, citrus, pineapples, cotton and meat. Manufacturing production 
consists mainly of export-oriented agro-forestry-based activities. The sector 
expanded impressively between 1986 and 1988, at 25 percent per annum. 
This was largely the result of the considerable influx of direct foreign 
investment, which entered the country in order to avoid economic sanctions 
against South Africa and take advantage of Swaziland's privileged access to 
European markets under the Lome Convention. New investments were 
established in drink processing, textiles, furniture and footwear (Ministry of 
Trade and Industry). Most notably, the regional supplier of Coca-Cola 
concentrates (CON CO) moved from South Africa to Swaziland and begun full 
operations in 1987. In addition, the country's largest textile company, 
NATEX, was established in 1988. 
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In 1989, overall output declined reflecting a sharp drop in woodpulp 
production caused by a boiler explosion at the Usutu Pulp Company. In 
1990-1991, growth was basically led by the drink-processing sub-sector. The 
textile industry has been hit by the reduction of tariffs in the SACU area and 
difficulties in accessing outside markets. In addition, despite the expansion in 
the sugar refineries of Ubombo and Simunye, the sub-sector has remained 
basically stagnant since 1989. Furthermore, investment activity slowed down 
in 1990 resulting in a growth rate of only 3-4 percent for the non-agricultural 
sub-sector in 1991, well below the high level of about 10 percent of 1989 and 
1990. This trend is linked to the political changes in South Africa, especially 
the imposition and the lifting of economic sanctions (EIU, 1993/94). At the 
beginning of 1985, the government therefore unveiled a new incentive 
package to attract foreign private investment, with a tax holiday for 
manufacturers and an extension of residence permits for foreign investors 
from two to five years among its main features. In 1986, Taiwanese investors 
opened four textile related manufacturing plants in Swaziland, creating almost 






Figure 5.3: Manufacturing contribution to GDP 
1~1~1~1~1_1~1~1~1~ 
Year 
-+-- Manufacturing. value · , 
Added (% of GOP) !: 
Source: World Bank. 1999. 
In late 1987 another major step towards establishing a competitive and 
vertically fully integrated textiles industry was made when an agreement was 
signed with the World Bank's International Finance Corporation and the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) for a US$35 million 
expansion of the National Textiles Corporation of Swaziland (EIU, 1997/98). 
The 1992 drought has affected some manufacturing activities such as the fruit 
canning industry. Despite the relative diversification of the industrial base, the 
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sector continued to be dominated by few sub-sectors sugar, wood pulp, drink 
processing and fruit canning 
During 1995/96 SIDC continued its catalyst role for private sector industrial 
growth; five major projects were approved with an estimated value of E45 
million. The projects include the establishment of poultry processing plant, 
construction of a factory, development and expansion of factory premises in 
the Matsapha Industrial Site. The sector expanded by a mere 0.3 percent in 
1996/97 compared to 4 percent realised the previous year. The growth areas 
of the sector were in drink processing, sugar based production activities and 
refrigerators. The world economic upturn, in particular the positive economic 
growth registered by South Africa in 1996 were a large proportion of 
Swaziland's exports is destined increased export demand. In 1997/98 the 
manufacturing sector continued to be the main engine of growth for the 
economy and expanded by 5.5 percent (Central Bank of Swaziland, 1999). 
T bl 5 6 M f t d E rts 1991 1995 a e . anu ac ure xpo -.. I 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
Other food products 411.5 522.5 696.1 842.0 962.7 
Textiles 202.4 188.2 193.5 250.9 281.8 
Refrigerators ·35.6 72.9 183.0 172.2 192.5 
Paper products 41.8 50.2 64.0 56.5 64.6 
Other 99.8 148.0 205.2 344.7 141.4 
Source: WTO, 1998. 
The government industrial policy is promoted through the Swaziland Industrial 
Development Corporation (SIDC), which was set up in 1986 to take over from 
the ailing National Industrial Development Corporation of Swaziland (NIDCS), 
and the Small Enterprise Development Company (SEDCO), although it has 
for the most part been Tibiyo, which has been used to establish local holdings 
in large enterprises. 
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5.2.3 Mining Sector 
Mining and quarrying have declined in both relative and absolute terms since 
the 1970s and 1980s. Their share in GDP fell from 10 percent in the 1960s to 
2.7 percent in 1982/83. Anglo-American closed its iron ore mine at Ngwenya 
in 1978, with the last shipment of the remaining stockpile being made in 1980. 
However, asbestos production, a small diamond mining operation and the 
recovery in coal production in 1984 have supported mineral earnings. The 
major mineral that has been under production currently is the asbestos. The 
Havelock Asbestos mine is run by Turner and Newall through a local 
subsidiary, which is 40 percent owned by Tibiy014. The 26286 tons produced 
in 1983 supported exports valued at E 17.3 million or 5 percent of total 
exports. 
Since then the downward trend in production, which has persisted throughout 
the 1981-1986 period, has been ameliorated in export terms by the falling 
Lilangeni/Rand exchange rate. Exports in 1986 were valued at E24 million, 4 
percent of total exports. Extensive exploration was undertaken at the 
Havelock mine in 1986 with a view to increasing its life, though it remains to 
be seen what Turner and Newall's plans are in the light of this, given their 
earlier announcement to the government that they would not apply for the 
renewal of their lease when it expired in 1986 (MEPD, 1992). 
The diamonds are minerals of industrial quality in Swaziland. The detail 
exploration was completed in 1984. Sales commenced in 1984, bringing in 
E575000 and rose to E3.92 million in 1985 when production was 21128 
carats. In 1986, output rose to 39144 carats. The value of output also rose 
E20 million in 1989, but declined by 25 percent to E15.2 million in 1990. 
Coal production at the Emaswati mine increased in the 1980s but 
unfavourable prices forced its closure in 1992. A new mine at Maloma 
14 A Swazi nation organization is an investment agency with interests in a number of sectors of 
the economy namely, mining, manufacturing, agriculture, property, finance tourism and 
transport. 
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commenced production in 1994. There was a decline in mineral receipts 
during 1995 to E86 million, 12.8 percent lower than previous year's figure of 
E98 million. Asbestos emerged as the leading mineral export earner, even 
though its earnings fell by 18.4 percent compared to the year before and 
accounted for 57 percent of total revenue followed by diamonds at 33 percent 
and coalat 10 percent. During 1997, the mining industry revenue declined by 
a marginal 3.9 percent largely due to the closure of the Dvokolwako Diamond 
Mine. The industry registered E90.9 million sales vis-a-vis E94.6 million 
recorded in 1996 (EIU, 1997/98). 
5.2.3 (a) Asbestos 
Asbestos production rose by a marginal 3 percent during 1995 to record 
27914 tonnes from 26 988 tonnes recorded in 1994. In 1997 there was an 
insignificant 0.5 percent decline in production to amount to 25888 tonnes 
against 26014 tonnes in 1996. Asbestos continued to lead all other minerals 
as the major revenue earner in the industry. Amounting to E48 million, 
asbestos total sales were E11 million lower than the previous year's income. 
Despite a slight fall in production during 1997, asbestos receipts showed a 
substantial growth of 10.7 percent to record E64.1 million compared to E57.9 
million in 1996. Exports of asbestos were E48 million down 18.4 percent 
primarily due to a decline in the international prices of the fibre compared to 
1994. The amount of fibre sold to local brake and clutch manufacturing plant 
also dropped by 14.6 percent to 234 tonnes from 274 tonnes during 1994. 
5.2.3(b) Coal 
Maloma Coal Mine produces high quality anthracite for export to Europe and 
other overseas markets. During 1995, 171666 tonnes were produced 
compared to 222770 tonnes of coal produced in 1994/95. Export earnings of 
coal for 1995/96 amounted to E8.4 million. In 1997 there was a significant 
increase in the production of coal. Production grew by a substantial 57.5 
percent to 203115 tonnes compared to 128973 tonnes in 1996. Export 
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receipts also rose by 34.6 percent to E10.6 million against E7.9 million 
recorded in 1996, largely affected by the increase in volumes exported and 
also supported by the favourable exchange rate (Central Bank of Swaziland, 
1998). 
5.2.3{c) Quarried Stone 
During 1995 there was a significant 60 percent drop in the volume of quarried 
stone produced to record 113962 cubic metres. Consequently, total sales of 
the stone declined 42.3 percent from E6.3 million sold in 1994 to E3.6 million 
in 1995. The reduced sales were due to a low demand in the construction 
sector especially to major road works as construction was either delayed or 
not yet started (Central Bank Swaziland, 1996). Furthermore, the heavy rains 
in the latter part of 1995 might have contributed to this decline. During 1997 
three was a significant upsurge in volumes of crushed stone produced to 
show 455753 cubic metres compared to 221237 cubic metres in 1996. 
Consequently, total sales of stone grew more than double to E16.1 million 
from E5.1 million in 1996. The increase in sales was due to c. high demand in 
the construction sector as major construction of roads was undertaken. 
5.3 Investment and Savings 
An interesting feature in Swaziland's development is the decline in the 
investment to GDP ratio observed in the second half of the 1980s, which may 
have negative implications for growth prospects. This resulted mainly from a 
nominal decrease in public investment both by central government and 
parastatals. The fact that Swaziland was able to grow rapidly in the second 
half of the 1980s, despite the observed decline in the average investment 
ratio, suggests increased capacity utilisation based on previous years 
investments, and possibly some efficiency gains associated with increased 
economies of scale (IMF, 1997).· 
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Table 5.7: Comj!osition of GDP by Expenditure (Percentage Share) 
1971-1979 1980-1984 1985-1990 
Private Consumgtion 56.5 70.7 58.5 
Government Consumption 16.6 20.9 18.1 
Total Consumption 77.3 91.6 76.6 
Private Investment 15.2 14.4 12.4 
Public Investment 15.0 15.2 7.8 
Total Investment 30.2 29.6 20.2 
Exports of Goods & Services 66.8 64.6 75.5 
Imports of Goods & Services 70.1 87.8 73.3 
Gross Domestic Savil}gs 30.4 8.1 20.9 
Gross National Savings 27.9 11.8 22.8 
Source: World Bank (1993). 
It is common to find the relative importance of public investment declining at a 
certain stage of economic development, e.g. once basic infrastructure has 
been put in place. In Swaziland, part of decline in public investment could be 
attributed to a structural shift of this nature, particularly given the high levels 
attained in the late 1970s and early 1980s. However, there is evidence that 
investment in certain key public services was inadequate and capacity was 
overstretched to meet increased demand generated by the expansion in 
economic activity. In particular, investment in electricity, water and 
telecommunications suffered significantly as a result of financial difficulties 
faced by the public utilities while investment by central government was 
poorly targeted. Since 1989, the government has embarked on ambitious 
investment plan which, however, does not adequately address priorities and 
could prove unsustainable in the long term (World Bank, 1993). 
Figure 5.4: Investment and Savings 
Source: World Bank, 1999. 
-+-In\estment (as %of 
GDP) 
-.- Sa\Ang (as % of GDP) 
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The private investment to GDP ratio showed a slight fall compared to the 
previous decades. Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, private investment 
fluctuated markedly in real terms, mostly driven by foreign investment. The 
exception was the 1982-1984 period, when private investment kept up in real 
terms despite the decrease in foreign investment caused by the South African 
recession. Re-invested earnings by CON~O, Usuptu Pulp and Lonrho Sugar 
Corporation account for 50 percent of foreign investment in the 1980s. After 
peaking in 1989, nominal foreign investment contracted by 50 percent in 1990 
and stagnated thereafter, reflecting the onset of another recession in South 
Africa and levelling-off of economic activity (EIU, 1992/93). 
Since the 1990s, there has been a slow-down in foreign direct investment 
(FDI) which, together with low levels of investment by domestic 
entrepreneurs, has been the major contributor to the stagnation of the 
manufacturing sector. Growth in equity capital has also shown a gradual 
decline over the years from 1991, apart from an increase in growth from 11.8 
percent in 1994 to 33.1 percent in 1995 reflecting a major restructuring 
exercise in the textile industry. Similarly long-term capital inflows have also 
seen a declining trend in growth from 58.8 percent in 1991 to -8.6 percent in 
1996. Taking into account inflation, the real value added of FDI has recorded 





Source: WTO, 1998. 





Exports of goods and services relative to GDP increased remarkably over the 
second half of the 1980s to an average of 75 percent from about 65 percent 
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the previous decade. This is attributable to the start-up of new manufacturing 
exports and sustained growth in traditional exports, particularly of sugar. By 
contrast, imports of goods and services as a percentage of GDP fell to an 
average of 73 percent in line with lower levels of public investment during part 
of this period, thus allowing a narrowing of the resource balance deficit. 
Gross domestic savings as share of GDP increased over the second half of 
the 1980s, peaking at 29.6 percent in 1988, as a result of a large government 
savings. Gross national savings as a percentage of GDP were high during 
most of the period, peaking at 35-40 percent in 1987-88, but declining 
thereafter because of SUbstantial profit remittances. 
5.4 Employment and Wages 
Wage Councils determine wages in the private sector, which include 
representatives of employers, employees and the government. Sector-
specific minimum wages negotiated by the wage councils exist in virtually all 
sectors. Wage increases are determined each year by the wage council on 
the basis of the cost of living index. Wage employment, representing about 25 
percent of the total labour force, grew by an average annual rate of only 2.2 
percent in the 1980s. This is below the growth rate for the 1970s, which 
averaged 5.9 percent and the growth in the labour force, estimated at 2.7 
percent. Civil service employment expanded above the average, by an 
annual rate of 4.5 percent, driven by teacher recruitment. Employment by the 
. parastatal sector remained stagnant (IMF, 1997). 
Because of its proximity to South Africa and relative degree of labour mobility, 
private sector wages in Swaziland are high in relation to the country per 
capita income, which is one-third of that in South Africa. Since public sector 
wages, at least for skilled labour, tend to follow those in the private sector, 
this has had the effect of increasing the government overall wage bill. Wage 
councils and annual collective bargaining set wages in the private sector, and 
the minimum wage is set as a by-product of this process. Minimum wages 
rose in real terms over the second half of 1980 from a very low base. Civil 
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service pay policy has been subject to much controversy within Swaziland 
and has led to significant industrial relations difficulties over recent years. Not 
less than three salary commissions have been charged with the responsibility 
of revising the wage structure since 1986. Important pay scale adjustments 
were effected in 1988 and 1990. In addition, in response to union pressure, 
cost of living adjustments are being done on an annual basis since 1987 
(World Bank, 1993). 
Current employment figures indicate a marginal increase from 94766 in 1966 
to 95681 in 1997. The private sector remained the major employer with 
64122 persons employed in 1997 compared to 63497 persons in 1996. 
There was only slight growth in the jobs created by the agricultural sector due 
to improved weather conditions realised in 1997, despite the El Nino threat. 
The public sector showed a marginal increase of 0.9 percent to register 
31269 jobs in 1997 from 31559 jobs in 1996. The increasing size of the 
public sector still remains a major concern for Swaziland. Services realised 
an increase of only 1.8 percent but remained a major employer in the formal 
sector, employing 26 percent of total employment. Manufacturing employed 
18.2 percent and distribution followed with 11.2 percent; this was however, a 
drop from 13.2 percent recorded the previous year. There was an upsurge of 
21.3 percent in the construction sector emanating from the increased 
construction activity mainly in the upgrading of the major roads, other 
government offices and houses, and the Maguga Dam project. 
There is an escalating brain drain from Swaziland with more young graduates 
finding employment in neighbouring countries, especially South Africa. 
Swaziland is not able to absorb completing graduates and school leavers at 
the rate at which they are released into the labour market. The problem is 
perpetuated by the lack of investment, which may create suitable posts for the 
qualified graduates. The closure of companies during 1997 only aggravated 
the problem. As employment prospects depend on the rate at which 
investment is drawn into the country, there is an urgent need to create an 
investment friendly environment. 
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5.5 Social Services Sectors 
5.5.1 Education 
The 1986 Population Census found that63 percent of the population aged 
more than five years was literate which represents a substantial improvement. 
Gender differences had virtually disappeared with 64 percent of males and 63 
percent of females being classified as literate. The literacy rate is currently 
thought to be around 74 percent for both males and females which represents 
a enormous turnaround from the 30 percent recorded in 1966 (Central 
Statistics Office, 1988). 
Table 5.8: Number of Pupils in Primary and Secondary Schools, 1974 -
1993 
PupilfT eacher PupilfT each er 
Primary Secondary Primary Secondary 
1974 86110 14301 38.8 23.4 
1975 89528 16227 37.9 22.0 
1976 92721 17396 36.9 19.7 
1977 96835 19359 36.2 19.8 
1978 100700 20584 35.3 19.2 
1979 105607 22091 35.0 19.1 
1980 112019 23198 34.2 18.0 
1981 119913 24826 33.4 17.3 
1982 125303 26469 33.3 17.6 
1983 129767 27828 33.1 18.2 
1984 134528 28833 33.3 18.4 
1985 139345 29914 33.9 19.2 
1986 142206 30489 33.1 18.2 
1987 147743 32942 33.1 18.7 
1988 152895 35278 32.8 18.5 
1989 157345 41881 32.2 20.1 
1990 166545 41128 32.8 18.6 
1991 172908 44085 32.3 18.1 
1992 180285 51514 32.8 19.1 
1993 186271 50304 32.7 18.0 
Source. Central Statistics Office, 1996. 
The improvement in the literacy rate reflects the quantum leap in enrolments 
in all classes of the education system. There has been rapid expansion of all 
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levels, and gross enrolment ratios have risen for primary education from 65 
percent in 1968 to 100 percent in 1992. However, the net figure is lower, 
estimated at 82 percent due to high drop out and repeater rates. The 
secondary and tertiary gross enrolment ratios are 50 percent and 4 percent 
respectively (Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1996). In 
total, primary school enrolments have grown by 3000 percent in the 25 years 
since 1968 but the number of teachers has increased even more rapidly with 
the result that pupil/teacher ratios have declined from 38 in 1968 to 33 in 
1993. 
The extreme low base of secondary education at independence is illustrated 
by the fact that there were only 6246 pupils in 1968 out of a 1966 population 
aged 15-19 years of 36000. There has been subsequently a rapid growth 
with enrolments going up by 805 percent. Even so the number of teachers 
increased faster, and the average pupil/teacher ratio has fallen 21 in 1986 to 
18 in 1993 «Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1996). 
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Source: Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1996, 1998. 
5.5.2 Health 
The 1966 Population Census data indicated that the average life expectancy 
at birth was 44 years. On the basis of the 1986 census, data show that 
average life expectancy at birth had increased by 29 percent, to 57 years. 
The infant mortality rate has declined by an impressive 41 percent from 168 
per 1000 live births in 1966 to 113 per 1000 in 1983 and further to an 
estimated average of 99 by 1986. Other aggregate health indicators, such as 
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calorie supply, are encouraging. The Swaziland figure is 105 percent of 
required calorie supply, which compares with an average of 89 percent of 
sub-Saharan Africa. The data on health manpower shows a ratio of doctor to 
population of 7500 and 1 nurse per 1000 «Ministry of Economic Planning and 
Development, 1996). Health spending accounted for 8.5 percent of recurrent 
expenditure in the 1997/98 budget, its proportion having fallen from 10.5 
percent in 1990/91. As in other African countries, pressure is being exerted 
on Swaziland's health budget by the spread of HIV-Aids epidemic. Aids has 
made rapid inroads, and 22 percent of the sexually active population is 
estimated to be HIV-positive (EIU, 1997/98). 
5.6 Macroeconomic Policies 
5.6.1 Fiscal Policy 
Given the kingdom's membership in the CMA which allows for free capital 
movement between member countries and the fixed peg of Swaziland's 
currency to the South African rand, fiscal policy is the main macroeconomic 
policy instrument. The fiscal situation in Swaziland is highly dependent on 
SACU receipts which account for more than half of total government revenue. 
After experiencing positive fiscal balances during 1987/88-1990/91 due to 
strong economic growth fuelled by increased foreign direct investment, the 
fiscal situation worsened during 1992/93-94/95. Therefore, the fiscal balance 
shifted from a surplus of 5 percent of GDP in 1991/92 to a deficit of 6 percent 
of GDP in 1994/95. In addition to the slowdown in economic growth, the 
deterioration of the fiscal situation was due to an increase in government 
expenditure, particularly current outlays (WTO, 1998). 
The central government revenue declined by about 3 percentage points of 
GDP to 31 percent of GDP in 1994/95 from its level of in 1991/92. Despite 
some fluctuations, SACU receipts increased as a percentage of both GDP 
and total revenue. They declined by about 2 percentage points of GDP 
between 1991/92 and 1992/93, to 13 percent as result of sluggish import 
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growth. The share of SACU receipts in total revenue rose from 44 percent in 
1991/92 to 48 percent in 1994/95. Revenue from taxes on net income and 
profits, the second largest revenue source after SACU receipts, declined by 
about 1 percentage point of GDP during the early 1990s (IMF, 1997). This 
decline was due solely to lower corporate income tax receipts which were 
adversely affected by a fall in foreign direct investment flows, the drought, and 
the recession in South Africa. 
During the period 1992/93-1994/95, expenditure on goods and services 
remained flat as a percentage of GDP, while government subsidies and 
transfers, mainly as a result of transfers to the Disaster Relief Fund (DRF) in 
response to a regional drought, and the government's contribution to the 
pension scheme of the Swaziland Posts and Telecommunications 
Corporation (IMF, 1997). In 1994/95, they rose again by more than 2 percent 
of GDP, owing to (i) the allocation of E71 million for the restructuring of the 
Swaziland Posts and Telecommunications Corporation, (ii) a rise in subsidies 
to subvented institutions, including the University of Swaziland and the Swazi 
National Treasury, and (iii) transfers to meet wage adjustments for the 
employees of some public enterprises. 
With regard to current outlays by sector, expenditure on general services rose 
from 5.6 percent of GDP in 1991/92 to 11 percent in 1994/95, reflecting an 
increase in the wage bill and expenditure on goods and services. However, 
the share of expenditure on social services in total current outlays declined 
from 47 percent in 1991/92 to 40 percent in 194195. Expenditure on 
economic services increased strongly in 1992/93, but declined during 
1993/94-1994/95. Despite some fluctuations, capital expenditure grew by 1 
percent of GDP on average during the 1991/92-1994/95 period. It grew 
strongly in 1992/93 due to funds allocated for new projects in the areas of 
transportation and communication. In 1993/94 however, capital expenditure 
fell by 1 percent of GDP owing to a low implementation rate, but rose by 1 
percent of GDP in 1994/95, because of the acquisition of a new aeroplane. 
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Government net lending remained insignificant as a percentage of total 








Figure 5.7: Government Budget 
I -+- Surplus/deficit (% of 
I GDP) 
Year 
Source: Quarterly Bulletin, Central Bank of Swaziland , various issues. 
The budget moved from a small deficit in 1968/69 to a surplus in 1969nO, 
mainly because of the massive increases in SACU revenue, while 
expenditure remained at the low level determined in the pre-independence 
period. During the 1970s, the budget recorded a deficit in six years and a 
surplus in four years. There were two exceptional years. In 1975/76 the 
enormous revenue from the Sugar Levy gave rise to a surplus of E23.7 
million (11 percent of GDP). In 1978/79 a deficit of 12.3 percent of GDP 
occurred as a result of an increase of 94 percent in capital expenditure and 
net lending (Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 1993). The 
government of Swaziland took steps to address the weaknesses in budgetary 
control, particularly the growth in expenditures for enterprises outside the 
regular budget. Nonetheless, after a surplus of 5 percent of GDP in 1980/81 
(which resulted from an unsustained increase in revenue) there were a deficit 
of 9.6 percent of GDP in 1981/82 and there were deficits in six years during 
the 1980s with an average ratio of 4.4 percent. 
The fiscal balances shifted from a surplus of 5 percent of GDP in 1991/92 to 
a deficit of 4 percent of GDP in 1992/93, and in the following two fiscal years, 
the deficit stood at 5 percent and 6 percent of GDP, respectively. The 
government financed these deficits, primarily through a draw down of its 
deposits held at the Central Bank and the sale of assets (Central Bank of 
Swaziland, 1995). In 1995/96 the deficit declined to less than 1 percent of 
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GDP. This improvement came mainly from a large increase in SACU and 
sales tax receipts and a decline in nominal expenditure on capital and goods 
and services. Overall government revenue (including grants) rose by about 3 
percent of GDP to 35 percent. Personal income tax receipts grew by 1 
percent of GDP because of strengthened tax collection stemming from the 
introduction of the final deduction system (IMF, 1997). 
5.6.2 Monetary Policy 
Monetary policy in Swaziland is constrained by membership of the Common 
Monetary Area, whose members are Lesotho, Namibia, South Africa and 
Swaziland. South Africa determines effectively monetary policy for the area 
as the dominant economy. Over the years South Africa followed prudent 
monetary policy, to the advantage of the other member countries. In 
particular, Swaziland has been constrained from the inappropriate financing 
of rising fiscal deficits through the printing of money. The Government has 
maintained a net creditor position with the domestic financial sector, largely 
financing deficits through external sources; its focus, therefore, has been 
largely on fiscal policy. 
Although the rand is not legal in Swaziland it circulates freely, at par with the 
Lilangeni, and is believed to make up more than 25 percent of the money in 
circulation. This renders use of money supply aggregates [M 1 and M2] for 
monetary policy meaningless, and so the Central Bank and the Government 
are limited in defining or measuring the money supply. Historically, interest 
rates have been held below the rates prevailing in South Africa. There has 
been a deliberate move in recent years to narrow the gap between domestic 
and South Africa interest rates to ensure that rates move towards positive real 
levels and to reduce the incentive for any unnecessary capital outflows from 
Swaziland. Deposit rates, in general, have been negative in real terms, 
whereas lending rates have tended to be equal to or above the inflation rate 
(Central Bank of Swaziland, 1994). 
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5.6.2(a) Consumer Prices 
Most prices are free in Swaziland with the exception of those for petroleum, 
cotton, milk, maize, tobacco and public sector utilities. These prices are 
adjusted periodically to reflect change in costs and market conditions, but 
price adjustments for some utilities have been insufficient to cover operating 
costs. Given the importance of South African imports in the consumption 
basket of Swaziland, the consumer price index follows closely the movement 
in South Africa inflation. Domestic inflation, as measured by the consumer 
price index, averaged 13 percent per annum between 1986 and 1990, 
following a 20.6 percent hike in 1985 caused by the depreciation of the 
Lilangeni. 
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Source: World Bank. 1999. 
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In 1992, inflation measured as changes in the consumer price index (CPI) 
declined in line with developments observed in South Africa. In 1993, 
inflation rose sharply in Swaziland. while it decelerated in South Africa. This 
upward movement in Swazi prices, which continued throughout 1994, arose 
from drought-related increases in food prices and the larger weight being 
given to food in Swaziland's consumption basket compared with that of South 
Africa (IMF, 1997). Strong currency depreciations were experienced during 
the year as South Africa lost capital around the election in April 1994. The 
weakened currency probably exerted inflationary pressure in the domestic 
market through imports. Owing to favourable climatic conditions, however, 
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food prices declined in 1996, thereby contributing to a slow-down in inflation 
to about 13 percent in 1996 and 10 percent in 1997. 
5.6.2(b) Money Supply 
Money supply narrowly defined to include only Emalangeni in circulation and 
demand deposits has increased ten times since 1974. There has been rapid 
expansion in 1993 and 1994. The large increase of 36 percent in demand 
deposits was the result of an upturn in private sector credit of 36 percent and 
caused M1 to grow by 31 percent in 1994. 
Table 5.9: Money Supply and Quasi Money, 1974 -1994 (E'OOO) 
Money 
(E) in Demand Supply Savings Time Quasi 
Circulation Deposits M1 Deposits Deposits Money 
1974 16.53 13.59 30.12 8.32 15.42 23.74 
1975 21.02 18.23 39.25 9.89 28.27 38.16 
1976 6.52 22.18 28.70 12.09 36.31 48.40 
1977 7.31 20.69 28.00 13.43 48.06 61.49 
1978 8.90 27.73 36.63 15.66 62.29 77.95 
1979 9.59 30.60 40.19 17.67 59.75 77.42 
1980 11 .90 37.96 49.86 21.44 62.41 83.85 
1981 14.41 36.93 51.34 25.73 64.51 90.24 
1982 15.03 43.06 58.09 30.24 73.06 103.30 
1983 15.23 45.62 60.85 31.90 105.40 137.30 
1984 16.77 51.04 67.81 35.47 135.39 170.86 
1985 17.45 59.47 76.92 39.88 176.45 216.33 
1986 25.20 89.93 115.13 50.01 160.76 210.77 
1987 27.19 98.23 125.42 57.95 188.38 246.33 
1988 32.20 110.73 142.93 72.88 290.42 363.30 
1989 37.20 131 .82 169.02 87.64 384.26 471 .90 
1990 48.19 144.29 192.48 108.95 388.24 497.19 
1991 52.99 158.55 211 .54 123.05 450.64 573.69 
1992 56.09 198.21 254.30 140.83 552.09 692.92 
1993 75.19 215.30 290.49 197.75 577.62 775.37 
1994 69.59 241 .99 311 .58 229.78 640.40 870.18 .. 
Source: MInistry of Economic Planning and Development, 1996. 
The strong depreciation of the Lilangeni would normally result in an increase 
in the value of net foreign assets when expressed in local currency, but a 
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decline of 4 percent was recorded in September 1994 from E988 million to 









Figure 5.9: Money Supply 
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Source: World Bank, 1999. 
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Quasi-money, which comprises savings and time deposits, has shown a 
much rapid growth of 36 times over the period which indicates the progressive 
financial deepening of the monetary system «Ministry of Economic Planning 
and Development, (1996). However, it only increased by 12 percent in 1994 
and there was also a change in composition of quasi-money with call deposits 
including short notice and savings deposits growing faster than longer-term 
time deposits. This may reflect the combined effect of a decline in the yield 
curve, the generally low level of interest rates, widening of the interest rate 
differential between South Africa and Swaziland for long-term deposits and 
expectations of increasing inflation. Total money stock, which is the sum of 
M1 and quasi-money, is dominated by quasi-money (75 percent of the total) 
whereas in 1974 M1 represented half the total. This change is generally 
beneficial as it facilitates the transformation of savings into investment. 
5.S.2(c) Domestic Credit 
Table 5.10 indicates that the government is a substantial net creditor to the 
banking sector from 1987 because of its large budget surpluses until 1991/92. 
This has ensured that its deposits with the banking sector are higher than its 
borrowing from banks as indicated by the negative sign for credit to 
government. 
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Table 5.10: Net Domestic Credit, 1974 -1994 (E million) 
To Government To Private Total 
Sector 
1974 -6.29 29.59 23.30 
1975 -34.37 45.01 10.64 
1976 -32.55 46.62 14.07 
1977 -38.55 49.53 10.98 
1978 -44.36 74.64 30.28 
1979 -51 .18 85.39 34.21 
1980 -65.70 98.30 32.60 
1981 -52.11 131.89 79.79 
1982 -30.96 140.78 109.82 
1983 -16.42 146.49 130.07 
1984 -23.92 156.01 132.09 
1985 -21.61 159.15 137.54 
1986 12.75 165.33 178.08 
1987 -34.33 206.82 172.49 
1988 -80.78 265.53 184.75 
1989 -217.85 341.31 123.46 
1990 -298.16 457.41 159.25 
1991 -419.01 654.86 235.85 
1992 -589.28 612.91 23.63 
1993 -497.71 744.82 247.11 
1994 -398.76 875.30 476.55 . . 
Source: MInistry of EconomIc Planning and Development, 1996 . 
During this period credit extended by banks to the private sector was growing 
rapidly and exceeded the level of net credit to government. Net domestic 
credit remained therefore high until 1991 when net credit started to decline. , . 
In 1993 total net credit became positive, the government increased its cash 
borrowings from commercial banks, mainly because of its growing budgetary 
deficits, while total demand for credit by the private sector returned to positive 
growth rates. This trend was reinforced in mid 1994 when private sector 
credit accelerated in line with the strengthening economic recovery and 
government's net credit position declined further because of the worsening 
budgetary situation and the consequential reduction in reserves deposit in the 
local banking system (Ministry of Economic Planning and Development, 
1996). 
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5.6.2(d) Interest Rate Policy 
Since 1988, the Central Bank of Swaziland has deliberately kept interest rates 
below those in South Africa with the objective of encouraging borrowing for 
productive investment and reducing commercial banks high level of liquidity. 
While this policy succeeded in increasing private sector lending, most of it has 
been directed to short-term financing of trade and working capital as well as 
personal loans rather than to investment. This is not surprising given that the 
structure of bank deposits resulting from this policy has contributed to 
discourage long-term lending as time deposits account for a very small 
proportion of total private deposits 9 percent in 1991. 
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Figure 5.10: Interest Rates in Swaziland 
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Source: Central Bank of Swaziland, 1999 and MEPD, 1996. 
Furthermore, negative real interest rates for time deposits have not only 
prevented an increase of domestic savings but have also encouraged capital 
. flight as suggested by the increase in short-term capital outflows during 1986-
1990. This policy should be reversed not only because of the need to change 
the deposit structure in favour of long-term deposits but also because an 
increased level of financial savings will be required in the future to make up 
for the reduction in bank excess liquidity. The liquidity ratio has substantially 
declined from 53 percent in 1987 to below 25 percent in 1991, compared with 
the reserve requirement of 16 percent. During 1991-1993, Swaziland's 
interest rates declined, however, in line with developments in South Africa, 
and the interest rate differentials between the two countries narrowed. In real 
terms, over 1991-1992, Swaziland's deposit and lending rates were positive · 
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(IMF, 1997). Between October 1997 and March 1998, there were major 
changes in interest rates in South Africa, but the Central Bank of Swaziland 
followed the same procedure. The discount rate was reduced by one 
percentage point during the same period to 14.75 percent. Deposit rates at 
banks ranged between 6.75 and 11 percent compared to 10 percent and 
13.75 percent prevailing in March 1997 (Central Bank of Swaziland, 1998/99). 
5.7 Balance of Payments 
Swaziland's balance of payments weakened in 1996, posting an overall 
surplus of only E66.1 million compared with E 108.2 million in 1995. 
Contributing to the diminishing 1996 surplus position was the worsening 
services account and the financial account which continued to experience 
outflows albeit at lower levels than in prior years. The account recorded an 
increased deficit of E330.6 million from a revised E 113.5 in 1995, as a result 
of relatively stagnant exports and imports increasing by 15.5 percent (Central 
Bank of Swaziland, 1998). 
5.8 Economic Constraints 
5.8.1 Realisation of the Objectives 
Several important factors could threaten Swaziland's economic objective, e.g. 
increased competition for foreign direct investment (FDI) from other countries 
in the sub-region resulting in reduced FDI in Swaziland and therefore, 
economic slow-down, relocation of companies to South Africa due to better 
incentives or proximity to market, resulting in further job losses, and decline in 
exports, rising unemployment with consequent unrest due to job losses, and 
net job creation currently standing at less than 1 percent compared to 
population growth rate of 3.4 percent. 
There are also revenue losses resulting from developments in international 
trade, including the renegotiations of the SACU agreement. Short-term 
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revenues are also expected to fall due to the need to offer competitive tax 
rates and other incentives to attract FDI. The current political issues, further 
industrial unrest, and the loss of production due to strikes and stay-away, 
rising fiscal deficits, and high inflation and interest rates are expected to affect 
the economy negatively. 
5.8.2 Internal Factors affecting Development 
The internal factors that have adversely affected economic development 
include the legal framework, licensing constraints and the issue of work 
permits to expatriates, drought, shortages of skills, and infrastructural 
deficiencies, particularly the communication network and unreliable electricity 
supplies. 
5.8.3 External Factors affecting Trade 
The external factors that have adversely affected the economy include 
preferential trade arrangements with the European Union and other 
developed economies, world commodity prices, particularly for sugar and 
wood pulp, the South African economic and political performance and 
development, and membership of the SACU and CMA. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
6 AN OVERVIEW OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN ECONOMY 
6.1 Introduction 
The aim of this chapter is to provide some historical perspective for the 
subsequent analysis and recommendations. The chapter starts with a 
description of the structure and growth of the South African economy. Then it 
examines how this structure has emerged within policies instituted by 
government. and looks at one of the most obvious consequences of previous 
policies. Chapter six concludes with recent developments in macroeconomic 
policies in South Africa. 
6.1.1 Background 
Rapid economic growth in South Africa began with the discovery of diamonds 
in the Kimberley region in the 1870s providing the economic background to 
the formation of Union in 1910 (Jones and Muller. 1992). In the past the 
growth of the South African economy has been associated with mining 
developments in one form or another. It has only been in recent times that 
other sectors in the economy have driven growth. While it was the discovery 
of diamonds and gold in the latter half of the nineteenth century which gave 
South Africa economic hope. it was the location and inaccessibility of these 
resources which heralded the beginning of economic development (Abedian 
and Standish. 1992). The diamond and gold fields were situated in the then 
undeveloped interior of the country. In addition. gold deposits were rarely of 
the alluvial type. so heavy equipment. power supplies and large force of 
organised labour were required to extract and process the ore. These factors 
were responsible for the establishment of a rail system. the opening up of the 
coal fields for the generation of electricity. and the establishment of urban 
concentrations. commercial farming and manufacturing interests in the 
interior. 
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In 1910 agriculture was the major occupation, but its quality varied 
enormously from one region to another. The most progressive farming areas 
were those parts of the country settled by English speakers in the Eastern 
Cape and Northern Natal. In the Western Cape, market forces had already 
led to experiments in modern fruit growing for export and there were signs of 
renewed life in the vineyards. In contrast to agriculture, which was highly 
efficient, gold mining dominated the South African economy in 1910. It had 
expanded considerably since the end of the Boer War in 1902, aided by the 
importation of Chinese labour. This had solved the immediate problem of 
labour shortage, but at the expense of political controversy, and in 1906 the 
Chinese workers began to be repatriated. They were replaced by black 
labour (Nattrass, 1990). 
Activities in the primary sector formed the backbone of the economy. In the . 
secondary sector, manufacturing had barely begun. Around Johannesburg, 
there were mechanical engineering concerns that met some of the needs of 
the mining industry and there was the dynamite factory. Elsewhere, the 
making of wagon wheels and ox-carts, leather-making, and the processing of 
agricultural products were the principal industrial activities. South Africa had 
a very open economy that made importing easy and enjoyed no comparative 
advantage in manufacturing. It was cheaper to import most goods, and this 
was possible because the gold output solved the balance of payments 
problems that would otherwise have risen. Skilled craftsmen were in short 
supply and this raised labour costs in a country in which there was little or no 
tradition of skilled craftsmanship and technological know-how. In such a 
situation, free trade made any sustained moves towards industrialisation 
virtually impossible. The tertiary sector, by comparison, was far more highly 
developed, particularly the commercial and business services. 
While gold still remains the single most important product in the South African 
economy, there have been some major changes in the structure of the 
economy since 1910. As cited earlier, in 1910 the economy was based 
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mainly on farming and mining, but both these sectors suffered serious 
setbacks in the build-up to the Great Depression of 1929. While farmers 
faced various international and domestic crises, gold mining suffered under a 
falling real gold price and a militant growing white trade union movement. 
Since, that time agriculture has been of decreasing importance, and 
contributed only 6.21 percent to the GDP in 1990. This decline in the 
importance of agriculture is a common feature of change and has been seen 
in most developing countries (Abedian and Standish, 1992). 
In monetary terms, the growth of the economy was very rapid in the years 
between 1933-1961, as the national income advanced from £236.9 million in 
1933 to £2,805.5 million in 1961, an increase of 1080 percent. During this 
period, agriculture occupied a declining role in the economy until 1948, when 
the National Party's victory in the general election of that year installed a 
farmer-sympathetic government. Mining too experienced a long relative 
decline from 1939 to the late 1950s when the Free State goldfields came into 
production. It was in the middle of the war that the share of manufacturing 
finally overtook that of mining. By 1948 the contribution of manufacturing to 
GDP was double that of mining. This promotion has taken many forms. The 
two most important have been import substitution policies and direct state 
involvement in the economy. Import substitution policies include tariffs, 
import quotas and currency rationing. Government in the manufacturing 
sector has taken many forms, but three of these are of more importance. 
First, government has established and owns many industrial enterprises. 
These include Iscor and Armscor. Second, development agencies 
established by the government own, control, or have interests in a wide 
variety of manufacturing industries. Finally, government has had an all-
persuasive influence on manufacturing through a multiplicity of legislation and 
regulation. 
The tertiary sector, which here includes building and construction, utilities as 
well as the commercial and governmental services, increased its relative 
importance during the war and then marginally declined during the 1950s. In 
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real terms the average annual growth rate of 17.3 percent by manufacturing 
in the late 1930s has never since been equalled. Per capita income had also 
increased very considerably, rising from the low level of £26.1 in 1933 to 
£146.3 in 1961 (Jones and Muller, 1992). The sustained economic growth 
that transcended political developments and eventually undermined them is 
revealed in the dramatic increase in the Gross Domestic Product and in the 
per capita product. All sectors of the economy experienced sustained growth. 
Agriculture benefited from prices maintained above world levels and massive 
government assistance that coincided with the drive to mechanisation and 
increased specialisation accompanied by a wider use of fertilisers. Mining's 
period of rapid development had to await the 1973 rise in the price of gold, 
but then its contribution to the economy expanded considerably. The tertiary 
sector has also been transformed (Jones and Muller, 1992), by the revolution 
in transport accompanying the building of motorways, the introduction of jet 
transport and containerisation, by the revolution in retailing that has seen the 
self-service chain store replace the family concern, and by the phenomenal 
growth of the financial sector. 
During the turbulent years of the 1970s, in real terms the domestic economy 
grew by only 3.2 percent per annum. Relative economic performance was 
beginning to deteriorate, but a strong gold price shielded policymakers from 
this reality. By the second half of the 1970s, the growth had slumped to 1.5 
percent per annum, inflation has soared to an average annual rate of 15.7 
percent, and the exchange rate was beginning to deteriorate. During this 
period the Rand depreciated 34.9 percent against a trade-weighted basket of 
currencies. South Africa's economic performance in the 1980s and early 
1990s was severely hampered by the poor political environment and a 
deterioration in the terms of trade. 
The second prinCipal factor to hasten economic decline in the 1980s was the 
political environment. Four decades of apartheid racial policies had 
heightened conflict between the white government and the disenfranchised 
majority, as well as between business and labour, as avenues for political 
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expression were sought. Fixed investment spending declined from an 
average of 24 percent of GDP in the 1960s to recent levels of under 15 
percent. From 1985 to 1993, the economy continued to stagnate, growing by 
only 0.9 percent per annum, with real income per capita shrinking by .1.3 
percent on average each year 
However, towards the end of 1992 and the beginning of 1993 certain positive 
developments became apparent in the economy, including: (i) agricultural 
production, which had declined substantially throughout 1992 because of 
adverse weather conditions, recovered sharply, (ii) the physical volume of 
mining production, which had already increased slightly in 1992, rose further 
mainly because of higher gold production, (iii) the physical volume of 
manufacturing began to rise, and the financial environment remained 
relatively stable. In the 1990s decade, the economy contracted between 
1990 and 1992, and growth since then has not been dramatic. Real GDP 
growth reached 2.9 percent in 1995, 3.9 percent in 1996 and slumped to 1.7 
percent in 1997 (SARB, 1999). 
Figure 6.1: Economic Performance in South Africa 
Year 
Source: EIU, various issues. 
6.1.2 The Development of Economic Policy 
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The development of any economic policy is usually in the interests of the 
ruling government. Prior to 1924, the ruling economic philosophy was that of 
liberalism in trade, and, as the rand rebellion of 1922 demonstrated , 
repression of labour (Abedian and Standish, 1992). As a result of apartheid 
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policy and other discriminative policies, South Africa entered 1970s with one 
of the most skewed distributions of income in the world. The decade of the 
1970s can be seen as a watershed in South African economic development. 
Despite dramatic increase in the gold price, the economy registered an 
average annual growth rate of only 3.2 percent over the decade. Three of the 
major causes of this poor economic performance were: (i) The internal and 
external pressure for change in South Africa led to declining confidence on 
the part of both foreign and domestic investor, and investment time horizons 
were shortened. (ii) The policy of import substitution had reached its limits, 
but export promotion had not been pursued seriously. Industrialisation 
slowed and manufacturing became dependent on the whims of the gold 
market. (iii) The poor conduct of monetary and exchange rate policies led to 
substantial inflation and inflationary expectations, which further reduced 
investment (Abedian and Stand ish, 1992). 
Currently South Africa's international competitiveness puts it amongst the top 
25 percent of countries. After approximately R50 billion of foreign capital had 
left the country between 1985 and 1993, this pattern was reversed after the 
constitutional change and in the wake of the gradual abolition of exchange . 
control. From 1994 to 1996 foreign capital to the tune of R27.4 billion flowed 
into the country. After 19 years of double-digit inflation annual price increases 
have been below 10 percent since 1993 (Calitz, 1997). For the first time large 
numbers of South Africans are gaining access to education, primary health 
care and running water. Against this background of conflicting evidence the 
South African government released its macroeconomic strategy for growth, 
employment and redistribution (GEAR) in 1996. 
The primary focus of the GEAR document is growth, achieved through 
greater export-competitiveness, growing foreign investment, and productivity 
improvements. GEAR stresses the need to adopt economic policies which 
will encourage investment in the economy and allow South Africa to compete 
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in the global marketplace15. Some of the primary components of GEAR 
strategy are as follows: 
• Deficit reduction - fiscal discipline combined with reducing the budget 
deficit to 3 percent of GDP and producing a 6.1 percent growth rate by the 
year 2000. 
• Tight monetary policy - to control inflation and encourage domestic 
savings and investment with high interest rates. 
• Trade liberalization - gradual elimination of any restrictions on foreign 
trade. This means that tariffs, which are taxes on goods coming into South 
Africa, should be eliminated. GEAR argues the removing tariffs will keep 
prices low. 
• Remove exchange control - exchange control must be gradually 
eliminated in order to attract foreign investment into the country. 
• Regulated flexibility of labour markets - labour should have some degree 
of regulation. Collective bargaining should be maintained as a method of 
negotiating labor market outcomes. 
• Productivity improvements - the amount produced by each worker must 
increase. In order to ensure that productivity improvements mean lower . 
costs of production, GEAR also argues that wages should not increase 
faster than productivity. 
• Education and Training - SUbstantial improvements in the education and 
training of the workforce. 
6.2 Agriculture Sector 
In any economy the agricultural sector plays a vital role in the process of 
economic development. In the early days of development, the agricultural 
sector usually dominates the economic scene being both the major producer 
and employer in the economy. However, this situation has changed, and over 
time the sector becomes relatively less significant as industrialisation takes 
place. Nattrass (1990) argued that the change in the relative importance of 
15 Government of South Africa, 1996, Macroeconomic Strategy for Growth, Employment and 
Redistribution. 
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agriculture and manufacturing implies that, as the development process 
continues, productive resources must be transferred from · agriculture to 
industry. However, the growth of the industrialised economies has been 
marked by a flow of both labour and capital from agricultl:lre. The transfer of 
resources was largely accomplished because it was possible to increase the 
productivity of the factors of production remaining in agriculture and so 
produce the increased output necessitated by the growing demand for food 
and inputs in the developing industrial sector with smaller inputs of capital and 
labour per unit of agricultural output produced. 
Furthermore, the role of agriculture in an economy is determined by the size 
and quality of land and by the extent of the economy's development. A totally 
undeveloped economy will be totally dependent upon agriculture. In an 
advanced economy, the role of agriculture is minimal. In South Africa, 
agriculture comprises two very distinct components; the sub-sector dominated 
by whites and that under the control of blacks. The role that these two sub-
sectors have played in the development of the South African economy has 
been very different (Nattrass 1990). 
6.2.1 Commercial Agriculture: White Agriculture 
Nattrass (1992) stated that labour productivity in white agriculture rose, in 
addition the resident population on the white farms grew more rapidly than 
farm employment. The growth rate of output in physical terms was relatively 
steady throughout the period, although it has picked up slightly in the most 
recent period. The output of food appears to have proceeded at a rate 
considerably above the rate of growth of population, which allowed for the 
increased use of agricultural products as inputs into manufacturing, an 
increase in agricultural exports and the increased local demand for foodstuffs 
following from both the rising population and the increase in average living 
standards. 
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All three of the major input categories, namely, land, capital and labour, have 
contributed towards the increase in white agricultural output over the period 
since 1911, although to a different extent. Between 1930 and 1976 the total 
area controlled by farmers outside the black rural areas rose by only 3.5 
percent. The total area cultivated, however, more than doubled over the 
same period. Capital in the commercial agricultural sector rose by an 
average of 3 percent per year between 1946 and 1980, measured in constant 
1975 prices, and had nearly trebled in terms of its total real value over that 30 
year period. The labour input has also grown, but somewhat more slowly 
than capital, averaging 2 percent per year. Over the years from 1946 to 
1977, farm output in the sector rose at a yearly average rate of 4 percent. 
Employment in white agriculture grew in absolute terms throughout the period 
to 1970 and from then on appears to have started to decline slowly. 
The significant changes in the structure of white agriculture undoubtedly 
occurred in the days of the early exploitation of minerals when farmers, who 
had previously largely been producing for their own use, saw the possibilities 
for profit that were opened by the growing mining towns. As a note of interest 
, although there was net emigration by whites from agriculture from 1921 
onwards, the number of farms owned by whites increased up to 1951. This 
seeming contradiction could be the result of anyone of a number of things: 
for instance, the rate of out-migration may have been lower than the natural 
rate of population growth, or alternatively it may be due to the fact that in 
many cases more than one farm is owned by a farmer. (Nattrass, 1990). In 
1975, 5 percent of the farms accounted for 40 percent of the total farmland, 
whilst at the other end of the scale 24 percent of the farms had land holdings 
of less than 50 hectares and together accounted for less than 7 percent of the 
total white farmland. 
6.2.2 The Traditional Sector: Black Agriculture 
The main activities of black agriculture take place in the former areas of the 
black states. From a purely climatic point of view, black agriculture areas are 
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very favourably situated. In general, black farming was organized on tribal 
lines with no security of individual tenure. The agricultural land is traditionally 
allocated on a strip basis with the number of strips being largely determined 
by the availability of land. Grazing land is communal and even cultivated land 
may not be fenced, as once the crop has been harvested, it too reverts to the 
community for grazing purposes until the time comes to sow the next crop. 
Generally, productivity levels in black agriculture are low and the sector's 
major contribution to South African economic development has been as a 
labour supplier rather than as a food producer. The major foodstuffs 
produced in the black agricultural sector are maize, sorghum (millet), 
vegetables and wheat. Between 1921 and the 1970s there was virtually no 
change in the total volume of cereal crop production throughout the period 
although there was a change in the crop mix as maize was apparently 
increasingly substituted for sorghum. 
From various researches, many factors have been cited for the low 
productivity in this sector. People leave the rural areas of the black states to 
work as migrants in the modern economic centre because they and their 
families are unable to survive on what they can produce in their rural homes. 
Secondly, innovation in agriculture requires investment. Studies on the 
behaviour patterns of migrants suggest that they typically remit only between 
2-25 percent of their earnings to their rural homes. (Bureau of Market 
Research: 1972, a,b,c. Clarke and Ngobese, 1975). This low level of 
remittance to the rural areas, coupled with the low levels of productivity there, 
means that rural family incomes are too small to permit any substantial 
savings, making it virtually impossible for these families to finance investment. 
It is also argued that the persistence of the tribal system is the root of the 
sector's low productivity. Hobart Houghton stated this viewpoint quite 
explicitly when he said: 
"The explanation would appear to be that the African peasants have failed 
to adapt their farming practices to modern requirements. General 
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conservatism, the system of land tenure and certain social customs, like 
'ukulobola', combine to perpetuate obsolete methods of farming.,,16 
6.2.3 The Economic Contribution of Agriculture 
The contribution of agriculture to GDP fell rapidly after 1919. By 1939 it 
amounted to less than half the 1913 figure. From 1933 onwards government 
policies have been able to push up the prices of agricultural commodities, but 
they have not been able to halt the decline in the relative weighting of 
agriculture in the economy. Between 1940 and 1945 the contribution grew 
from £50.7 million to £81.9 million. By 1960 this had trebled to £248 million, a 
substantial increase in the purchasing power of farmers, but nevertheless of 
declining relative importance within the economy (Jones and Mueller, 1992). 
From 12.9 percent of GDP in 1961, agriculture's contribution to GDP had 
fallen to 5.6 percent by 1988. The relative contribution of agriculture to the 
gross domestic product during the period 1990-1995 was just under 5 
percent. The importance of agriculture, therefore, does not lie in its 
contribution to the country's GDP, but in the country's ability to feed itself and 
in the influence exerted upon the government by the relatively small farming 
community. 















Source: World Bank, 1999. 
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Agricultural exports declined relatively as South Africa's industry base 
broadened. In the immediate postwar years they averaged about 35 percent 
of production. The sugar exports had been a development of the 1930s when 
South Africa had privileged access to the British and Canadian markets. On 
the other hand fresh fruit exports had been expanding since the beginning of 
the twentieth century, and had been accompanied by tinned fruit . and 
preserves and wine. Indeed in 1933, wool alone accounted for 39 percent of 
non-gold exports, a proportion that had fallen to 12 percent by 1958. 
In 1954, for the first time, the export of food, beverages and tobacco 
combined exceeded that of wool. This increase in exports considerably 
exceeded the increase in prices. Between 1930 and 1960 wholesale prices 
roughly trebled, agricultural exports rose almost ninefold. Between 1945 and 
1957 when wholesale prices did not double, exports rose almost sixfold. 
When the agricultural contribution to GDP fell below 10 percent in the 1970s, 
its contribution to exports remained 20 percent. Such exports included 
manufactured goods such as preserves, tinned fruit and alcoholic beverages. 
In 1982, exports of preserved fruit and jam, together with deciduous and 
citrus fruit and grapes, amounted to R361 million and exceeded the value of 
wool exports. In the following two years fruit exports, at R342 million and 
R511 million exceeded maize exports and were the country's leading 
agricultural exports. 
The agricultural contribution to GDP has not grown significantly in real terms 
since 1991. This was attributed to the poor weather conditions between 1991 
and 1994. The agricultural policy reforms since 1994 were aimed to remove 
institutional and policy-induced distortions, increase competitiveness, and 
provide disadvantaged farmers with access to agricultural resources. Price 
deregulation started in 1996 with the abolition of the marketing boards and a 
reduction of import tariffs. The simple average tariff level on agriculture is 
now 5.6 percent. 
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According to the 1996 edition of Abstract of Agricultural Statistics agricultural 
imports in the period 1992 to 1994 annually averaged R4.4 billion, versus an 
export figure of R6.4 billion for both processed and un processed agricultural 
produce. In 1994 alone, which was an average agricultural year th~ value of 
imports came to R4.9 billion and exports to R8.3 billion. In 1997, export 
subsidies were eliminated, except on sugar. 
Figure 6.3: Agricultural Sector as Generator of Export Earnings 
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Source: World Bank, 1999. 
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6.2.4 Linkage Effects of the Agricultural Sector with Other Sectors 
Table 6.1: Linkage Effects of Agricultural Sector: Purchases as 
P fG I ercentage 0 ross ncome 
Agricultural purchases Percentage Agricultural sales Percentage 
Fodder production 18.8 Food industry 51.8 
Textiles sector 1.0 Liquor industry 1.8 
Wood products 0.5 Tobacco industry 1.4 
Paper products 1.0 Textile industry 0.6 
Fertilisers 10.7 Wood processinq 2.3 
Other chemicals 1.4 Pulp and paper 2.1 
Diesel, ect 7.9 Total 61.4 
Manufacturinq 
Metal products 1.0 Total Intermediate 70.6 
Transport spares 1.3 Final consumption 24.4 
Total Industry 47.9 Exports 5.7 
Electricity, gas and 1.6 
water 
Building construction 0.6 
Trade, incl. Motor trade 9.1 
Transport 3.9 
Labour 20.2 
Source. ABSA Bank, 1996. 
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From Table 6.1, it is clear that industries absorb the major part of agricultural 
spending. Directly measured, it amounts to some 48 percent of agricultural 
spending. In addition more than 20 percent of gross income is paid as 
wages. As a provider of raw materials for further processing, agriculture also 
makes an important contribution to the economy. A large number of industrial 
sectors responsible for some 25 percent of total industrial production obtain 
their basic raw material inputs from the agricultural sector. More than 60 
percent of total gross agricultural production is delivered to the manufacturing 
sector for further processing or consumption, and some 24 percent of gross 
production is destined for final consumption, and about 6 percent of gross 
production is exported. 
As a job provider agriculture remains important, and estimates suggest that 
currently some 850000 workers are permanently employed in agriculture. 
Mechanisation in order to achieve optimal production and the rising cost of 
labour are the main reasons for job opportunities declining in both absolute 
and relative terms, but agriculture remains important because of the large 
number of benefiting dependants per farm worker (ABSA Bank, 1996). 
Naturally, there are also large numbers of temporary workers, seasonal 
labour in particular, who augment their income from time to time in this way. 
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1991/92 1992/93 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 
Volume (000 tonnes) 
Maize 3277 9997 13275 4866 9958 
Wheat 2142 1324 1984 1840 1977 
Hay 6980 6661 6197 4958 5424 
Sugarcane 20078 12955 11244 15683 16714 
Viticulture products (hi) 9997 9183 9124 9663 10126 
Citrus fruit 948 982 1008 1149 1062 
Deciduous fruit 2383 2327 2036 2338 2422 
Subtropical fruit 539 402 377 353 419 
Vegetables 1906 1906 1890 1886 2014 
Wool 88 76 80 70 64 
Cattle & calves 2328 2305 2017 1550 1597 
slaughtered 
Sheep & goats 7498 6981 5331 3430 3915 
slaughtered 
Value (R m) 
Maize 1490 4137 4868 2825 5995 
Wheat 1321 923 1493 1390 1569 
Hay 1044 1620 1078 1090 1481 
Sugarcane 1140 1226 1123 1626 1751 
Viticulture products (hi) 708 692 866 966 1214 
Citrus fruit 658 709 744 1227 1322 
Deciduous fruit 1505 1255 1727 1838 1962 
Subtropical fruit 355 343 303 341 411 
Vegetables 1057 1103 1249 1531 1587 
Wool 428 323 371 573 498 
Cattle & calves 
slaughtered 2871 2809 2922 3325 2939 
Sheep &goats 
slaughtered 884 911 946 867 896 
Source: EIU. 998/99. 
6.2.5 Developments in Agriculture 
In addition to the economic contribution agriculture makes to the South 
African economy, it is necessary to examine some of the underlying trends in 
agriculture itself. The first trend concerns price and cost increases in 
agriculture. The price of the food basket, made up as in the consumer price 
index (GPI), rose annually by 13.8 percent on average in the period 1970-
1995. This compares in the total GPI, food included of 12.4 percent per 
annum. During this period, prices fetched by agriculture increased annually 
by an average of 11.4 percent, which is lower than the rate of increase for the 
total GPI or food prices paid by the consumer. Processed food product prices 
increased by 12.3 percent on average per annum, which is marginally lower 
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than the increase in the total CPI. The main reason for the cost of a food 
basket rising faster than producer prices is the introduction of the general 
sales during the period under review. The rate was only 4 percent. This 
general sales tax was later replaced by the value added tax (VAT) (ABSA 
Bank, 1996). 
Another important development in agriculture, is the event that affected the 
financial position of agriculture during this period. Between 1975-1995, the 
gross income of agriculture grew from R2752 million to R29563 million. This 
represents an annual average increase of 12.6 percent. Net farming income, 
i.e. after compensating for production factors (mainly labour and interest 
payments) increased from R1338 million in 1975 to R13135 million in 1995. 
This is an annual average increase of 12.1 percent, which is lower than the 
increase in gross takings. In this period the wage account grew by 12.9 
percent per annum on average. The number of farm labourers declined by 
some 16 percent in this period, suggesting an increase in remuneration per 
worker of approximately 14 percent on average per annum17. 
However, agriculture still has some serious problems. Unstable weather 
conditions remain a problem. These increasingly force agriculture to apply 
sound management principles. In addition, there are aspects such as safety 
on farms, land reform, establishment of the smaller farmer, land tax, water 
tax, labour legislation, marketing, and assistance with agricultural 
development in Southern Africa. These features create major uncertainty in 
agriculture the need for demand adjustments and pose challenges in this new 
millennium. 
6.3 Mining Sector 
The mining sector in South Africa has historically been the mainspring of 
modern economic development. The foundations of the present-day 
economy were laid with the exploitation of the discoveries of first, diamonds in 
17 For more discussion on this, see ABSA Bank, 1996, A Perspective on Agriculture in South 
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Kimberley, and then gold on the Witwatersrand. The discovery and 
exploitation of diamonds and gold led to an economic metamorphosis and the 
entrenchment of the white settlers throughout the region. The economist 
Frankel, commenting in 1938, on the overall importance of the diamond 
discoveries to the establishment of modern South Africa said: 
"The miracle which Europeans in South Africa needed had occurred. The 
most effective means for obtaining surplus wealth had been found when the 
size of the industry is taken into account. The wealth accruing from the 
production of diamonds in South Africa has probably been greater than that 
which has ever been obtained from any other commodity anywhere in the 
world" (Frankel: 1938, p.S2). 
Frankel argued that the most significant characteristic of the diamond industry 
was its ability to generate surplus. The diamond industry developed largely 
through the process of reinvesting the profits that were earned in the industry. 
In the initial stages, particularly in the case of the alluvial deposits, very little 
capital was applied to diamond mining. However, as the dry diggings began 
to go deeper and to cave in and fill with water, it became apparent that the 
answer lay in abandoning the initial mining techniques, which consisted of 
mining a 47 foot road servitude, and in the adoption of subterranean mining. 
With the change in the approach to diamond mining, came a significant 
increase in the size of the capital input needed for the mining operations. At 
the same time as mining costs started to increase with the switch to 
underground mining techniques, competition between the mining companies 
led to an oversupply of diamonds to the market. World prices declined 
dramatically. It became apparent to the leading capitalist of the time that it 
was essential to control the supply of diamonds to the market if the 
profitability of the industry was to be maintained. 
In the 1970s, gold mining was the second-largest sub-sector in the South 
African mining industry. Its impact was felt on employment creation, 
contribution to state revenue and contribution to the GDP. The development 
of the gold mining industry had also a significant political and economic 
Africa. 
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impact on the relative position of South African blacks. It has intensified the 
tendencies towards racial economic inequality instituted by the discovery of 
diamonds. The sector accounted for some 8 percent of GDP and 60 percent 






Figure 6.4: Mineral Sector Contribution to GDP 
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Source: South African Statistics Bulletin, 1999. 
The development of gold mining had an immediate impact on capital 
accumulation. This took place through the generation of output allied to the 
needs of the industry itself such as pit props, explosives, miners boots, food 
and liquor as well as the provision of services such as those provided by the 
transport riders and the Amawasha (the Zulu, washerman's guild) (Van 
Onselen, 1982). There was also a direct link between the growing mining 
sector and infant manufacturing activity. The gold mining industry has also 
made a very significant contribution to South African capital accumUlation 
through its capacity to earn foreign exchange. Since the 1970s there has 
been a decline in the volume of gold production, partially due to ore bodies 
being worked out (EIU, 1988/89). However, the major reason was that 
government policy requires mines to follow an average grade mining policy. 
This ensures that the life of mines is prolonged when the gold price, in rand 
terms, rises. 
Output increased slightly in 1982 and 1983 in response to lower prices and 
the momentum of increasing production was continued in 1984. In 1985, and 
1986 production again fell in response to strongly rising prices and strikes. In 
1987, the further fall in output, from 638 tonnes to 605 tonnes, was 
aggravated by a major strike by black workers for about half of the month of 
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August 1987. In 1995, the annual output of gold slumped to 520 tonnes, 100 
tonnes lower than in 1993. Gold output slid to a trough of 492.5 tonnes in 
1997, and in 1998 the first half of the year saw cumulative production of 234.9 
tonnes, slightly lower than the 241 .6 tonnes produced in the first half of 1997. 
Gold earnings have been buffeted by the fall in prices to below US$30010z in 
late 1997 from levels of up to US$40010z in earlier years. The mining sector's 
share of export earnings actually understates the contribution that it makes to 
net foreign exchange earnings because, unlike manufacturing, the sector 
makes relatively little use of imported inputs. The mining sector has also 
been a significant source of funds for the state. 
T bl 63 M"" P d f a e " : mmg ro uc Ion 
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Volume (000 tons) 
Gold (000 kg) 619.2 579.3 519.8 494.6 492.5 
Iron ore 29385 32321 32144 30951 33333 
Chrome 2827 3559 5130 4982 5794 
Copper 166 165 161 151 151 
Manganese ore 2507 2851 3165 3254 3095 
Diamonds (000 carats) 10324 10857 9569 10166 10009 
Coal 182031 195805 203427 208362 21861 
Lime & limestone 18215 19719 18776 18495 7 
18600 
Gross value (R m) 
Gold (000 kg) 23169 24953 23335 26482 25077 
Iron ore 1279 1400 1658 1692 2088 
Copper 1035 1255 1679 1497 1636 
Manganese ore 549 645 687 784 892 
Lime & limestone 536 605 688 693 691 
Total including others8 46632 50712 54180 63104 66314 
Source: EIU, 1998/99. 
8 Others include silver, chrome, coal, diamonds, asbestos and uranium. 
Mining and quarrying growth was stagnant from 1990-1998, with a 0.1 
percent annual average growth over the period. The share of mining in GDP 
declined from around 9.2 percent in 1990 to 6.5 percent in 1998. This has 
been attributed to the decline in gold mining, which shrunk from 51.9 percent 
of export earnings and 63 percent of employment in 1990 to 40.7 percent and 
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55.6 percent in 1998 respectively (Department of Finance, 2000). Gold 
production decreased at an average rate of 2.9 percent since 1990, with a 
worsening trend over the past five years, owing to lower production levels, 
rising production costs and a downward trend in the dollar price of gold. The 
volume of platinum, coal, chrome and iron-based metal has been increasing 
over the last five years. 
6.4 Manufacturing Sector 
The success of the industrialisation process in South Africa owes a great deal 
to the rise of Afrikaner nationalism, and in particular to the rather strange 
political alliance that took place in 1924 between white labour and white 
Afrikaner- dominated rural capital. South African manufacturing has always 
been closely tied to the fortunes of the mining industry and even today the 
links between the two sectors remain strong. In the initial phases of 
industrialisation, the products produced were closely allied to the needs of the 
mines and the subsequent development of manufacturing relied heavily on 
the economic resources that had been accumulated by the mining sector. 
The foreign exchange earned from the sale of minerals financed the 
extensive importation both of capital goods and essential intermediate inputs 
that were needed by the growing industrial sector. 
Over the period from 1919 to 1976, industrial output grew at a yearly average 
rate of 5.9 percent in real terms. There have been two periods of rapid 
industrial expansion, namely, the period between 1936-1951, which included 
the second World War, and the period 1964-1975. As industrialisation gained 
momentum, substantial changes took place in the manufacturing sector, 
encompassing changes in the range of commodities produced, in the size of 
the firms producing the products, and in the techniques used in the 
production process itself. In 1960, the physical volume of manufacturing 
output was six times as large as in 1930. The volume of manufacturing was 
about 12 percent lower in 1995 than at its peak in 1981. About half of the 
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drop occurred in 1985. Some sectors, such as motor manufacturing, were 
affected to a much greater degree (Jones and Muller 1992). 
There was 1 a percent gain in real manufacturing output in 1986. But the 
sector recovered between 1986-1987 and recorded a growth rate of more 
than 4.7 percent. In the 1990s, the growth rate ·of the sector has fluctuated. 
The sector grew by 1.2 percent between 1990 and 1994. In 1995, the 
manufacturing sector recovered with growth of 7.6 percent, but this rate fell 
back in 1996 to 0.4 percent, and recovered only fitfully to 3.3 percent in 1997 
(EIU, 1998/99). 
Table 6.4: Manu acturmg ro uctlon f P d 
1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Sales (1995=100) 96.5 92.6 91.3 93.1 100.0 102.0 102.5 
Volume of 
production 96.4 93.5 91.7 93.6 100.0 100.6 103.9 
(1995=100) 
81.0 78.5 77.9 80.0 83.3 81.5 81.2 
Capacity 
utilisation (%) -658 -83 -477 851 2261 nla nla 
Change in 




(1990= 1 oci) 
Source: EIU. various Issues. 
On average, the amount of capital needed per man employed increased in 
real terms and output per man (labour productivity) rose correspondingly. 
This suggests that more merchanised methods of production were introduced 
over the period. On the whole, however, both the increases in the degree of 
capital intensity in production methods and in labour productivity were 
relatively low. Between 1924 and 1976, the real profit rate in the 
manufacturing was maintained by the following: (i) the real value of output per 
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rand unit of plant and machinery invested in the sector remained virtually 
constant and (ii) the proportion of every rand earned from the output 
produced in the sector that was paid out as wages, was also extremely stable, 
notwithstanding the fact that the average real wage rates both of black and 
white workers rose over the time period. 
6.4.1 Structural Change in the Manufacturing Sector 
During the period under review, there have been major changes in the 
manufacturing sector. In the early stages of South African manufacturing the 
output of the sector was substantially geared towards the production of goods 
for the domestic consumer market and the mining industry. In the early 1950 
and 1960s, the three sub-sector of food, clothing and textiles, and wood and 
paper products together accounted for 57 percent of the total manufacturing 
production. Factories making more sophisticated machinery were almost 
non-existent and contributed only 1 percent to the sector's total output. By 
1976, there had been a significant change. The output from the machinery-
making sector had grown at an average annual rate of 14 percent throughout 
the period to provide 13 percent of the sector's total output. Chemicals and 
metal products had also become increasingly significant, as had the 
production of electronic equipment. 
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While manufactured exports have been erratic, they have shown an 
increasing trend over the last decade. However manufactured exports 
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actually declined between 1980 and 1989, and reached an average level of 
16 percent of merchandise exports. The sector recovered in 1993. A number 
of factors have contributed to increases in manufactured exports. These 
include export incentives, the declining value of the rand, and especially 
important, a prolonged recession and the low levels of demand in the 
domestic market. While there are exceptions, micro-level studies have found 
that firms were not investing significantly in plant and equipment in order to 
produce for export market (Joffe et ai, 1997) 
Figure 6.6: Manufacturing Sector contribution to GDP 
Source: World Bank, 1999. 
-+--- Manufacturing, value 
added (% of GDP) 
As in the case of output, the period 1936-1951 was the one which saw the 
most rapid rate of increase in employment in the manufacturing industry as a 
whole, with an average yearly rate of increase of over 6 percent. The share 
of employment in manufacturing that was accounted for by the clothing and 
textile sub-groups was nearly twice as large as their contribution to the 
sector's output. The most rapidly growing sub-sectors, over the period, in 
employment terms, were machinery, metal products and clothing and textiles. 
Manufacturing employment also rose steadily in the 1970s, increasing by a 
little over 35 percent between 1972 and 1982. However, since then, 
manufacturing employment, despite some fluctuations, has shown a tendency 
to decline. In 1993, there were 89000 fewer jobs in manufacturing than there 
had been in 1982 (EIU, 1996/97). 
The structural transformation that has taken place in South African 
manufacturing as the economy has modernised, shows very clearly in the 
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way that capital has accumulated in the subsectors. The rate of investment 
has been the highest in the machinery sub-sector, metal products and base 
metals and the lowest in the sectors that were relatively well established at 
the beginning of the 1960s and 1970s. 
As cited above, the manufacturing sector is the largest contributor to GDP. 
The sector's share in GDP has been very stable over the last three decades. 
This stability can be seen in figure 6.6. Manufacturing grew by an annual 
average of 0.1 percent in real terms between 1991 and 1999. Productivity 
grew as trade reform exposed the sector to competition and new export 
opportunities. From 1994 to 1997, the sector was buoyed by strong 
consumption spending (Department of Finance, 2000). 
6.5 External Trade and the Balance of Payments 
As in other economies in sub-Saharan Africa, South African foreign trade has 
two main features, namely, the dominance of primary products (commodities) 
in exports and the importance of foreign trade when measured as a . 
proportion of the national income. The Union had a very open economy and, 
as part of the British Empire, had few impediments to the exchange of goods 
and services with Britain (Jones and Muller, 1992). The imposition of tariffs 
specifically designed to foster industrialisation, discouraged growth of certain 
imports, but the volume of gold pouring out of the South African mines 
removed potential balance of payments constraints and encouraged the 
growth of imports. Gold followed by agricultural products dominated exports. 
In 1986, gold and agriculture accounted for 26 percent of the national income. 
Exports and imports were also influenced by the pattern of industrialisation. 
While official import substitution policies in the 1950s and 1960s discouraged 
the import of consumer goods, this did not prevent them from rising in 
industries such as clothing and footwear, where the foreign manufacturer was 
able to cover his costs sufficiently to offset the tariff. The growth of 
manufacturing output in the 1960s promoted the growth of manufactured 
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exports, which explains why the manufactured proportion of total exports rose 
from 26 percent to 41 percent between 1964 and 1970. These exports, 
however, were not an engine of growth, they were a consequence of growth, 
and the South African economy did not enjoy the benefits of export-led 
growth. 
From 1973-1979, however, South Africa did experience export-led growth. In 
those years non-gold exports experienced an average growth rate of 40.3 
percent compared with an average of 23.6 percent for Gross Domestic 
Product. Base minerals led the way with an average growth in exports of 58 
percent, followed by manufactured goods with 41.3 percent. The collapse of 
the rand in 1985 provided a further boost to exports. With the achievement of 
political stability in the mid-1990s, and the reduction in the level of domestic 
inflation, South Africa is expected to experience further export-led growth. 
The current stable depreciated exchange rate will also make the South 
African export products more competitive in the international export market. 
6.5.1 The Pattern of Exports 
Gold dominated exports in 1961 and, in the next decade, despite the fixed 
gold price, it retained its relative importance. In 1961 gold exports exceeded 
manufactured exports by 40 percent and agricultural exports by 156 percent. 
A decade later, in 1972 manufactured exports exceeded gold exports, while 
un processed agricultural exports, which had not kept pace with economic 
growth, now amounted to not much more than a third of gold exports. 
Between 1961 and 1972 the value of gold exports had more than doubled, 
with the result that they remained very important for the balance of payments. 
In 1961 the value of gold exports amounted to 37.7 percent of total exports 
and in 1972 to 36.5 percent. The increase in the price of gold then led to a 
regression in the structure of the economy, as gold increased its relative 
importance. It is important to recognise that, while the value of gold output 
expressed as a proportion of GDP was declining, this was not the case when 
expressed as a proportion of exports (Jones and Muller 1992). 
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The broadening of the base of the South African economy that had been 
such a feature of the 1950s continued in the 1960s and the 1970s; but in the 
1970s it was overshadowed by the rise in the price of gold and metals, both 
as a proportion of GDP and a proportion of exports. The effect upon exports 
was obvious in 1973, when gold once again overtook manufactured goods, 
despite their impressive growth in the later 1960s. Neither the South African 
economy as a whole, nor its exports were able to escape from the 
dependence upon gold, even though manufactured goods exported had 
increased their proportion from 26 percent in 1964 to 41.1 percent in 1970. In 
the late1970s and 1980s the combination of a higher gold price and a 
declining rand strengthened these regressive features in the economy. 
Between 1973 and 1986 gold exports rose by over nine-fold. Gold, however, 
had experienced a slight relative decline as a result of the boom in other 
mineral exports. It was the growth of these exports that saved the balance of 
payments in these years, though at the price of making the economy yet more 
dependent upon volatile primary products. Coal, platinum, chrome, copper, 
iron ore, manganese and diamonds led the way, with coal the star performer, 
overtaking diamonds in 1981. In the 1980s platinum began to figure more 
prominently among the minerals exported. This boom in mineral exports has 
compensated for the disappointing performance of manufactured exports. 
The principal exports, other than gold and diamonds, were metal products 
and agricultural products. In the 1970s, exports of metal and metal products 
rose from R100 million in 1970 to R1 553,8 million in 1980. Chemical exports 
also rose, though from a lower base. They rose more than sevenfold from 
R63.2 million in 1970 to R443.7 million in 1980. While fruit quadrupled its 
exports, other food and livestock increased theirs by more than sixfold. Coal 
exports only became important in the later 1970s, but by 1981 they had 
overtaken diamonds. In 1980, the principal export~ were pearls, precious and 
semi-precious stones, and gold coins at R2 845.9 million, mineral products at 
R1 547.0 million, base metals at R1 594.3 million, unprocessed agricultural 
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products at R820.7 million, and processed foodstuffs, wines, spirits and 
tobacco at R729.7 million. 
In the decade after 1976, the rise of markets in the Far East and the 
continued growth of the American market counterbalanced the decline of 
Britain as an export market for South African goods. The collapse of the rand 
in 1985 and the intensification of the political campaign against South Africa 
that followed led the Pretoria authorities to stop publishing details of the 
destinations and sources of South African exports and imports. In 1977 the 
principal export markets were Britain, America, Japan, Germany, France, 
Switzerland, Belgium and Italy. A decade later the order had changed very 
considerably as both United States and Japan had overtaken Britain by 1983, 
Germany and Italy by 1987, reflecting the boom in mineral exports from South 
Africa. 
6.5.2 The Pattern of Imports 
In the early 1980s primary goods and intermediate goods still accounted for 
well over four-fifths of exports, reflecting the difficulty experienced by 
exporters of manufactured goods. The pace of industrialisation in South 
Africa and the progress of import substitution on the other hand had 
influenced imports. Though the variety of South African imports widened, the 
trend already established before 1961 of importing increaSing quantities of 
producer goods continued. In 1945 the textile industry in South Africa was 
very small and textiles figured prominently in the list of imported goods. By 
the late 1980s imports of consumer goods of this kind had fallen to negligible 
proportions. Machinery and transport equipment accounted for 36.2 percent 
of all imports in 1961. 
By 1973 this had dipped to 32.1 percent and by 1986 to 29.9 percent. In 
1968 machinery imports were valued at R519 million and accounted for 21.8 
percent of imports. Chemical imports, however, had increased substantially 
reflecting the growth of the plastics industry, synthetic textiles, paper and 
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packaging, pharmaceuticals and a variety of petrochemical products. 
Chemical imports rose from 20 percent of GDP in 1961 to 23 percent of GDP 
in 1982. The rise in the gold price in 1973 reversed the long-term trend 
towards a more self-sufficient economy and had the effect of increasing the 
country's dependence upon international trade. In 1987 imports were still 
relatively more important than they had been 14 years earlier. 
Table 6.5: South Africa's Current Account of Balance of Payments 
(R billion) 
1989 1992 1993 1994 
Merchandise exports 39.1 50.4 58.4 69.9 
% of total exports 56 61.5 62.2 63.3 
Net gold exports 19.1 19.4 22.4 23.7 
% of total exports 27.4 23.6 23.9 21.5 
Service receipts 8.5 9.6 10.7 13.3 
% of total exports 12.2 11 .7 11.4 12.1 
Income receipts 3.1 2.6 2.3 3.5 
% of total exports 4.4 3.2 2.4 3.1 
Total exports 69.8 82.0 93.9 110.3 
Merchandise imports 44.3 52 60.5 77.7 
% of total imports 67.3 68.9 69.6 72.1 
Payment for 9.2 12.4 15.4 18.1 
services 14.0 16.5 17.7 16.8 
% of total imports 
Income payments 12.3 11.1 11 12.1 
% of total imports 18.7 14.6 12.6 11.2 
Total imports 65.8 75.5 86.9 107.8 
Balance on trade 13.9 17.9 20.4 15.9 
account 
Balance on service -0.7 -2.9 -4.7 -4.8 
account 
Balance on income -9.2 -8.4 -8.7 -8.6 
account 
Current transfer 8 -0.5 -1 -2.1 -2.2 
Balance current 3.5 5.6 4.9 0.3 
account 
Source: ABSA Bank. 1999 and SARB. Quarterly BulletinS. 
a Net receipts. 
1995 1996 1998 
86.6 103.9 135.1 
66.6 66.4 68.4 
22.5 26.3 25.9 
17.3 16.8 13.1 
16.8 21.6 29.1 
12.9 13.8 14.8 
4.1 4.7 7.3 
3.2 3.0 3.7 
130 156.5 197.3 
99.4 118.7 150.8 
73.3 73.5 73.6 
21.7 24.7 30.2 
16.0 15.3 14.7 
14.6 18 23.9 
10.7 11.2 11.7 
135.6 161.4 204.9 
9.7 11.5 10.2 
-4.9 -3.1 -1.1 
-10.4 -13.4 -16.7 
-2.3 -3.2 -4.1 
-8 -0.1 -11.6 
During the period of financial sanctions against South Africa (1985-1993), a 
surplus on the current account of the balance of payments had to be 
maintained in order to cope with the annual net outflow of foreign capital, thus 
protecting the country's foreign reserve position. However, during the post-
sanctions period 1994-1998, the current account showed a cumulative deficit 
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of R37.8 billion, while a cumulative net outflow of foreign capital amounting to 
RS7.9 billion was recorded during the same period. South Africa's non-gold 
export volumes increased by 9.1 percent per annum during 1994-1998. This 
resulted mainly from a 2.S percent per annum depreciation in the real 
effective exchange rate, improving the country's international 
competitiveness, as well as an almost 4 percent per annum increase in real 
world economic growth during the same period, impacting positively on 
international demand for the country's exports (ABSA Bank, 1999). South 
Africa's import volumes increased by 9.9 percent annum during 1994-1998, 
mainly as a result of domestic real economic growth of 2.7 percent during this 
period. 
From Table 6.S, the South Africa's current account, the share of gold exports 
has more than halved from 27.4 percent in 1989 to a record low of 13.1 
percent in 1998. This declining trend could have been attributed to various 
factors which influence the value of gold exports. First, the dollar price of gold 
declined by 23 percent from US$382 per ounce in 1989 to US$294 per ounce 
in 1998. Secondly, taking into account a S2.6 percent depreciation of the 
US$/R exchange rate from R2.62 to RS.S3 over the same period, the rand 
price of gold increased by 62.S percent from R999 per ounce in 1989 to 
R1623 per ounce in 1998 (ABSA Bank, 1999). However, the third factor that 
probably had the most significant effect on gold exports, is the country's gold 
output which declined by 21.8 percent from 60S.6 metric tonnes in 1989 to 
473.8 metric tonnes in 1998. This fall in gold output as a result of increasing 
production costs over time, resulted from a decrease in the grade of gold 
bearing ore, higher real wages, production losses due to strikes, unrest and 
accidents, and mining operations being conducted at ever-increasing depths 
below the surface. 
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6.6 Social Service Sectors 
6.6.1 Education 
Education in South Africa has been in crisis for many decades. This crisis is 
a product of long history of inequality in educational provision as reflected in 
different racial policies. The allocations of government expenditure to various 
racial groups have been based on the apartheid policy. Black education has, 
therefore, been especially severely disadvantaged because of these policies. 
This pattern changed after the 1976 student revolts that reflected the failure 
of Bantu Education. Therefore, black education was forced to reassess its 
effectiveness. Not much changed in state schooling immediately after 1976, 
but in 1978 and 1979 the state increased expenditure on black education. 
More classrooms were built in the urban areas and more money was 
allocated for maintaining schools in these areas. In January 1980, a new 
statute, the Education and Training Act, replaced the Bantu Education Act. 
Amongst other things it declared that free and compulsory education would 
be the centre of policy (Samuel, 1990: p.23). 
According to Pillay and Adams (1989) the enrolment ratio in education 
adequately measures the degree of quantitative expansion and educational 
development. World wide and in South Africa there has a dramatic 
expansion of education at all levels. In South Africa school enrolment ratios 
of black pupils have especially increased, between 1960-1989. 
The gap in the per capita expenditure on education between black and white 
pupils narrowed significantly from the late-1960s to the mid.;.1990s. In 1969, 
per capita spending on black pupils was only 6 percent of that spent on white 
pupils, while in 1994/95 it had increased to about 28 percent. In 1995/96, 
there was a 15 percent shift in expenditure on education away from white to 
black. In fiscal year 1983/84 education accounted for 17.1 percent of total 
government expenditure and 4.6 percent of GDP, while in 1997/98, it 
constituted 21.2 percent of total expenditure and 6.6 percent of GDP (ABSA 
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Bank, 1999). 
Table 6.6: Education: Percentage of Age Group E 11 d nro e 
Primary Secondary 
1960 89 15 
1970 99 18 
1986 115 58 
1990 122 74 
1996 131 54 
Source: World Bank. 1999. 
It can be seen from Table 6.6, that there has been an increase in the school 
enrolment ratio for both primary and secondary. By comparing the two ratios, 
the primary school enrolment ratio has been very high. It increased from 89 
percent in 1960 to 115 percent in 1986 and then to 131 percent in 1996. This 
improvement might have brought by policy changes in the education system 
of South Africa, specially the abolition of Bantu Education in the 1980s which 
has reduced inequalities between different groups in the country. The 
secondary school enrolment has increased slightly compared to primary 
school enrolment ratio. From 15 percent in 1960, it increased to 58 percent in 
1986. It continued to increase and has reached a high level of 74 percent in 
1990 and later decreased to 54 percent in 1996. 
6.6.2 Health Services 
For many years, health expenditure focused on high-quality curative care 
accessible by a minority of the white population to the neglect of primary 
health care for the majority of the black population. Health indicators in South 
Africa are a reflection of general socio-economic conditions in the country. 
Apart from these indicators, infant and child mortality rates are generally high, 
while life expectancy at birth is relatively low in comparison to other countries. 
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Table 6 7· Health Indicators ..
Health Expenditure 1990-1995 
as % ofGDP 
Public Private US$ per capita Population per Hospital bed per 
Sector Sector physician 10000 population 
1990-1994 1990-1994 
3.6 4.3 77 1527 39 
Source: ABSA Bank, 1996. 
Health conditions in South Africa are reflected inter alia, by the following: 
• 10863 AI DS cases were reported from 1982 to July 1996 
• The estimated number of tuberculosis (TB) was 159000 in 1996. 
• In 1996, 29160 cases of malaria were reported, while 158 people died 
from the disease in that year. 
Table 6.8: Registered Health Personnel in South Africa (per 10000 per 
Populationl 
1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 1994 
Nurses 9.1 16.9 22.1 38.3 40.2 37.8 
Doctors 4.5 4.9 5.0 6.0 7.3 6.5 
Pharmacists 1.7 1.8 1.8 1.9 2.7 2.2 
Dentists 0.7 0.8 0.7 1.0 1.2 0.9 
Paramedics 0.3 0.8 2.2 5.0 8.3 8.7 
Source: ABSA Bank, 1996. 
From Table 6.8, it is clear that there has been an improvement in health 
facilities and an increase in the number of health personnel, particularly 
between 1950 and 1990. The number of nurses per 10000 per population 
has increased from 9.1 in 1950 to 40.2 in 1990 and then decreased to 37.8. 
The increase in the number of doctors is not that impressive as compared to 
the nurses. Pharmacist and dentist numbers have also grown slowly as 
compared to paramedics. The new government is trying to redress the 
balance of health care, and has already made considerable progress in 
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expanding primary healthcare. Although 300 clinics have been built since 
1994, there is a drive to improve the number of clinics in some former 
homeland areas where each rudimentary health clinic serves as many as 
30000 people. Health expenditure takes just over 10 percent of total 
government expenditure, and a quarter of overall health spending in 1994/95 
was diverted to primary health care, compared with only 5 percent in 1993/94 
budget. Health expenditure has also been about 6 percent of GDP in recent 
years (ABSA Bank 1996). 
Like other most African countries, South Africa is faced with a relatively high 
rate of population growth compared to developed countries. The country's 
average annual population growth fell from a high of 2.8 percent during the 
1960s to 2.2 percent during 1990-1997. These population growth trends are 
not detrimental to efforts to improve the average standard of living of the 
population and put enormous pressure on government finance. Apart from a 
high population growth rate, illegal immigration into South Africa also poses a 
major problem in respect of many socio-economic issues in the country. 
6.7 Macroeconomic Policies and Economic Growth 
6.7.1 Fiscal Policy and Economy Growth 
The effect of fiscal policy on economic performance is experienced in two 
ways. First, the effect of fiscal policy on macroeconomic variables such as 
aggregate demand, the total government borrowing requirements, and the 
growth rate of the economy is known as the macroeconomic approach. 
Secondly, the effect of the fiscal structure on the microeconomic foundations 
of production is fundamental to an understanding of the influence of fiscal 
expenditures. 
In 1990 the South African fiscal had an actual expenditure of close to one 
third (31.8 percent) of the country's GDP. In 1960 this figure was 13.2 
percent. During the period from 1960 to 1990 the macroeconomic 
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significance of the fiscal allocations grew steadily. Over the same period, the 
share of fiscal revenues also increased markedly, from 14.10 percent of the 
GDP to 28 percent in 1997. While such remarkable increases reflect the 
rising economic importance of fiscal allocations over the period, the financing 
side of the fiscal policy that is the tax-deficit mix of state revenue, namely, 
public debt, has raised a great deal of interest and confusion world-wide, and 
it needs to be carefully assessed. In economic terms, public debt is regarded 
as problematic only if its growth rate exceeds the rate of growth of .the 
economy over time. 
Longer- term trends in tax revenue and government expenditure as 
percentages of GDP are depicted in figure 6.7. Expenditure grew strongly in 
relation to GDP in the 1980s to reach a peak of 32 percent in 1992/93. After 
remaining at similarly high levels for most of the mid-nineties a reversal of the 
trend began to emerge after 1996/97. Revenue was relatively stable relative 
to GDP during the 1980s and the 1990s. 
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The South African income tax schedule was subject to frequent changes 
during the 1966-1990 period. Although there is little evidence of the impact of 
the tax rates on the supply of labour, theoretically the disincentive effects of 
these tax rates would be expected to influence primarily the supply of white 
labour (Abedian and Standish, 1992). The stability of the debtlGDP ratio 
depends largely on the relative magnitude of the real rate of economic growth 
and the real interest rate. Thus monetary policy, by setting the nominal 
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interest rate on one hand and influencing the inflation rate on the other, exerts 
a substantial impact on this ratio. 
Figure 6.8: Government Debt in South Africa 
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Source: Abedian et ai, 1997. 
Although the stock of public debt has been rising since the 1960s, as a 
proportion of GDP its share has been generally declining over the period. 
The trend of the South African debt as a ratio of the GDP has been rising in 
the 1980s and 1990s. This could herald fiscal difficulties if continued over 
time. By 1987, the interest on public debt constituted 15.6 percent of central 
government expenditure. The corresponding ratios in 1960 and 1970 were 
4.9 percent and 8.6 percent respectively. In the 1990s, these ratios continued 
to rise and have reached a high level 20.4 percent in the 1996/97 financial 
year. 
6.7.2 Investment and Savings 
The overall level of savings and investment in the country seems to have 
been affected by tax rate changes. In the years between 1978-1982, national 
savings remained within a narrow band of 25 to 28 percent of GDP. National 
investment, on the other hand, has shown a great deal of variation. The 
impact of the Sharpville (1960-1962) and Soweto (1976-1979) events, and 
those of the 1980s, are clearly discernable. In the wake of all such political 
events the country's national savings exceeded national investment. 
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Lombard and van den Heever (1990) argued that net savings available for 
domestic capital formation was seriously depressed over the past two 
decades by a rapidly accelerating need to provide for the replacement of 
capital depreciation from a sluggishly growing gross output. The basic 
problem was the wasting of capital resources and falling output productivity of 
capital formation, which in turn is explained by the huge subsidies on the user 
cost of capital in the 1970s. A main element in these subsidies was negative 
real interest rates in the period. A second drain on domestic savings 
available for investment was substantial outflow of capital as the financial 
sanctions were felt. Particularly since 1985 a large proportion of net domestic 
savings (41.5 percent) has been applied to the reduction of foreign liabilities 
or the accumulation of foreign assets. 
An individual with annual earnings of R30,OOO paid on average 21.5 percent 
tax in 1988, as opposed to 6.3 percent in 1970 or 10.8 percent in 1975. Such 
substantial cuts into disposable income have obviously diminished the 
individual's ability to save. This is further compounded by the impact of a 
rising general sales tax (GST). Over the period 1970-1990, income tax and 
GST increased their share from five to almost 20 percent of national personal 
incomes. The Value Added Tax (VAT) introduced in September 1991, was 
expected to enhance this trend to a large degree. While theoretically a 
superior tax when compared with GST, its introduction on top of the existing 
high income tax robs the average income earners of their chance to save. 
Instead, it ensures a much larger and more widely-based revenue for the 
state. 
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6.7.3 Monetary Policy for Economic Growth 
South Africa is the leading member of the Common Monetary Area (CMA). 
Other member currencies are linked or pegged to the South African rand. 
Since 1970, the South African economy has suffered from a rate of price 
inflation which has been higher than that of its trading partners. Among other 
ills, it has also experienced wide fluctuations in nominal and real interest rates 
and a decline in the value of the Rand in the period. Inflation control and 
exchange rate stability have been prime concerns of the monetary authorities, 
the problems have occurred despite the authorities' efforts to prevent them. 
Since the advent of the new government in South Africa, developments in 
monetary policy have been dominated by certain factors. First, after almost 
10 years of persistent capital outflow, which imposed a binding balance of 
payments constraint on the country, the economy was faced with a surge in 
capital inflows. Between 1985 and 1994, capital outflows averaged over R5 
billion per annum. In 1993 alone, outflows totalled over R15 billion. After the 
elections between July and the end of December 1995, capital inflows 
amounted to over R30 billion. In February 1996, however, there was a 
sudden change in sentiment, which resulted in a reversal of these inflows and 
a significant depreciation of the rand, which at one stage fell to over 
R4.70/USD. 
The second major development was the abolition of the financial rand in 
March of 1995, the result of which was that transactions by non-residents now 
have a direct impact on the capital account. In addition, the abolition of the 
financial rand meant that the partial insulation of South African interest rates 
from world rates through the financial rand mechanisation no longer existed. 
There are two other important developments that also need to be cited. First, 
after years of inflation inertia, the inflation rate has declined significantly. 
Whereas it averaged around 15 percent in the 1980s, the latest figure was 
below 10 percent. The other important factor affecting monetary policy is the 
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high degree of Reserve Bank independence that prevailed during the late 
1980s. This coincided particularly with the appointment of Dr. Stals as 
governor in 1989, and the Reserve Bank was afforded a greater degree of the 
independence under his leadership. 
6.7.3{a) Monetary Policy, Interest Rates and Prices 
Until 1998 the bank rate was the major operational tool of monetary policy. 
Interest rates in South Africa displayed a great deal of variability during the 
1980s. At the beginning of the 1980s, the bank rate was 4.7 percent and in 
real term this implied highly negative real interest rates. This was due to a 
large extent to the influence of the high gold price, which resulted in a decline 
of the money market shortages, and therefore excess liquidity. By 1983, this 
situation changed. The gold price slumped and the Reserve Bank, under the 
influence of the De Kock Commission of Inquiry into Monetary Policy, allowed 
interest rates to rise substantially. By 1984, the bank rate had risen to 20.75 
percent, implying high positive real interest rates, and with prime rates higher 
than these rates, the economy had experienced an extremely wild gyration of 
real interest rates. 
It was only in 1988 that the balance of payments constraint became 
dominated by balance of payments developments. Therefore, in 1988, for the 
first time since the onset of the debt crisis, private sector domestic fixed 
investment began to increase, albeit modestly and off a low base. This had a 
significant impact on the current account, and the authorities had to respond 
to the rapidly declining surplus by raising interest rates and imposing import 
surcharges. During the course of 1988/89 the bank rate rose from 9.5 
percent to 18.0 percent. Since 1989, following the appointment of Dr. Stals 
as the Governor of the Bank, a more consistent monetary policy has resulted 
in relatively more stable but positive real interest rate. As balance of 
payments' pressures moderated in the early 1990s and the inflation rate 
showed signs of declining, the bank rate was reduced gradually from 18 
percent . in March 1991 to 12 percent in October 1993. In September 1994, 
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this trend was reversed with a rise to 13 percent following the adverse 
balance of payments pressures and a reversal of the downward trend in 
inflation. Further one percentage point increases were implemented in 
February and June 1995. Following the capital outflows and the decline in 
the rand since February 1996, the Reserve Bank raised the bank rate a 
further one percentage point in April 1996. It should be also noted that these 
interest rate increases have been undertaken at a time of declining inflation 
rates, implying that the real rate has been increasing substantially. 
The other factor with respect to interest rates that must be kept in mind in any 
scenario is that South African interest rates are likely to become more 
affected by interest rate developments internationally, than was the case in 
the past. First, the current moves towards liberalisation of the capital account 
imply that South Africa's interest rates have to move more in line with those 
abroad and follow interest parity considerations. In the past, South Africa's 
interest rates were in part insulated from international developments through 
the financial rand mechanism. Essentially it meant that because foreign 
investors invested at the financial rand, but interest and dividends were 
repatriated at the commercial rand rate, the discount between the two rates 
enhanced the returns to non-residents. Thus if interest rates in South Africa 
were low, a depreciation in the financial rand would enhance the yield to the 
non-residents. 
Therefore, the adjustment was made through the financial rand rate, rather 
than through changes in domestic interest rates. Secondly, domestic interest 
rates have been shielded from foreign interest rate developments through the 
Reserve Bank operations in the forward exchange market. Until recently, the 
Reserve Bank has set the forward rate directly and has done it in such a way 
as to encourage traders to finance their imports offshore. An important 
component of the forward exchange rate policy has been that the forward 
premium or discount has been set simply on the basis of trade finance 
interest rate differentials, rather than on the basis of expected exchange rate 
changes. 
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Table 6 g. Interest Rates and Inflation ..
Bank Rate Prime Inflation Real Bank Real 
Overdraft Rate Rate Overdraft 
Rate Rate 
1985 15.00 15.50 14.9 0.03 0.53 
1986 11.00 14.50 17.1 -6.10 -2.60 
1987 9.50 12.50 14.9 -5.45 -2.45 
1988 12.25 15.20 . 12.0 0.17 3.12 
1989 17.00 20.00 13.7 3.27 6.27 
1990 18.00 21.00 13.3 4.61 7.61 
1991 17.00 20.25 14.20 2.72 5.97 
1992 15.00 18.25 13.0 1.95 5.20 
1993 13.00 16.25 9.7 3.30 6.55 
1994 13.00 16.25 9.0 4.00 7.25 
1995 15.00 18.50 8.7 6.30 9.80 
1996 17.00 20.25 7.2 5.63 8.91 
1997 16.00 19.25 8.8 4.12 7.53 
Source: SARB, Quarterly Bulletins, various Issues. 
During 1995, the Reserve Bank announced its intention to withdraw gradually 
from the forward market. The implication of this move was that the insulation 
provided by the previous activities of the Bank to interest rates and the 
exchange rate would be phased out, and forward premia and discounts would 
be more appropriately reflect expectations of future exchange rate 
developments. However, during the 1996 crisis, the Reserve Bank reverted 
to its policy of using the forward market as a means of intervention in the 
foreign exchange market. During the period between mid-February and end 
of April, the Reverse Bank's net oversold forward position had increased to 
over US$12 billion from US$8 billion (LSE, 1996). 
6.7.3(b) Inflation Rate 
From Table 6.9, it can be seen that South Africa's inflation rate during the 
1980s was characterised by a high degree of inertia, with consumer price 
inflation fluctuating narrowly around the 15 percent level. Despite much 
tighter monetary policy since 1988, the inflation inertia was only broken in 
1992 when the inflation rate began to drop, averaging 9.7 percent in 1993 
and 9 percent in 1994. Food price inflation dropped markedly in 1995, with 
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prices rising by 8.7 percent during the year and the overall inflation rate 
dropping to 7.4 percent (Kahn, 1996). An important element in the downward 
trend in the inflation rate was the fact that during 1995 the rand exchange rate 
was relatively stable. A stable exchange rate implies that imported prices will 
be rising at the same rate as foreign price inflation. It is also argued that the 
South African inflation rate is higher than those of its trading partners; this 
implies that the real exchange rate is appreciating and therefore putting 
adverse pressure on the manufacturing sector. 
6.7.3(c) Money Supply 
The target of monetary policy according to the Reserve Bank is M3, and 
guidelines are set for the rate of growth of this variable. The Reserve Bank 
has had mixed success in maintaining the rate of growth of M3 within these 
guidelines. For instance, in 1994 the guidelines of the upper and lower limits 
were 9 percent and 6 percent respectively. The actual growth of M3 for the 
year was 14.6 percent. The guidelines are 10 percent and 16 percent. The 
money supply also began to increase, having been contained in 1992 and 
1993, and in June 1994 increased by 15 percent. Bank credit extended to the 
private sector, after having contracted in 1992 and most of 1993, extended by 
13.2 percent in June 1994 (Khan, 1996). 
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6.7.3(d) Monetary Policy and Capital Inflows 
During the period of inflows in 1994/95, there was the fear that if foreign 
capital inflows continued unabated on the same scale, the Reserve Bank 
would face the problems of many other emerging markets, particularly in Latin 
America. The phenomenon of excessive capital inflows provides a direct link 
between monetary policy and exchange rate policy in South Africa as well as 
elsewhere. The problems facing South Africa with respect to capital I 
nflows were: 
~ It was difficult to know at the time what the nature of these capital inflows 
were. According to the Reserve Bank, a large proportion of these inflows 
were short-tern and therefore easily reversible. 
~ These inflows complicated monetary control, particularly with respect to 
the impact on the money market shortage. 
~ The Reserve Bank was concerned about the impact of an appreciating 
rand on the country's international competitiveness, even though an 
appreciation of the nominal rate would contribute to the decline in the 
inflation rate. 
6.7.3(e) Exchange Rate Policy 
It is the rate of exchange, the conversion rate at which the authorities are 
prepared to convert South African rand into other currencies, that links the 
foreign trade sector to the rest of the domestic economy. As a result, there is 
a definite link between changes in the exchange rate and changes in the 
supply of money in the domestic economy. The interim report of the De Kock 
Commission, which concentrated its attention on this particular relationship, 
included the following statement: 
"One of the first and most basic conclusions reached by the 
Commission in this regard is that there are few hard and fast a priori 
rules which can be laid down about the many different effects of 
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exchange rate changes in South Africa. In most cases the nature and 
significance of the relationship between exchange rates and other 
economic variables depend upon circumstances.18. 
Overall exchange rate policy has been determined by the factors that have 
influenced the rest of the international trading community, but within these 
overall limits domestic exchange rate policy has been reasonably 
conservative, with the authorities, in general, favouring the maintenance of a 
stable exchange rate. After leaving the gold standard in 1936, South Africa 
signed the Bretton Woods Agreement in 1945, which established a system of 
relatively fixed international exchange rates. During that period the Bretton 
Woods Agreement remained in force, and the South African currency was 
realigned only once in 1949 when it was devalued by 30 percent against the 
United States dollar. Despite the apparent stability of the South African 
currency between 1945 and 1971, there was a significant change in the 
authorities' attitude towards the foreign sector of the economy during this 
period that was not reflected in the exchange rate. 
In 1960, there were significant social disturbances throughout South Africa 
and these triggered off a feeling of economic insecurity that was reflected in a 
massive outflow of capital. In 1961 the authorities closed the gates, by 
imposing a limit on the outflow of capital and tightening up on exchange 
control regulations. These restrictions remained in force until their abolition in 
February 1983 and had a Significant influence on the domestic monetary 
situation. In 1968, the establishment of the two-line gold market heralded the 
start of the end of the era of relatively fixed international exchange rates. This 
failed to stabilise the international economy, and in 1971 the Bretton Woods 
system was finally abandoned. In the adjustment that followed, the South 
African authorities decided to tie the rand to the dollar and to allow them to 
float together, within limits, against the other international currencies. The 
decade of the 1970s was one of considerable instability on the international 
current markets and it is virtually impossible to detail all the movements that 
18 Quotation from Nattrass 1990, pp.266 
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took place over this period. 
The rand was however, devalued quite significantly against the dollar in 1975 
and lost ground, with the dollar, to other major currencies such as the 
German mark, the Swiss franc and the Japanese yen. Throughout this period 
the controls on the outflow of capital were maintained, which in effect, 
resulted in an overvaluing of the rand on the international market (Kahn, 
1992). 
As a result of controls on capital outflows, the South African balance of 
payments has strengthened and built up liquidity. This situation has 
generated pressure for a relaxation of the exchange controls. The Interim 
Report of the Commission of Enquiry into monetary policy recommended that 
steps should be taken in this direction. The first step was freeing the rand, 
and a dual exchange rate was introduced via the creation of the financial rand 
at the end of 1978. This system was abolished later in February 1983, 
together with exchange control over non-residents. Initially, it appeared that 
this boldness was to be rewarded with inflows of capital, as foreign investors 
responded by injecting funds into the South African economy. Political 
instability and the precipitous decline of the rand against other currencies, 
notably the dollar, from the end of 1982 led to massive outflows of foreign 
capital. The refusal of foreign banks to roll over short-term debt in 1985 and 
the resulting debt crisis confirmed the severe financial problems of the 
economy. This necessitated the reintroduction of the financial rand in 
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Source: World Bank, 1999. 
The most significant recent development in exchange control liberalisation 
was the abolition of the financial rand mechanism in March 1995. This 
effectively removed most controls on inflows and outflows of non-residents' 
capital. However, the restrictions on local borrowing by non-resident 
companies remain, although these were relaxed in June 1996 (Kahn et ai, 
1998). Apart from the abolition of the financial rand, there have been some 
gradual moves towards lifting controls on residents. First, there was the 
announced intention that applications from South African companies wishing 
to undertake direct investments in Africa in particular would be given 
favourable treatment. Secondly, there was the asset swap mechanism 
announcement by the Reserve Bank, which allows institutional funds to 
purchase blocks of foreign assets in exchange for domestic assets. In June 
1996, institutions were allowed to invest up to 3 percent of their annual 
income flows abroad. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
7 A REVIEW OF ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN BOTSWANA 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter attempts to understand the good economic performance that 
occurred in Botswana. The chapter also provides an overview of economic 
performance and highlights the policies that have led to the impressive 
economic performance in this small economy. Chapter seven also sheds 
light on the constraints to industrial development in Botswana. 
7.1.1 Background 
The country is a landlocked state in the Southern Africa, bordered by South 
Africa in the south and southeast, Zambia and Zimbabwe in the northeast, 
and Namibia in the north and west. The climate is sub-tropical, ranging from 
continental to semi-arid. The desert covers almost 70 percent of the country, 
with the Kalahari dominating southern and western Botswana. The country 
has population of around 1.5 million, with a large share concentrated in the 
eastern regions where the major towns are located. When Botswana gained 
independence on September 30, 1996 it was one of the poorest and least 
developed countries on earth. Per capita Gross National Product (GNP) was 
estimated at no more than US$69. British budgetary grants in aid and other 
grants to the tune of 57 percent financed the recurrent budget of the 
government. It was in the light of these facts that the Transitional Plan for 
Social and Economic Development published on the day of independence 
stated that, fundamental to the plans and policies of the Government, is the 
determination to make the country a financially viable entity in the shortest 
possible period (Mogae, 1985). 
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Botswana today is a paradox of political economy. This is a capitalist 
economy based on central planning, more capitalist than any of its 
neighbours (including South Africa) in lack of state ownership, control and 
management of industry or agriculture or even of infrastructure, but also more 
planned than even supposedly-socialist states in Southern Africa in terms of 
state machinery identifying, projecting and inducing the growth of economic 
sectors over five-year periods (Murray and Parsons, 1985). The 
transformation of Botswana has been dramatic. Substantial improvements in 
incomes, infrastructure and employment have been achieved since 
independence, which was supported primarily by income from the mining 
sector's income. Whereas only 4 percent of the total population lived in urban 
centres at independence, by 1991 this had increased to 46 percent. 
The country's infrastructure, which was hardly developed when Bechuanaland 
was a British protectorate, has improved significantly, with a road system 
comprising more than 4600 km of tarred roads linking main urban centres, 
and the extension of dependable water, electricity and telecommunication 
services to many parts of the country. Botswana's significant achievements 
of economic development have to large extent resulted from sound and 
effective management by the government, which had pursued a policy of 
financial prudence. Compared to other sub-Saharan African countries, the 
country has demonstrated strong economic growth and social development 
(WTO, 1998). 
7.1.2 Economic Performance since Independence 
At independence in 1966, as mentioned above Botswana was of the 20 
poorest countries in the world and the dominant economic activity was cattle 
raising. Botswana is now counted as a middle-income country, and has been 
the world's fastest growing economy since its independence in 1966. The 
country's economic performance may be of rather wider interest than its size 
would suggest. In, itself Botswana's growth is not all that remarkable. The 
discovery of large mineral deposits mainly diamonds but also copper-nickel, 
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demand for diamonds led to an improvement of the mining sector, while 
following improvements in the international prices of metals in 1993/94, 
production of copper and nickel increased significantly, contributing to a 
growth rate of 5 percent in the mining sector. 
Table 7 1· Sectoral Break Down of Botswana's GDP at Constant Prices ..
Economic Activity 1993/94 1994/95 1995/96 1996/97 1997/98 
(P million) 
Agriculture 198.9 189.8 189.0 188.6 186.4 
Mining 1585.4 1561 .6 1716.3 1815.8 1987.9 
Manufacturing 283.1 295.3 314.5 330.8 346.4 
Water & electricity 121.6 129.1 127.9 134.2 147.3 
Construction 261.0 265.2 272.4 287.7 300.1 
Tradea 736.7 794.2 852.1 942.5 1022.0 
Transport 212.6 226.2 239.6 270.6 295.8 
OthersD 1389.2 1458.5 1529 1648.4 1799.8 
GDP 4667.5 4792.9 5108.3 5474.0 5928.9 
GDP per capita (Pula) 3082.1 3231 .3 3392.0 3658.3 3941 .0 
Source: MFDP, 1999. 
a And hotels and restaurants 
b Include general government, banks, insurance and business services, and 
social and personal services 
The main contributory factor behind the impressive improvement in economic 
activity in 1995/96 was the continued high performance of the two major 
sectors: mining and general government. These sectors grew by 9.9 percent 
and 6.8 percent in real terms respectively during the year, compared to -1.5 
percent and 6.1 percent in 1994/95. The increase in government spending 
was largely on infrastructure development. Recent reform measures aimed at 
resuscitating the economy and providing a firm basis for economic 
diversification are likely to have strengthened economic recovery. These 
measures include the Orapa diamond mine expansion, the north-south 
pipeline, the liberalisation of exchange controls, the reduction of corporate tax 
rates, wage restraint and the restructuring of parastatals. Notable growth was 
also recorded in manufacturing, which grew by 6.5 percent in 1995/96 
compared to 4.3 percent in 1994/95, mostly due to rapidly rising exports of 
non-traditional commodities to South Africa. 
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In terms of GDP by expenditure, economic growth in 1997/98 was largely 
explained by a significant increase in domestic demand. During the year, 
gross domestic expenditure, which comprises gross fixed capital formation 
and consumption, rose by 15.4 percent, increasing its share in GDP from 80.9 
percent to 86.2 percent. Gross fixed capital formation increased by 12.1 
percent while total government and household consumption increased by 
16.2 percent. The share of government consumption increased from 29.3 
percent to 30.0 percent, while that of the households increased from 25.2 
percent to 28.5 over the period. At the same time, the share of gross fixed 
capital formation rose from 23.6 percent to 24.4 percent during the one-year 
period (Bank of Botswana, 1999). The contribution of external demand to 
GDP growth was depressed during the year as a result of the slow growth of 
exports, coupled with a significant increase in imports. Exports of goods and 
services grew only by 5.5 percent, while imports of goods and services rose 
by 19.0 percent. As shares in total GDP, exports decreased from 58.8 
percent in 1996/97 to 57.3 percent in 1997/98, while imports increased from 
39.5 percent to 43.4 percent over the same period. 
7.2 Sectoral Performance 
7.2.1 Agricultural Sector 
The agricultural sector in Botswana is composed of two distinct production 
subsectors, traditional and commercial. Each sector comprises both crop and 
livestock farming activities. The difference between commercial and 
traditional farming is based on land tenure, technology and market 
integration. Commercial farms, mainly freehold or leased, comprise 8 percent 
of the total land area. These farms hold about 14 percent of all cattle and 
account for about 37 percent of total production of cereals and pulses. 
Commercial farms tend to specialise in cattle production. Traditional farming, 
with individual managed arable holdings and communal grazing livestock hold 
about 86 percent of all cattle, 98 percent of goats and 83 percent of sheep. 
Commercial farming tends to adopt a business approach in the management 
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of farm enterprises. The commercial sector uses modern technology and 
applies purchased inputs. The Traditional sector uses family labour. 
Because Botswana is partly semi-desert and partly savanah, with erratic 
rainfall and relatively poor soil, the country is more suited for grazing than to 
arable production. The agricultural sector contributed about 40 percent to 
GDP at independence in 1966. Its share has now declined to about 4 percent 
due to the rapid development of the mining sector, particularly diamond 
mining. Rapid urbanisation and the growth of manufacturing have also 
contributed to this decline. Despite this decline, agriculture remains an 
important source of food, income, employment and capital formulation for the 
majority of the population living in the rural areas. About 2 percent of formal 
employment comes from the sector. 
Figure 7.2: Agriculture contribution to GDP 
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Source: World Bank, 1999. 
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Cattle production continued to receive the lion's share of agricultural 
development funds after independence, mainly in the form of funds for 
borehole drilling and the modernisation of the Lobatse abattoir to meet the 
demands of overseas markets. The Botswana Meat Commission (BMC) was 
established as a parastatal corporation to take over the abattoir and the 
marketing of beef in 1965 (Murray and Parsons, 1985). Favourable terms for 
beef exports were first obtained in the United Kingdom and then through the 
U.K. in 1975 with the European Economic Community. The Botswana Meat 
Commission thereby sold beef to Europe at four times the world market price. 
The value of Botswana Meat Commission sales increased from P8.6 million in 
1970 to P53.4 million in 1976. It was not until 1978 that the value of diamond 
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exports surpassed that of beef. Such growth, however, was accomplished at 
the cost of overgrazing and the rapid deterioration of the range. In 1976, it 
was calculated that there was enough grazing land to support only 2 million 
cattle without inflicting permanent damage to the range, provided there was 
rain . In the 1970s the range had to support 3 million cattle (Murray and 
Parsons, 1985). 
A second abattoir with daily throughout capacity of 115 head of cattle was 
opened in Maun, and a third at Francistown in 1990 with a daily throughout 
capacity of 400 cattle. However, the Maun abattoir was closed in 1996 as a 
result of the contagious lung disease in Ngamiland. Between 1991 and 1995, 
BMC produced 20867 tonnes of beef and exported 19500 tonnes . BMC 
contributed 5 percent annually to domestic consumption, while beef 
consumption countrywide averaged 50000 carcasses in municipal abattoirs 
and home slaughter. During the 1997/98 financial year, the Botswana Meat 
Corporation slaughtered 162000 cattle, 2000 sheep and 2000 goats, as 
compared with 127000 cattle, 2843 sheep and 2115 goats in 1996/97. Even 
though this is an improvement over the previous year, this· resulted in only 62 
percent capacity utilisation at the Francistown and Lobatse abattoirs. This led 
to the introduction of incentive schemes by the BMC to encourage traders 
and farmers to sell to the BMC (MFDP, 1999). 
These activities include a guarantee scheme in which commercial banks give 
advances to cattle traders to buy and sell cattle to the BMC, as well as the 
footlot scheme aimed at increasing throughout and slaughter weights. In 
general, the beef markets continue to be depressed because of the BSE 
(Mad Cow Disease) scare in Europe. Prices of beef in Europe, which 
accounts for 75-80 percent of the market, remained low during the year. 
Despite the depressed market, the BMC made a surplus, which enabled the 
abattoir to declare a 13 percent bonus at the end of the year. Producer prices 
were also increased by 5 percent during 1997/98. 
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Table 7.2: BMC Sales by Product and Market Share, 1993' 
Product United Germany Other 
Kingdom Europe 
Beef 
Chilled 27.3 18.0 3.2 
Frozen 11 .9 14.0 12.9" 
Corned beef 3.5 0.0 0.2 
Wet blue 0.0 0.0 12.8" 
hides 
Carcass meat 0.0 0.0 00 
Wet blue 0.0 0.0 12.8" 
hides 
Edible offal 3.1 0.0 0.1 
Total' 45.8 32.0 29.2 
Market Share 27.6 19.3 17.6 
Source: WTO, 1998. 
' . Pula million unless otherwise indicated 
" Netherlands 
b Italy 









21 .6 14.0 
b Including other lesser-value products and smaller markets (Hong Kong , 
Mauritius) . 
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Crop production in Botswana since independence has been even more 
problematic. In drought years the country has had to import almost all its 
maize and much of its sorghum, the two main food staples and subsistence 
crops. Even in years when rains were good , crop production has failed to 
keep with the population growth rate. National self-sufficiency has dropped 
from an average of 90 percent in 1966 to no more than 50 percent in the early 
1980s. Sorghum is the predominant and staple crop in Botswana. Maize and 
wheat have also recently gained popularity, especially in the urban areas . 
Food crop production constitutes less than one-third of consumption even in 
drought-free years. Botswana is therefore a net importer of cereals, with 
South Africa as the main source of imports. One of the contributing factors to 
the ever-increasing cereal imports is Botswana's rapid population growth. 
The 1997/98 rainfall season was generally drier compared to the 1996/97 
season. Rainfall was low, poorly distributed and erratic, with prolonged dry 
spells. This resulted in low ploughing and planting rates. In terms of 
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production, crop yields were generally low during the 1997/98 crop season , 
with average yields of 115 kg/ha for sorghum, 61 kg/ha for maize and 113 
kg/ha for pulses compared to 220208 and 191 kg/ha, respectively in 1996/97 
(MFDP, 1999). It is estimated that crop production for 1998/99 in the 
communal subsector will be around 9740 tonnes, which would be about 29 
percent of the previous year's production of 33339 tonnes . This production 
comprises of 6340 tonnes of sorghum, 1120 tonnes of maize and 2280 
tonnes of pulses. 
The total crop production forecast for both communal and commercial farms 
is estimated at 13009 tonnes in 1997/98, which is substantially lower than 
33470 tonnes in 1996/97. This production falls far short of the country's total 
cereal requirements of 302154 tonnes for the 1998/99, and it is expected that 
the short-fall will be met from imports. Prices of maize, sorghum meal and 
rice increased slightly in 1998. The monthly average retail price of maize was 
P1 .64/kg , compared to the previous year's figure of P1.48/kg in 1997. 
Similarly, the monthly average retail prices of sorghum meal and rice were 
P1 .69/kg and P4.97/kg in 1998, compared to P1.48/kg and P4.90/kg in 1997 
respectively (EIU, 1998/99). 
7.2.2 Mining Sector 
Good fortune has shone on Botswana since independence. In 1967 
diamonds were discovered at Orapa and the existence of major copper-nickel 
deposits were established at Selebi-Phikwe. Both these deposits were in the 
Bamangwato where the Morafe not the central state held the mineral rights, 
but the Bamangwato were persuaded to relinquish their rights to the state in 
the national interest in 1967. The two mines enjoyed contrasting fortunes . 
The Orapa mine began producing diamonds in July 1971 at a rate of 2.4 
million carats per annum. Mining was opencast and processing costs were 
negligible. Output increased steadily during the 1970s and new mines were 
opened at Letlhakane in 1977 and Jwaneng in 1982. In 1984, nearly 13 
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million carats were produced with an estimated value of almost 900 million 
Pula (Mogae, 1985) . 
The dream of copper fuelling economic development was transformed into a 
nightmare by plummeting world metal prices and by technical problems in 
mining and smelting processes. Production got under way until 1974 and the 
mine only began to run efficiently in the early 1980s. Although a number of 
company restructurings resulted in the Anglo-American Corporation of South 
Africa replacing Amax as the major shareholder in Bamangwato Concessions 
limited (BCl), by 1984 their accumulated deficit was P70 million. The 
justification for keeping the mine operational has been its efficient low-cost 
productivity, despite its massive accumulated debt. The Morupule coalmine 
at Palapye was established to supply coal for electricity generation at Selebi-
Phikwe. It has since increased its output to fire a new 90 MW power station 
commissioned in 1987 to provide power for a national grid independent of 
South Africa but interdependent with Zimbabwe. The Morupule mine 
produces less than half a million tonnes a year from coalfields conservatively 
estimated to contain 17 billion tonnes. 
, 
Since the first decade after independence the mineral industry has been the 
main agent of growth in Botswana. Exploitation of mineral resources was 
emphasised in the planning process and actively pursued by government 
officials. Mining development involved complicated negotiations and 
financing arrangements . It also involved sizeable expenditures, financed by 
government loans, to improve infrastructure. The government provided the 
new mines with the bulk of water, power, and transport facilities necessary for 
opening. As a result mineral exploitation and the associated infrastructure 
construction grew at a rate of 20 percent a year in real terms between 1968 
and 1975, and the share of mining in construction in GDP increased from 1 
percent to 12 percent. 
The enormous influence of mining and mining interests in Botswana is 
illustrated by the fact that in 1973/74 GDP was little more than the aggregate , 
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cost of commissioning the mine and the surface treatment plant at Selebi-
Pickwe (R180 million) . As mineral development and the associated 
construction activity progressed , Botswana's exports increased from less than 
Ri1 million in 1966 to R105 million in 1975. Mineral products accounted for 
R54 million . Imports, the main source of government revenue, increased 
from R19 million to nearly R160 million. The effect on employment, however, 
was not proportionate. Formal sector employment increased from 48000 in 
1972 to over 60000 in 1976. In that year, mining accounted for more than 12 
percent of GDP, but employed only 7 percent of the cash labour force in 
Botswana. Mining has provided the basis for Botswana's economic 
development, and the country is now the third largest African mining producer 
after South Africa and the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) . 
7.2.2(a) Contribution of Mineral Sector to Gross Domestic Product 
As cited earlier, mineral development has made a major contribution to the 
growth of the economy of Botswana. Indeed, the mining industry was largely 
responsible for the graduation of Botswana from recurrent budget aid from 
British Government and entitlement to International Development Association 
resources in the early 1970s, and from the world 's least developed countries 
in the late-1980s. At independence, in 1966, the mineral sector contributed 
almost nothing. By 1972, diamond production at Orapa had started and the 
sector's contribution to GDP had jumped to 11 percent of the total , which was 
then only P103.6 million . In 1983, with production at Orapa doubled from 
1978, letlhakane and Jwaneng mines commissioned , and the Bel copper-
nickel project on stream, the industry was contributing 32 percent of GDP, 
which itself had grown more than ten times to over P1153 mill ion (Gaolathe, 
1997). 
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Table 7 3· Mineral Sector Contribution to Gross Domestic Product ..
1972 1980 
GDpa 103.6 875.5 
Mining GDpb 11.2 201.6 
Mineral share of 11 23 
total GDP (%) 
Source: Bank of Botswana, 1997. 
a Gross domestic product (Pula million) 
b (Pula million) 
1985 1989 1993 1995 
1828.6 5836.8 9126.0 12530.3 
753.1 2969.3 3042.3 4086.3 
41 51 33 33 
The mining sector's share reached its peak in 1989 when it accounted for 
more than 50 percent of the GDP, which was then P5837 million or 182 times 
what it was in nominal prices at independence. The industry's share has 
since decreased to 33 percent in 1995. In the 1990s, the mineral-led 
Botswana economy had recorded an average annual rate of growth of 13 
percent in real terms since independence. In 1998, the sector experienced 
unfavourable market conditions due to the economic turmoil in the East Asian 
economies. 
7.2.2(b) Diamonds 
Diamonds remain the leading export commodity, contributing 68.6 percent to 
total exports during the first half of 1996 compared to 71 percent during the 
same period in 1995. Botswana' s output is marketed exclusively by De 
Beers Central Selling Organisation (CSO), and Debswana renewed its five-
year exclusive marketing arrangement with the CSO in 1996. In 1982-1985 
Botswana had to stockpile an estimated 20 percent of annual output under 
the CSO deferred-purchase clauses. With increases in capacity at Jwaneng 
and the depreciation of the pula against the dollar, exports have continued to 
grow in pula value terms despite the quota imposed by the CSO. In 1995, 
export earnings set a new record of US$4 billion. The current diamond mines 
had reached planned production limits by the early 1990s, making Botswana 
the second largest volume producer after Australia, and second only to 
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Russia in value of output. In 1991, production was reduced to 16.5 million 
carats, in line with the long-term mining plan, and to 15.9 million and 14.7 
million carats in the following two years. With the commissioning of the fourth 
stream at Jwaneng late in 1994, production the rose to 15.5 million carats and 
to 16.8 million in 1995 (EIU, 1996/97). 
The vulnerability of the industry to adverse trends in the world market was 
heightened in 1992 when increased supply, mainly in the form of smuggled 
Angolan diamonds, caused a 13 percent drop in Botswana's sales of rough 
diamonds. The CSO was forced to introduce quotas in September 1992, 
reducing all producers' delivery entitlements by 25 percent. This was eased 
to 15 percent in July 1993. Total sales of rough diamonds through the CSO 
in 1994 were US$4.25 billion, rising to a record US$4.3 billion in 1995. The 
CSO rough diamond sales declined from US$4.64 billion in 1997 to US$3.34 
billion in 1998, as a result of global economic uncertainties. This resulted in 
Debswana stockpiling 20 percent of production as from February 1998. 
Diamond exports fell by 12 percent from P6.8 billion in 1997 to P6.0 billion in 
1998 (MFDP, 1999). 
7.2.2(c) Copper/Nickel 
Production of copper-nickel matte at Selebi-Phikwe began in 1974, and 
output rose steadily, reaching 50000 tonnes per year by late 1980s. 
However, the value of sales of matte declined consistently during the 1980s 
owing to depressed international prices of copper and nickel. In 1995, the 
high-grade matte production from BCl amounted to 48500 tonnes containing 
18000 tonnes of nickel, 20500 tonnes of copper and 271 tonnes of cobalt. 
Copper-nickel matte output is refined in Norway and Zimbabwe under long-
term contracts. In the late-1990s, the nickel and copper prices in the world 
markets were also adversely affected by the economic turmoil in Asia. Prices 
of nickel and copper fell sharply, and in October 1998 both reached their 
lowest points in ten years. Average prices per pound for the year were 
US$2.10 for nickel and US$0.75 for copper. The continued depression in the 
187 
prices of base metals resulted in Bel being unable to meet its operating 
costs during 1998, and emergency funding had to advanced, primarily by 
government. 
7.2.2(d) Soda Ash and Salt 
Soda ash production started in 1991, with production of 62000 and 26000 
tonnes of soda ash and salt respectively. After five years of operations in 
difficult market conditions, Soda Ash Botswana encountered insurmountable 
financial problems early 1995 and was placed under liquidation in June. 
Operations continued under the control of the liquidators until a newly formed 
company known as Botswana Ash acquired the assets. In January 1996, 
severe flooding halted production, which resumed on a smaller scale in April 
and by the end of 1996 full productionb was restored. In 1998, soda ash 
production was 196000 tonnes, compared to 200000 tonnes in 1997. At the 
same time, soda ash sales increased marginally, from 195 000 tonnes in 
1997 to 196000 tonnes in 1998. Although the selling prices of soda ash 
improved somewhat in 1998, they continued to be constrained by strong 
competition in the South African market from other soda ash producers. Salt 
production remained well below the design capacity of the plant at 215000 
tonnes in 1998. The amount of salt sold during the year was 135000 tonnes 
or 14 percent higher than in 1997 (Government of Botswana, 1999). 
7.2.2(e) The Mineral Industry as a Generator of Export Earnings 
The industry has been an overwhelming foreign exchange earner for the 
country. In 1980, the mining industry contributed 81 percentage of export 
earnings, of which 60 percent and 21 percent were attributable to diamonds 
and copper-nickel respectively. 
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Table 7.4: M· mera lE x po rt s 
Total of which of which Diamonds Copper-
Exports Diamond CopperlNick Share % Nickel 
Pula (Pula el (Pula Share % 
million) million) million) 
1972 30.3 ---- ---- ---- ----
1976 153.2 ---- ---- ---- ----
1980 390.4 235.7 80.8 60 21 
1981 332.3 136.5 79.7 41 24 
1983 696.7 459.2 65.8 66 9 
1985 1384.3 1048.1 119.9 78 9 
1987 2664.7 2251.4 118.2 84 4 
1989 3742.6 2860.9 471.9 76 13 
1991 3738.0 2941.5 296.4 79 8 
1993 4312.1 3340.2 219.8 77 2 
1995 5760.7 4090.0 287.2 71 5 
Source: Bank of Botswana, 1997. 
The value of total exports in current prices increased fifteenfold from P390.4 
million in 1980 to P5760.7 million by 1995. Throughout this period, except 
around 1981 when the diamond market was depressed, the contribution of 
diamonds and copper-nickel to total exports varied between 75 percent and 
nearly 90 percent with the former accounting between 60 percent and 84 
percent of the total and the latter less than 10 percent in most years. Soda 
ash and common salt exports have been varying between P53 million and 
P114 per annum since 1992. 
7.2.2(f) The Mineral Sector as a Generator of Government Revenue 
The mineral revenues to Government increased a hundred fold from P1 
million in 1972, the first full year of Orapa Mine production, to nearly P100 
million by 1981, reflecting the doubling of Orapa Mine production, the 
commissioning of Letlhakane Mine and the renegotiated fiscal regime during 
the late-1970s. After a moderate lull occasioned by the depressed diamond 
market, revenues rapidly grew from P376 million in 1985 to P2005 million by 
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1991, reflecting the major contribution of the Jwaneng diamond mine, which 
was commissioned in 1982, and the improved market conditions. 
Table 7 S· Mineral Sector Contribution to Government Revenue ..
Government (Mineral Total Government Mineral share of 
Revenues, PMS) Revenues, PM Total Revenue (%) 
1972 1.0 19.3 5 
1976 23.3 87.8 27 
1980 76.6 249.1 31 
1981 101 .1 306.6 33 
1983 99.5 393.7 25 
1985 376.5 802.9 47 
1987 845.0 1547.5 55 
1989 1508.1 2556.0 59 
1991 2005.3 3740.7 54 
1993 1866.1 4652.2 40 
1995 2278.7 4492.5 51 
Source: Bank of Botswana, 1997. 
S Pula Million 
The revenues from minerals have since then continued to grow to reach over 
P2278 million by 1995, partly as a result of the commissioning of the recrush 
plant and the fourth stream expansion project at Jwaneng, which increased 
caratage production of that mine by over 40 percent. In percentage terms the 
mineral share of total government revenues grew from 5 percent in 1972 to 
33 percent in 1981, and reached a peak of nearly 60 percent in 1989. It has 
since been oscillating around 50 percent of the total. In 1995, the sector's 
contribution to government revenue stood at 51 percent. 
7.2.3 Manufacturing Sector 
Before independence, in 1966, the manufacturing industry had been of 
negligible importance to the economy of Botswana. Lack of capital and 
labour, high utility and transport costs, the relatively small domestic market, 
and the openness of that market to South African goods through the Customs 
Union, have been almost insuperable barriers to industrial development in 
Botswana. In 1966, manufacturing accounted for 8 percent of the total GDP. 
The only factory of any size was the meat cannery owned by Botswana Meat 
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Commission in Lobatse. Fifteen years later, in 1981-1982, manufacturing's 
share of GOP had hardly changed at 9 percent, though the value of 
production had risen from P2.9 million to P71 million. By 1984, there were 
only 32 licensed manufacturing companies employing more than 10 people, 
and the total labour force in the formal manufacturing sector was just over 
10000 - 11.6 percent of the formal sector total. Although employment in 
manufacturing advanced at the rate of 14.2 percent during 1979-1985, this 
was no solution to the problem of 20000 school leavers coming onto the 











Figure 7.3: Manufacturing contribution to GDP 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 
Year 
--+- Manufacturing, value added 
(% of GOP) 
Source: World Bank, 1999. 
Although the manufacturing sector accounted for only 6 percent of GOP in 
1994-1995, manufacturing output expanded rapidly in the 1980s and into the 
early 1990s, with export-oriented textiles and vehicle assembly showing 
strong growth. Manufacturing GOP increased by an annual average of 8.9 
percent over the period 1980-92. However, the sector's output contracted in 
1992/93 and 1993/94, as the textiles subsector was adversely affected by 
trends in export markets and in particular the weak Zimbabwean dollar. In 
1994-1995, the sector started to recover strongly with diversification of 
markets for textile products, as well as exports of new products such as 
assembled motor vehicles. Formal employment in manufacturing increased 
from 21700 in March 1994 to 23444 March 1995. This expansion 
represented a considerable diversification of Botswana's manufacturing base, 
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with textiles, beverages, chemicals, paper, metals, plastics, and electrical 
products experiencing the highest growth rates (MFDP, 199). : 
During 1996/97, the manufacturing sector was the only non-mining sector 
which showed slower growth than in 1995/96. The sector's output was down 
from 6.5 percent to 5.2 percent. This is attributable to output decline in two 
subsectors, metal products and meat and meat products. The fall in output of 
the latter sector was partly the result of a large drop (19 percent) in livestock 
slaughtered by the Botswana Meat Commission and municipal abattoirs, and 
a 27 percent fall in the quantity of beef produced. This is attributable to the 
mass cattle slaughter and then the restocking in Ngamiland following the 
outbreak of cattle lung disease (Bank of Botswana, 1997). The 
manufacturing sector grew by 4.7 percent in 1997/98 compared to 5.2 percent 
in 1996/97. 
7.2.4 Constraints to Industrial Developmeneo 
7.2.4(a) Smallness of Domestic Market 
Botswana has a small population, estimated at 1.5 million in 1996, and this 
acts as a disadvantage to manufacturers because it limits the size of their 
most immediate market. The majority of the population still lives outside 
formally established urban areas. The rural income base and the dispersed 
population reduces the purchasing power of people and hence limits the 
opportunities to enjoy economies of scale. 
7.2.4(b) Geographical Area 
Being a land-locked country has partially slowed down the development of 
industry because the cost of accessing distant markets is high. There is no 
direct access to sea ports, which results in high transportation costs, and a 
dependency on transit routes through South Africa for the transportation of 
20 Mpabanga (1997) unless stated otherwise. 
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bulk exports and imports. Road and rail transport is expensive, making some 
domestic products more expensive in some locations in Botswana than 
imports from South Africa, where local manufacturers source some of their 
raw materials and equipment. 
7.2.4(c) Lack of Serviced Land 
An acute shortage of serviced industrial plots and factory space has been 
cited as one of the major problems in slowing down and inhibiting the 
establishment of manufacturing industries. The recent breakdown of 
computer systems set up to maintain a land register and maintain a land bank 
has left would-be manufacturers stranded without land. 
7.2.4(d) Lack of Entrepreneurial and Technical Skills 
Industrial activities have not been established in Botswana for long enough to 
enable the emergence of adequate numbers of experienced citizen 
entrepreneurs who can run profitable businesses. Entrepreneurship is still 
developing in Botswana. Although the Government has, in the past, been in 
the provision of education to Batswana, the education system has not been 
geared to satisfy the requirements of industry. There is currently a shortage 
of people equipped with the technical skills required in industry. 
7.2.4(e) Technology 
The majority of manufacturing companies in Botswana use simple technology 
in their production processes. The choice of technology is normally 
determined by the relative cost of capital and labour. The relatively high cost 
of capital in Botswana has encouraging labour-intensive investment. Limited 
access to finance impedes the acquisition of improved technology for 
increased production and improved productivity. Unavailability of funds leads 
to firms purchasing simple technology, which might not necessarily be 
efficient. Companies also have to import people with technical skills to meet 
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their requirements. The maintenance of technology for equipment bought 
from overseas is also a problem for most producers. The delays in obtaining 
spare parts from South Africa and overseas results in production losses, 
leading to manufacturers not being able to deliver orders according to 
schedule. There is a lack of a scientific environment and culture, and a lack 
of assistance and guidance in technology selection and acquisition. 
7.2.4(f) Institutional 
Investors have complained about the poor performance and effectiveness of 
some institutions created to facilitate investment. MCI has been criticised for 
exercising too much regulatory control on the establishment and operation of 
industries and trade through the Government's industrial development policy. 
Investors have also complained of burdensome regulatory procedures on 
trade and industry, such as the lengthy licensing process, which discourages 
productive investment and impedes expansion in exports. 
7.2.4(g) High Utility Costs 
Investors have complained of the high cost of utilities, such as power, water 
and telecommunications, in Botswana. The high cost renders some of 
Botswana-produced goods expensive in the domestic, regional and 
international markets. Lack of a developed infrastructure in rural areas has 
also been blamed for very few industries being established there. The utility 
companies have also been criticised for poor and slow service in connecting 
telephones, water and electricity to industry. 
7.2.5 Specific Problems facing Small to Medium-Scale Enterprises 
7.2.5(a) Lack of Access to Capital 
As in other developing countries, limited access to long-term finance is one of 
the major constraints that hamper development of the manufacturing sector in 
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Botswana. The problem is particularly acute for small-scale enterprises which 
have not established banking relationships or do not have a business record 
with commercial banks. Banks normally require borrowers to have collateral 
when applying for loans. Many local businesses lack collateral, and this 
inhibits their access to finance to implement their projects and expansion 
plans. Some of the major contributory factors to poor cash flows experienced 
by companies are high utility costs and high costs of imported raw materials 
and machinery. 
7.2.5(b) Poor Quality Products 
The majority of the firms are small to medium-scale, and are not able to 
undertake thorough market research and invest in technology improvement. 
Therefore, they end-up in producing product of poor quality, and access to 
international market is obviously limited. 
7.2.5(c) High Cost of Transport and Lack of Foreign Exchange in 
some Countries in the Region 
Access to international and overseas market is, however, limited by the high 
cost of transportation, insurance and poor communication systems existing in 
some countries in the region. The unavailability of foreign exchange in most 
of the countries in the region has also hindered local producers in selling in 
. those markets. 
7.2.5{d) Shortage of Raw Materials and Other Inputs 
Due to the unavailability of raw materials locally, the majority of firms are 
forced to import these, as well as machinery, equipment and other inputs, 
either from South Africa or the international market. 
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7.2.5(e) Fierce Competition from Imports 
The local market is further limited by imports from South Africa, which are 
usually cheaper and of better quality. Botswana companies in the past 
attempted to sell to local c.hain stores such as Jet, Pep, Cash Bazaar, Metro, 
Cash Build and others, but they have not been successful in penetrating the 
market, the reason being that the chain stores in Botswana are supplied from 
head offices in South Africa. 
7.2.5(f) Specific Problems facing Large-Scale Firms 
The most prominent problems cited by large-scale export manufacturers were 
high interest rates, problems with the immigration department delaying the 
processing of applications for expatriate staff work permits, and duties 
charged on materials imported from outside SACU (Mpabanga, 1997). 
7.2.5(g) Other Conflicting Policy Objectives 
A number of policy objectives tend to conflict with Industrial Development 
Policy and other measures established to foster rapid industrialisation. These 
include, the Citizens Reservation Policy, the Incomes Policy and The Revised 
National Education Policy on Education. 
7.2.5(h) Citizen Reservation Policy 
It was introduced in 1988 in order to promote active participation of the 
citizens in industrial development. This implies that a number of industries 
that require relatively simple technological skills and low levels of capital were 
reserved for citizens. This policy prohibits foreign investors from participating 
in the activities reserved for citizens. The policy restricts partnership with 
foreign companies, and thus conflicts with the aim of promoting 
entrepreneuship and acquisition of technical and management skills from 
foreign companies. The restriction also limits citizens from having the 
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opportunity to go into business with foreigners who have the necessary 
capital and know-how to ensure long-term investment and sustainability of 
business ventures. 
6.2.5(i) The Revised National Policy on Education 
This policy concentrated on the education of the population up to the primary 
and secondary schools levels, primarily to supply the general needs of 
Government, both Central and Local. The needs of the private sector and 
industry in particular were not a priority during that period. Botswana thus 
lacks human resources adequately trained with technical, science and 
business skills, and knowledge of modern industrial technology. The private 
sector has to import people with such qualifications, which often proves to be 
too costly for them. 
7.2.5(j) Wages and Salaries 
Wages in Botswana are said to be high compared to productivity (World 
Bank, 1993). This discourages firms from investing in Botswana and they opt 
for other countries in the region where productivity is higher and wages are 
lower. 
7.2.6 Government Policies to overcome Constraints 
The Government of Botswana has tried to solve problems by trying to 
implement pOlicies that might not be harmful to the industry and to the 
economy of the country as a whole. These include; Industrial Development 
Policy and Act; Financial Assistance Policy; local preference scheme; Selebi-
Phikwe regional development project; participation in trade fairs; promotion of 
non-traditional exports; reduction of income tax for manufacturing . 
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7.2.6(a) Industrial Development Policy and Act 
The Industrial Development Act was introduced in 1968, amended in 1988 
and revised in 1995. Changes to the Act in 1995 involved automatic granting 
of licenses. Licensing authorities are no longer allowed to make commercial 
judgements on applications. The changes also led to the elimination of 
objections by competitors. The primary objectives of the Act included : 
• the creation of productive jobs for citizens, 
• the training of citizens for jobs with higher productivity, 
• the diversification of the productive sectors of the economy and 
consequent reduction in vulnerability to economic factors beyond 
Botswana's control , 
• the growth of value added, or GDP, accruing in Botswana's control 
• the dispersion of industrial activities to rural areas. 
7.2.6(b) Financial Assistance Policy 
It was introduced in 1982 to assist and support new and expanding projects 
that create productive employment. Several studies have been undertaken to 
evaluate the performance of the projects implemented under this policy. In 
1995, an evaluation study concluded that the incentives have stimulated 
investment and employment generation for unskilled citizen employees in a 
fairly effective manner. There has also 'been considerable diversification of 
economic activity. Locals have gained some business and technical 
experience during the process, and exports of non-traditional products have 
also increased. 
7.2.6(c) Local Preference Scheme (LPS) 
It was introduced in 1976 and modified in 1986, in order to direct a substantial 
share of the purchases of Government, local authorities and parastatals to 
198 
local manufacturers. The firms which qualify for LPS are at a price advantage 
over foreign produced goods when tendering for Government contracts. The 
LPS has been replaced by a new policy, the Local Procurement Policy (LPP), 
effective from 1 April 1997. 
7.2.6(d) Selebi-Phikwe Regional Development Project (SPRDP) 
This project was introduced in 1976 in order to encourage investment in non-
mining economic activity in the Selebi-Phikwe area, and was modified in 
1986. Financial assistance is extended to industrial projects locating in 
Selebi-Phikwe and meeting certain other conditions. However, with the 
reduction of company tax on manufacturing to 15 percent, the financial 
incentives provided under the SPRDP have been effectively extended to the 
whole country. The 1992 evaluation report indicated that there were several 
disadvantages, which provide a disincentive for investment. SRPDP has 
been terminated and absorbed into TIPA as financing from the World Bank 
loan has been used up. 
7.2.6(e) Participation in Trade Fairs 
The government has also assisted local manufacturers in looking beyond the 
domestic market by participating in the local and international trade fairs. 
Some firms have succeeded in securing local and international orders 
through fairs, while others have failed. 
7.2.6(f) Promotion of Non-Traditional Exports 
. The partial fulfilment of the industrial development efforts by the Government 
can be seen in the improvements in the exports of non-traditional products. 
Non-traditional exports include principally textiles and clothing, soda ash, 
foodstuffs and motor vehicles. They have increased from P290 million in 
1992 to P700 million in 1994, increasing their share of total exports from less 
than 10 percent in 1995. The vehicle industry has contributed greatly to the 
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increase in the export of non-traditional products, vehicles exports increasing 
from P91 million in 1994 to P300 million in 1995. 
Table 7.6: Performance of Non-Traditional Exports (Pula Million) 
Veoetable Chemical 
1987 2.9 16.9 
1988 3.7 16.7 
1989 2.5 19.8 
1990 12.1 18.5 
1991 14.0 45.8 
1992 13.4 72.9 
1993 13.1 79.6 
1994 14.4 63.0 
Source: Bank of Botswana, 1997. 
S Food and beverages 
F&Ss Vehicle Wood 
27.0 39.3 2.3 
9.5 51 .7 2.2 
25.4 74.3 3.2 
34.6 60.0 2.5 
46.7 57.1 4.6 
47.8 70.9 5.4 
51.3 128.7 1.8 
62.2 406.7 1.5 










The government has reduced the company tax rate from 40 percent to 35 
percent and then to 25 percent with a lower rate of 15 percent for 
manufacturing in order to ameliorate the financial burden of taxes and boost 
the cash-flow position and profitability of firms. 
7.3 Social Services Sectors 
7.3.1 Education 
Education and health are the key components of human development in any 
country and obviously also have economic impacts as they influence the 
productivity of people in the workplace. The provision of these services has a 
financial impact as they have to be funded by the public and private sectors. 
In the education sector, policy changed in the early 1970s to greater 
emphasis on primary. Some of the results of the emphasis in education 
policy can be seen in Table 7.7. 
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Table 7.7: Education: p t ercen age 0 fA G ~ge rouJ! E 11 d nro e 
Primary Secondary 
1965 65 3 
1988 116 33 
1993 233 99 
Source: World Development Report, 1991 and 1997. 
The primary school enrolment increased by 1.0 percent from 1994 to 1995, 
whereas in 1998, it grew slightly by 0.1 percent. Enrolment in secondary has 
increased from 86684 in 1994 to 103159 in 1995, a growth of 19.0 percent 
(Government of Botswana, 1999). During the period 1996/97, the enrolment 
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Source: M FOP, 1999 and Author's calculation. 
The government has also acted to remove the strong bias against rural 
primary schools in the supply of trained and untrained teachers. Whereas 50 
percent of teachers in village primary schools were untrained in 1975 
compared with only 2 percent in towns, the figures were 31 percent and 27 
percent respectively by 1985. One result of improved levels of education can 
be shown through a decrease in the proportion of expatriates in the labour 
force (Harvey, 1992). Teachers training college enrolment decreased by 14.3 
percent during 1996/97 whilst the total number of teachers showed a 26.5 
percent increase. At the University of Botswana, enrolment increased by 8.7 
percent from 5062 in 1994 to 5501 in 1995. In 1996/97, university enrolment 
had grown by 8.6 percent from 5975 to 6488 (EIU, 1998/99). 
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7.3.2 Health 
As in the case of the education sector, the government has put more 
emphasis on health since it took office in 1966. The results of the improved 
levels can be seen in Table 7.8. There has been a greater growth in the 
number of nurses and in doctors, and the large reductions in infant and child 
mortality during the 1970s 
and 1980s. 
Table 7.8: Fertility and Infant Mortality (1962 -1997) 
Infant Mortality (per 1000 live Fertility (births per woman) 
births) 
1962 113 7 
1970 95 7 
1977 76 6 
1987 67 5 
1990 55 5 
1997 58 4 
Source: World Bank, 1999. 
The improvement in health was assisted by growth in the supply of water to 
villages. The government fell behind its own programme targets, partly 
because resources were diverted to urban water supply, and partly because 
the growth in demand from villages delayed the extension of supplies to small 
. villages at the planned rate. Nevertheless, over 55 percent of the population 
has access to piped water, in a dry and sparsely settled country (Harvey, 
1992). There was also a fall in the infant mortality rate from 113 in 1962 to 76 
in 1977 and then toSS in 1990, but it increased to 58 in 1997. This increase 
in infant mortality might be due to the rapid spread of HIV-AIDS in Southern 
Africa 
The fertility rate has declined during this period. It fell from 7 percent in 1962 
to 5 percent in 1990 and to 4 percent in 1997. The falling rate in Botswana 
was helped not only by the emphasis on primary health care but also by 
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greatly improved education and employment opportunities for women. As 
many girls as boys attend school - if anything there is a slight majority of girls. 
because some boys are taken to herd cattle. There has been also a greater 
growth in doctors and nurses in the hospitals. as it can be seen from figure 
7.5. 
Figure 7.5: Health Personnel 
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Source: Statistical Bulletin, 1999. 
The three most common causes of referral to hospital are diarrhoea. 
tuberculosis and pneumonia. Malaria is endemic in northern Botswana. 
moving east and south during the rainy season. and bilharzia occurs in areas 
with perennial water but cases are few (EIU. 1998/99). A 1998 UN report put 
the incidence of HIV in Botswana at one in four adults. one of the highest 
rates in sub-Saharan Africa. A National Aids Prevention and Control 
Programme (NAPCP) is in place and a National Aids Committee promotes 
preventive measures among the population. 
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7.4 Macroeconomic Policies 
7.4.1 Fiscal Policy 
After attaining political independence in 1966, the goal of financial 
independence for Botswana was a priority objective for the then impoverished 
nation. The specific purpose was to eliminate, in the shortest possible time, 
the reliance on grant-in aid funds from the UK Government to cover recurrent 
budget expenditure (Mogae, 1985). This important, but clearly limited, goal 
was attained in the financial year 1972173. In a recent biography of Sir 
Seretse Khama, this achievement is described as one of the 'proudest 
moments' of the late President's life (Parsons et ai, 1995, p.294). Since the 
day the government took the office in 1966, it has preached and practised the 
virtues of careful planning and fiscal restraint. Through successive 
Development Plans, Government has stuck to this credo, both recognising 
the importance of other constraints such as the availability of skilled 
manpower for instance and setting spending ceilings despite the growing 
abundance of financial resources. 
7.4.1(a) Trends in Government Revenue and Expenditure 
The rapid increase in government revenue since the 1970s has been caused 
by changes in the structure of revenues. First, the terms of the Customs 
Union revenue were re-negotiated effective fiscal years 1969-1970. Following 
the re-negotiation Botswana's revenue varied almost directly with Botswana's 
imports. Secondly, when the rate of economic growth began to accelerate in 
the late 1960s and early 1970s with the Orapa diamond mine, and, especially 
with the construction of the Shashe copper-nickel project, revenue from 
customs duties began to grow very rapidly. The revenue from mining, 
principally diamonds, began to grow with the increase of value added and 
exports in the mining sector. Income taxes other than those levied on mining 
companies also increased rapidly in the 1970s. The driving force behind the 
increase in revenue was the exceptional rate of growth of GDP from 
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Source: World Bank, 1999. 
The recurrent budget first moved out of deficit in 1973, and overall budget 
surpluses began in 1983. However, there remain important structural limits 
on government spending, the most important being the scarcity of skilled 
labour which constrained the growth of output. The fundamental objectives of 
Botswana's expenditure policy have been to spend only where spending was 
productive and for projects whose recurrent costs could be sustained 
indefinitely in the future. This spending policy has contributed to the building 
up of financial surpluses. 
The government has no domestic debt, and has accumulated large balances 
at the Bank of Botswana that stand at P7.5 billion in November 1996, just 
twice the previous year's recurrent government spending and 1.4 times the 
previous year's total government spending (WTO, 1998). From 1983/84 to 
1995/96, the government ran a continuous series of budget surpluses, 
covering both recurrent and development spending. As a result the nation as 
a whole has been a net saver, and large levels of financial reserves in both 
domestic and foreign currencies have built up. At the end of 1995, 
accumulated foreign exchange reserves were P13.2 billion, equivalent to 
US$4.7 billion, which were among the largest in the world on a per capita 
basis; and at the end of financial year 1995/96 government cash balances 
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stood at P7.7 billion, or 149 percent of total government expenditure during 
the year (Wright, 1997). 
In 1996/97, the financial result was a surplus of P1302 million. This 
compares with the original budget, which forecast a deficit of P636 million. 
This huge turn-around from expected deficit to actual surplus was due both to 
very rapid growth in government revenues and lower than expected spending. 
Underspending has been a common feature of the government budget in 
recent years, especially in the development budget. However, the pattern 
was somewhat different in 1996/97, the main source of underspending being 
in the recurrent budget which stood at P3972 million. Development spending 
was P2240 million. Total expenditure and net lending amounted to P9054 
million during 1998/99 financial year. This was because both the recurrent 
and development expenditures fell short of the revised estimates. While the 
actual expenditure on personal emoluments turned out to be P2156 million 
which was higher than the revised budget figure by 12.2 percent, total 
recurrent expenditure was 2.6 percent lower. At the same time, development 
expenditure was lower than the revised budget estimate by 12.0 percent at 
P2934 million, due to the slow implementation of some development projects 
(Ministry of Finance and Development Planning, 1999). 
During the same financial year, the total revenues and grants for the year 
amounted to P7677 million representing about 93 percent of the revised 
budget estimate. The revenue sources responsible for this drop were mineral 
revenue, non-tax revenue and grants. Mineral revenue, which accounted for 
the bulk of this decline, amounted to P3187 million. The non-tax revenue 
declined from P713 million to P682 million, representing a 4.4 percent drop. 
Revenue from customs and excise recorded a slight decline from P1265 
million to P1261 over the same period owing to the slight appreciation of the 
pula against the South African rand. Increases in revenue were recorded in 
non-mineral income tax and other taxes. 
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Table 7.9: Central Governmen 
1980/81 
Total Revenue 306.6 
Mineral revenue 101.1 
Customs & excise 102.0 
Non-mineral tax 38.5 
Revenue from BoB 0.0 
Other revenue 27.3 
Grants 37.8 
Total expenditured 308.4 
Recurrentb 166.8 
Developmentb 121.4 
Net lending 20.1 
Budget surplus 
Overall budgef -1.7 
Recurrent budget -12.0 
Percentage distributions 
Total Revenue & Grants 
Mineral revenue 33.0 
Customs & excise 33.3 
Non-mineral tax 12.5 
Revenue from BOB 0.0 
Other revenue 8.9 
Grants 12.3 
Total expenditure & net lending 
Recurrentb 54.1 
Developmentb 39.4 
Net lending 6.5 
Source: WTO, 1998. 
a Pula million at current prices 
b Expenditures 
C Balance 
d & net lending 
7.4.1(b) Foreign Debt 
U Ige, e ec e tBd tSI tdY ears a 
1985/86 1991/92 1993/9 1995/96 
1133.4 4069.4 5359.5 ' 5464.4 
581.2 1888.0 2278.7 2591.4 
149.2 761 .6 822.3 829.4 
93.6 357.3 420.5 356.9 
35.0 761 .9 1106.8 1050.5 
274.4 300.6 731 .1 636.1 
41 .1 69.8 186.6 37.1 
719.2 3372.2 4481 .2 5194.5 
427.0 1789.8 2702.4 3437.6 
247.5 1098.0 1558.3 1672.0 
44.6 484.5 220.5 84.9 
414.2 697.2 878.3 269.9 
330.6 858.0 1272.4 257.1 
51 .3 46.4 42.5 47.4 
13.2 18.7 15.3 15.2 
8.3 8.8 7.8 6.5 
3.1 18.7 20.7 19.2 
24.2 7.4 13.6 11 .6 
3.6 1.7 3.5 0.7 
59.4 53.1 60.3 66.2 
34.4 32.6 34.8 32.2 
6.2 14.4 4.9 1.6 
Since 1980, Botswana has enjoyed a very low level of foreign debt and public 
external debt service. The foreign debt and public external debt service 
amounted to US$48.4 million, which was about only 5.4 percent of exports of 
goods and services. However, the level of debt service has gradually raised 
the amount of 1985 was more than double that of 1983. The bulk of 
Botswana's existing debt is to official multilateral creditors, which accounted 
for US$348 million of the total disbursed long-term debt of US$509 million at 
the end of 1989 (EIU, 1991/92). 
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7.4.2 Monetary Policy 
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Before August 1976, Botswana was a member of the Rand Monetary Area 
(RMA). The main Central Bank of the RMA was the South African Reserve 
Bank (SARB) which also issues the rand currency in use in the RMA. A 
Botswana government white paper, published in 1974, gave the reasons why 
it would be to Botswana's advantage to leave the RMA and establish its own 
central bank, the Bank of Botswana (BoB). These advantages included the 
following21 
• The ability to manage Botswana's foreign exchange reserves, instead of 
having SARB do it for us, 
• The ability to choose our own domestic interest rate pattern, instead of 
having rates largely determined by the Johannesburg money market 
• The ability to issue our own currency, the Pula, and to choose our own 
exchange rate regime, instead of having SARB do so for us, 
• The ability to retain domestic savings for investment in Botswana, instead 
of routinely lending them to South Africa as a contribution to the financing 
of South Africa's development, 
• The ability to choose our own set of exchange control regulations, instead 
of having SARB do so for us, 
• The ability of the Government to place its funds at its own bank (BoB), 
instead of continuing to bank at one of the two commercial banks in 
21 Quoted from Hudson and Lewis (1985). 
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Botswana. 
The disadvantage included the need to introduce exchange control between 
Botswana and the remainder of the RMA. 
7.4.2(a) Stability of the Exchange Rate 
The objective of maintaining a stable exchange rate of the pula vis-a-vis 
foreign currencies is influenced almost entirely by trade considerations. 
Exchange controls take care of capital movements between Botswana and 
the rest of the world. In an effort to achieve a measure of exchange rate 
stability, some countries have sought refuge in trade-weighted currency 
baskets. In Botswana, stability was sought through a straightforward 
alignment of the pula to the US dollar between August and May 1980. In this 
exchange rate regime the direction of trade criterion was overly weighted in 
favour of the US dollar, in which about 70 percent of Botswana's exports are 
dominated. Therefore, when the dollar entered a prolonged period of 
depreciation on the foreign exchange markets between 1978 and 1980, the 
pula's stability in terms of the rand began to suffer (Ablo and Hudson, 1985). 
In order to account for the import side of the direction of trade criterion, a 
multiple currency basket comprising the Special Drawing Rights (SDR) and 
the rand was instituted in June 1980. In trade-weighted terms, the present 
basket exhibits an over-correction in respect of the rand. 
7.4.2(b) Instruments of Monetary Policy 
The popular wisdom is that the conventional instruments of monetary policy 
do not work in developing countries.22. In Botswana, where an independent 
monetary system has been in operation for over two decades, the ability to 
use monetary policy to affect the behaviour of the economy is subject to 
institutional development and a learning curve (Ablo and Hudson, 1985). 
22 This view was forcefully challenged by Edward S. Shaw in Financial Deepening in Economic 
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7.4.2(c) Interest Rates 
The Bank of Botswana commenced operations in 1976 when domestic 
interest rates were set for the first time by an independent monetary authority. 
In practice, independence cf the RMA in setting interest rates was somewhat 
circumscribed by a perceived need not to move far out of line with interest 
rates prevailing in South Africa. This perception derives strength from the 
permanent role of South African investment in total foreign investment in 
Botswana, and is reinforced by import dependence on South Africa. Over 
time, the concern over the interest rate differentials between South Africa and 
Botswana appears to have diminished, as evidenced by the historically high 
differentials which emerged between the two countries in 1981 (Abo and 
Hudson, 1985). Domestic considerations prompted a gradual lowering of 
interest rates between 1977 and 1979. The main impetus to these interest 
rate changes came from persistent surplus liquidity at the commercial banks. 
These banks responded to the steady build-up of surplus liquidity by turning 
away some large deposits. The Bank of Botswana stepped into the breach to 
provide deposit facilities for a growing number of large depOSitors. 
Interest rates remained unchanged in Botswana from 1970 until 1980 when a 
combination of pressures in early 1981 rendered the existing level and 
structure of interest rates untenable. First, pressure emanated from a 
sustained acceleration of price inflation, which caused real interest rates to 
turn progressively negative. Second, the demand for domestic bank credit, 
particularly parastatals, was forecast to increase substantially (Abo and 
Hudson, 1985). Stepped-up mobilisation of domestic saving was thus called 
for. Third, there was the obvious fact that, in general, international interest 
rates had risen to historically high levels. 
In Botswana, the authorities set minimum rates for both deposits and 
advances. Upward rigidity of deposit rates is very noticeable in Botswana. 
Development, Oxford University Press, London, 1973. 
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This is not surprising in a situation where the banks are highly liquid and 
competition for deposits is therefore non-existent. The monetary authorities 
in Botswana have so far eschewed the practice of setting maximum lending 
rates. Admittedly, there is only a handful of prime names in Botswana who 
can command the finest rate of their borrowing from the banks. The average 
borrower probably pays a margin of about three percentage points above 
prime. In 1997,there was reduction in the' bank rate, which was consequently 
followed by a decrease in the commercial banks' prime lending rate from 14.5 
to 14.0 percent. 
Figure 7.8: Interest Rates 
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Source: Bank of Botswana, 1997. 
The Bank of Botswana introduced a few changes during 1998. One of these 
changes was the introduction of a 6 percent penalty over and above the bank 
rate for overnight borrowing by commercial banks holding Bank of Botswana 
certificates in October 1996. This change was mainly targeted at enhancing 
the development of a secondary market by encouraging banks to sell their 
Bank of Botswana certificates in times of shortages of liquidity. During that 
same month, the statutory liquid assets requirement was also reduced for 
commercial banks from 20 percent to 10 percent and for hire purchase and 
leasing companies from 6 percent to 3 percent. During 1997, the Bank of 
Botswana instituted some reforms aimed at enhancing the efficiency of open-
market operations. 
The reforms already implemented included mini-auctions which are meant to 
capture fluctuations in liquidity between the main auctions. Consideration will 
be given to the introduction of Repurchase Agreements which are an 
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arrangement whereby the seller of a financial security enters into an 
agreement with another party to sell at an agreed price with a promise to buy 
the security back shortly after, also at' an agreed price (MFDP, 1998). During 
1998, positive real lending interest rates ranging from 5.5 - 7.6 percent 
recorded, while real deposit rates, as measured by the 88-day deposit rate, 
ranged from 0.8 to 2.5 percent (MFDP, 1999). 
7.4.2(d) Money Supply and International Reserves 
The ten-year period between 1980 and 1989 saw a remarkable growth in the 
monetary and financial field, especially when considered against the fact that 
the Bank of Botswana started operations only in August 1976 (Bank of 
Botswana, 1989). The money supply (M3) recorded an average growth rate 
of 28 percent per annum between 1980 and 1989, with the highest growth 
rate of 68 percent recorded in 1987 and the lowest (8 percent) in 1991. The 
growth in money supply was fuelled mostly by the external sector through 
diamond revenues. 
Figure 7.9: Growth in Money Supply 
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In 1996, the narrow measure of the money supply, M1 maintained the same 
pattern as was recorded in 1995, showing month-to-month volatility but no 
overall trend throughout the year (Bank of Botswana, 1996). The average 
level of M1 in 1996 was P566 million, virtually unchanged in nominal terms 
from the 1995 average of P560 million. M2 continued on an upward trend, 
and grew by 18 percent in the year to December 1996. M2 growth was due 
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mainly to a continued increase in interest-bearing deposits. The monetary 
aggregate showing the most rapid growth was M3 which grew by 27 percent 
in the year to December, mainly as a result of the growth in the Bank of 
Botswana Certificates held by the non-bank private sector. The main factor 
driving monetary growth during 1996 was the continued accumulation of 
foreign exchange reserves by the banking system. The net foreign reserve 
assets of the banking system rose by P5277 million or 40 percent. Much of 
this increase was due to revaluation gains in local currency as the pula 
depreciated against the international currencies in which the reserves are 
held. In 1998, M1 rose sharply by 25 percent to P1319 million from P1056 
million in 1997. 
The country's international reserves, estimated at P6.2 billion at the end of 
1990, represented an increase of 18.8 percent over the previous year. About 
a third of this increase, however, was attributable to valuation adjustments. 
The reserves, in terms of months of merchandise imports, also fell from 25 
months in 1989 to 24 months in 1990, yet remained amongst the highest in 
the world (Bank of Botswana, 1990). 
Figure 7.10: Foreign Reserves in Botswana 
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There was an increase in foreign exchange reserves in 1997, emanating from 
the balance of payments surplus and which continued to be the major factor 
exerting an expansionary impact on the broadly defined money supply, whilst 
the accumulation of government balances at the Bank of Botswana served to 
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sterilise much of the monetary growth (Bank of Botswana, 1997). 
7.4.2(e) Exchange Rate and Exchange Control Regime 
In Botswana, since current account transactions are virtually free of exchange 
restrictions, the main purpose of exchange control is to protect the capital 
account of the balance of payments. The exchange rate represents an 
important price instrument that can be used to influence imports and exports. 
An increase in the local currency price of foreign exchange is expected to 
lead to a decrease in the demand for imports and to an increase in the supply 
of exports. This theoretical formulation of the relationship between exchange 
rate changes and the demand for imports and supply of exports has received 
strong empirical support in the economic literature. In Botswana, the 
exchange rate has been used as a policy instrument. 
The pula was revalued upward three times in an attempt to hold down the 
cost of imported goods and services. To the extent that the revaluation gains 
were passed on to consumers or producers the objective of controlling 
imported inflation was attained. The magnitude of the revaluation (typically 5 
percent) has been constrained largely by considerations relating to the export 
sector. The main revenue earner (diamonds) has a remarkable history of 
market resilience but even this industry is not likely to be indifferent to the 
magnitude of pula revaluations. The second most important export sector 
(beef) is far from resilient, as witness the vagaries of its performance in 
response, principally, to developments in animal health. Curiously, and as a 
result of the heavy burden of external debt, the copper-nickel industry is 
considered, at worst, to be almost indifferent to the magnitude of pula 
revaluations. 
When the pula was introduced in August 1976 in place of the Rand, the 
question arose as to how the pula should be valued in terms of foreign 
currencies. The first decision was to peg the pula to the US dollar. At the 
time the rand was pegged to the US dollar so a de facto parity with the rand 
214 
could be achieved without actually being pegged to it. In August 1976, we 
had 
pula 1 = US$1.15 (1) 
pand 1 = US$1.15 (2) 
Hence, pula 1 = rand 1 by comparison of the two equations. This simplified 
transactions between Botswana and South Africa, since the traders knew that 
the middle rate for the rand-pula was to be one-for-one, and the only new 
expense for the traders would be the bankers' margins for handling foreign 
exchange transactions. However, in January 1979, the rand was taken off its 
US dollar peg and floated, while the pula remained pegged to the dollar. This 
began a period of rand/pula exchange rate volatility that proved disruptive to 
many productive activities. In 1980, the decision was then made to peg the 
pula to a trade-weighted basket of currencies including both the rand and the 
dollar. The developments in the exchange rate between South Africa and 
Botswana have not changed significantly over the last 25 years. As quoted 
by the Bank of Botswana in June 1998, the exchange was P 1= R1.3171. 





~ ~<o ~ro ~ ~'b ~OJ 2><:) 2>t.., 2>~ 2>0:> 2>~ 
t..,Oj t..,Oj t..,Oj t..,Oj t..,Oj t..,Oj t..,Q) t..,Q) t..,Q) t..,Q) t..,Q) 
Year 
Source: Bank of Botswana, 1997. 
-+-US$ 
---8 Pound ! 
Exchange control is a non-price policy instrument that is extensively used in 
developing countries. A strong balance of payments has permitted a 
significant relaxation of exchange controls in Botswana. In effect, exchange 
control liberalisation increases the reliance on price instruments in the 
management of the economy. Until the 1990s, Botswana was in the fortunate 
position of not having used exchange control on the current account to 
defend the exchange rate. On the contrary, relaxation of exchange control in 
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this area proceeded quite far. 
A major liberalisation of Botswana's exchange controls took place on January 
1, 1995, and the process has continued since then. Some of the key 
changes are: 
• the ending of all exchange control restrictions on current account 
transactions, 
• acceptance of Article VIII membership status at the IMF, 
• permitting permanent residents to make offshore (external) capital 
investments, both direct and indirect (portfolio), within limits, without 
reference to the Bank of Botswana, 
• permitting pension funds and related institutions to invest up to 70 percent 
(up from 50 percent) of their assets outside Botswana 
• permitting the shares of companies listed on approved foreign stock 
exchanges to be dual-listed on the Botswana Stock Exchange on an open 
register basis, and treating the purchase of such shares by residents as a 
domestic currency transactions, 
• permitting Botswana banks to open Foreign Currency Accounts (FCAs) for 
both residents and non-residents 
The 1995 liberalisation significantly eased the constraints on the export of 
capital, especially for offshore indirect investment by residents. However, the 
balance of payments data suggest that this did not have any Significant effect 
on outflows. When compared to 1994, private short-term capital flows in 
1995 showed a rise in inflows and a reduction in outflows, with a consequent 
reduction in the deficit on this account. In fact, the reserves have in general 
continued to grow during 1995 and 1996. The reserves rose from SDR 3 . .03 
billion in December 1994 to SDR 3.47 billion in November 1996, an increase · 
of 15 percent (Bank of Botswana, 1996). During 1995, the overall increase in 
the reserves was P1289 million. The current account surplus of P948 million 
and revaluation adjustments of P98 million dominated this. 
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7.4.2(f) Trends in Inflation 
--+- Current Account ! 
Balance i 
____ Foreign Exchange! 
Reserves :i 
~------------~ , 
The annual average rate of inflation is measured by the Botswana Consumer 
Price Index. From 1976 to 1995, the rate of inflation averaged about 11.5 
percent and has been relatively stable with a standard deviation of 2.3 
percent (Kahuti and Wright, 1997). If a period of high inflation is defined as 
being at least three successive years where inflation was above the mean for 
the whole period, then for Botswana only the periods 1979-1981 and 1991-
1993 meet this criterion. In only two years (1981 and 1992) has the average 
inflation rate exceeded 15 percent. The movements in prices of tradable 
goods dominate the structure of inflation in Botswana. These constitute 75.3 
percent of the CPI basket, nearly two-thirds of which are imported tradables, 
sourced mainly in South Africa. In this situation, it comes as little surprise that 
it is well established that inflation imported from South Africa is a major 
component of the inflationary process in Botswana (Atta et ai, 1996). 
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7.4.3 Investment and Savings 
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The task of devising policies to boost savings is dependent upon a good 
understanding of the factors which influence savings. This understanding of 
the factors results from two processes: first, a view of what economic theory 
says about the factors determining savings, and secondly, research to 
evaluate which of those factors are important in practice, the results of which, 
may well vary between different countries and time periods. An economy can 
potentially derive its savings from four different economic sectors: 
government, business, households and foreigners23. Recent economic 
literature on savings and investment continues to place capital accumulation 
at the centre of growth process. Therefore, investment continues to be 
regarded as an intermediate goal of economic policy as it makes it possible to 
increase the nation's physical and human assets, to take advantage of 
technological change, and to increase the productivity of the labour force and 
real wages. In so doing, investment can lead to a permanent increase in the 
standard of living. Though savings and capital accumulation generally 
improve the economy's growth performance, it must be noted that a high 
investment rate does not necessarily quarantee sustained growth24. 
Over the period 1974n5 to 1995/96, Botswana experienced rapid increases 
in the levels of and rates of real gross domestic savings and investment. In 
real terms, over the period, domestic investment increased more than 
23 A discussion on these economic sectors is beyond the scope of this chapter. 
24 A detailed discussion on investment and growth can be found in chapter eight. 
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fourfold , while savings rose over twentyfold. While there were substantial 
fluctuations in the rate of investment, Botswana has invested, on average, 
nearly 30 percent of its GDP per annum over the same period, a figure that 
compares very favourably with that of the Asian Tigers and other successful 
developing countries (Bank of Botswana, 1997). 
In Botswana's case, however, Government, with an average rate of savings of 
16 percent of GDP, has been the major source of investible funds, at least up 
to 1992/93. Savings by business only amounted to 8 percent of GDP per 
annum, while that of the household and parastatal sector was just 2 percent 
and 3 percent of GDP per annum, respectively. However, the last few years 
have seen private savings rising rapidly to reach 37 percent of GDP in 
1996/97. Although Government has been the largest source of savings, its 
relatively stable investment rate, averaging 10 percent of GDP per annum, 
has been low compared to the more volatile rate of the private sector (17 
percent), reflecting in large part the lumpiness of investment in major mineral 
projects. 
The primary determinants of investment in Botswana are the availability of 
investment opportunities, the availability of credit to the private sector, the 
level of the interest rate, the level of aggregate savings and the efficiency of 
intermediation by the financial system. Commercial banks have provided very 
little of the total investment finance. Government in contrast has been the 
largest financier through its development budget, while lending through the 
Public Debt Service Fund (PDSF) and grants from the Financial Assistance 
Policy (F AP) have been the third and fourth largest sources of investment 
finance. Retained earnings were the second largest source of investment 
finance, providing 9 percent and 51 percent in 1991/92 and 1995/96 
respectively, while relatively minor contributions came from non-bank financial 
institutions and the Botswana Stock Exchange. 
219 
CHAPTER EIGHT 
8. LITERATURE REVIEW 
8.1 Introduction 
In this chapter we review the literature with a view to identifying the causal 
relationship between macroeconomic policies and growth in GDP. In other 
words, we will be examining how economic policies may affect long-term 
growth. The first section of this chapter will concentrate on a theoretical 
literature review by surveying various growth theories and models. The 
second section discusses the findings or results of empirical work on growth 
determinants and macroeconomic policies. Few areas of economics can 
claim to be more controversial than the subject of economic growth (Choi 
1983). The search for a satisfactory explanation of growth has engaged the 
minds and energies of those who made significant contributions in 
economics. This was, in fact, the main focus of the work of Adam Smith and 
the classicists endeavouring to explain industrialization in eighteen and 
nineteen-century England, of Karl Max and Joseph Schumpeter in the long 
neoclassical eclipse of interest, and most recently, of the post-World War 11 
revival by those concerned with growth, both in developed and in the 
developing societies. 
As a result of a great deal of work, various theories and models have been 
produced. They have encompassed descriptive studies as well as studies 
concerned mainly with uncovering the causal chain of events, empirical 
research as well as the construction of abstract theoretical models, 
quantitative as well as qualitative analysis and policy formulation has been 
stressed. Each theory and model has its own adherents, and they often 
appear unable or unwilling to attribute any merit to any alternative approach. 
Simon Kuznets (1952) observes that there is enormous variety in the different 
growth processes in the world, for which reason, whether formulating or 
evaluating theoretical assumptions as to economic growth, any attempt to go 
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beyond mere lists of factors would have to be made, bearing in mind the 
characteristics of countries and of the periods relating to the growth process it 
is intended to explain. 
Akerman holds that a general theory of economic growth is not even 
conceivable since · there must be growth analysis strictly linked to the 
institutional and structural environment of the countries under consideration, 
in order to pinpoint the individual factors that promote structural changes, 
within the limits set in each country by the existing institutional system (see 
Vaciago 1970). We do not have a theory of economic growth general enough 
to serve as a basis for a policy at all stages of economic advance and with all 
types of economic systems. Most theories of economic growth vary mainly 
because they place different emphasis on the relative importance among the 
various factors and the interrelationships among the identified factors (Choi, 
1983). 
8.2 Theoretical Literature Review 
The theory of economic growth has a very long history in the literature. It 
goes back to the great classical economists such as Smith, Ricardo and 
others. The classical economists approach the study of economics with bold 
and expansive outlook. They wish primarily to discover the causes of long-
term growth in national income and wealth and the process by which this 
growth occurs. The classical thinkers, unlike most of their present-day 
counterparts, construct theories of economic growth that incorporate both 
purely economic and metaeconomic variables comprising nature and society. 
There is a considerable variation among the members of the classical school. 
The differences arise whether from the different assumption made regarding 
the "set of natural, psychological, and institutional constraints" (Lowe 1954, p. 
140) or from the different circular mechanisms that link the changes in the 
variables involved with the course of economic advancement. It is not our 
intention to present a systematic survey of all the variants of the classical 
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theory of economic growth. The classical analysis of growth may be best 
understood by studying the thoughts of two giants, Adam Smith and David 
Ricardo. 
8.2.1 Adam Smith's theory of Economic Growth 
Adam Smith's theory of economic growth is at first sight startlingly different 
from that of Quesnay (1756, 1757) and the Physiocrats (1757)25. In their 
argument industry produces no investable surplus and, therefore, makes no 
positive contribution to growth, which depends entirely on the reinvestment of 
the agricultural surplus. By 1776 when Smith published The Wealth of 
Nations, the Industrial Revolution was transforming the North of England, and 
he perceived more of its implications for output and living standards than 
many of his successors. In the theory he developed, both industry and 
agriculture play a vital role, but the agricultural surplus has a particularly 
important effect on growth and it will emerge that he took over crucial 
elements of Quesnay's argument which he greatly simplified. According to 
Smith (1776) increasing returns in industry, and "learning by doing" as growth 
theorists now call it can be expected to increase the manufactured goods that 
workers can afford to buy continuously in an economical and well-governed 
society. 
Smith went on to develop a line of argument about the positive association 
. between capital accumUlation and productivity growth which modern theory 
has only recently begun to rediscover. Astonishingly, in much of twentieth-
century growth theory, the rate of investment is predicted to have no effect at 
all on an economy's long-term rate of output and living standards. In Smith's \ 
theory, in contrast, capi.tal accumulation leads to increased population and 
employment, and provided that the market for manufactured goods is 
widened by this, an increased division of labour will follow, which will have 
favourable effects on labour productivity. 
25 EltiS, W . (1984). 
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Adam Smith's Assumptions 
Smith's basic assumptions about four of the factors which influence the 
development of economies will be mentioned, namely, his assumptions about 
returns to scale in the different sectors of the economy; about the relationship 
between the ratio of productive to unproductive employment and the rate of 
capital accumulation, and the principal considerations which motivate this; 
about how requirements for fixed and circulating capital vary with growth; and 
about how growth and income distribution interact- He sees growth as the \ 
. outcome of increased productivity, of which a major source is the division of 
labour that arises out of the propensity to exchange. Division of labour, in \ 
turn, is dependent on a widening of the market and the accumulation of 
capital and thus dependent on saving. Smith (1937, pp. 261-62) writes: 
"In that rude state of society in which there is no division of labour, in 
which exchanges are seldom made, and in which every man provides 
everything for himself, it is not necessary that any stock should be 
accumulated or stored up beforehand, in order to carry on the business 
of the society... As the accumulation of stock must, in the nature of 
things, be previous to the division of labour, so that labour can be more 
and more subdivided in proportion only as stock is previously more and 
more accumulated 2611 • 
Accumulation of capital is the keystone to Smith's theory of growth. His 
emphasis on the importance of capital accumulation in the growth process is 
a fundamental element in later growth theories. Capital accumulation would 
take place only if there were profits, for workers had no capacity to save. 
Only through capital accumulation could the level of technique improve, and 
in turn this increased profits. To Smith (1937, pp. 263-69), capital is divided 
into three parts: that portion reserved for immediate consumption (food, 
clothes, furniture), circulating capital (money, stocks of provisions, raw 
material, stocks of finished goods), and fixed capital (machines, profitable 
buildings, land improvements, acquired and useful abilities). Smith (1937, pp. 
26 Quoted from Eltis 1984. 
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341-56) also discusses four different ways of employing the accumulated 
capital: producing rude produce (agriculture), manufacturing, transportation, 
and distribution. 
Although Smith does not deny the important role of agriculture in feeding the 
urban population with an agricultural surplus and in forming the basis for a 
demand for manufactured goods, he emphasized the crucial importance of 
the nonagricultural sector in economic growth because he believes that 
division of labour and the accumulation of capital by savings out of profits, his 
two major sources of growth, are considerably better suited to trading and 
manufacturing activities than to agricultural activities. 
The following succinct summary provided by Phyllis Deane (1978, p. 37) 
recapitulates our discussion so far. The distinctive features of Adam Smith's 
theory of economic growth were: 
1. his emphasis on the role of labour specialization and its relation 
to the size of the market, 
2. the importance he attached to the role of the manufacturing 
sector in accelerating the pace of productivity growth for three 
reasons -
a. because there was more scope for division of labour in 
manufacturing, 
b. because the commercial and manufacturing sectors 
tended to save a relatively high proportion of income, and 
c. because the demand for their products was less readily 
satiated than the demand for, e.g., foodstuffs; and 
3. the way he made the growth of population, output and 
productivity all hinge on the rate of growth of capital 
accumulation. 
To Smith, the growth process generated as discussed above is likely to 
continue so long as produce per head grew faster than consumption per 
head, for this would ensure a continuing surplus, a rising demand for 
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labour, and hence a growing population. Smith's optimistic view on the 
prospects for growth was not shared by many of his immediate followers. 
It must be emphasized that putting Smith's theory in this purely economic 
format does not capture the whole spirit or the entire novelty of his 
approach to an explanation of growth. A greatly simplified, but still in 
purely economic format, interpretation of the Smithian theory of growth is 
provided by Sir John Hicks (1965, pp. 36-42), based on the third chapter 
of the second book of the Wealth of Nations titled "Of the Accumulation of 
capital or of Productive and Unproductive Labour," in the following simple 
equation 
Yt = (p/w)Yt_1 = (p/w)~ = k(p/w)Yt_1 (8.1) 
where Yt and Yt-1 are output (in terms of corn) of this year and last year 
respectively, p is the productivity of the average labourer, w is wage, ~ is 
capital available for the production, and k is the fraction of output available 
as capital after all "nonproductive leaks" are accounted for, i.e., k = ~t-
1. Under this formulation the growth rate of the economy is (p/w) - 1 or 
k(p/w) - 1, depending on whether the economy devoted capital only to the 
productive sector or diverts to the unproductive sector. We obtain a 
positive growth rate when productivity rises faster than the wage rate and 
the level of unproductive consumption. 
8.2.2 Ricardo's Growth Theory 
Ricardo (1817), the most theoretical of the classical ~conomists, 
demonstrated that the ultimate outcome of the growth process rested upon 
three basic propositions: 
1. the Malthusian law of population which held that population, unless 
checked by disease, famine, or war, tends to expand at an exponential 
rate; 
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2. the fundamental economic principle of diminishing returns, especially as 
applied to the scare resource of agricultural land; and 
3. a theory of capital accumulation in which profit is a key variable (Eltis, 
1984). 
The process that Ricardo and other classical economists envisaged begins at 
an early stage of development when population is small as compared to 
available arable land and, consequently, profits and the opportunity for capital 
accumulation are high. The high level of profits stimulates investment-capital 
accumulation, which in turn increases the demand for labour, thereby driving 
market wage rates above the subsistence level. This sets in motion the 
forces that induce an expansion in population. Two developments take place. 
First, as market wage rates rise above the subsistence level, profits will be 
squeezed and thus the rate of capital accumulation slows down. Second, 
more land must be brought into use to accommodate the food requirements 
of growing population. The employment of more and more labour on a fixed 
quantity of land brings diminishing returns into play. Market wages will tend to 
fall back toward the subsistence level. When this happens, capital 
accumulation will cease, population will stabilize, and the economy will enter 
into the stationary state. 
To summarise, the contribution by the classical economists to growth theory 
can be put in three points. First, the classical economists provide a list of 
crucial factors that are supposed to determine the pace of the output growth 
in the economy. The identified elements include factors of production -
natural resources, capital, and labour - technology, and the institutional 
setting of economic activity. Second, they develop certain propositional 
relationships among the identified elements. One well-known proposition in 
this regard is the effects of diminishing returns resulting from the combination 
of capital and labour with limited natural resources. Third, they suggest 
"some ranking in the growth-promoting properties of the different elements, 
some crucial factors on which to focus" (Deane 1978, p. 41). Capital 
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accumulation was identified as the single most important dynamic factor on 
the list. 
8.2.3 Harrod and Domar Models of Growth 
The modern growth theory differs from the earlier attempts in that it is both 
less ambitious and more precise. Postwar growth theorists have been 
content to relegate theories of population growth and of changes in the 
organizational or institutional framework, sometimes even of technological 
changes, to other disciplines or to accept changes in these rather crucial 
dimensions as given, rather than to be explained within the framework of the 
growth theory itself. The development of macroeconomics as a result of the 
Keynesian revolution created a demand for theoretical concepts that were 
selected and defined in empirically measurable forms. The beginning of 
modern growth theory, which is essentially an attempt to extract the long-run 
dynamic implications of Keynes's primarily static and short-run analysis for a 
mature, closed economy, is the work by Roy E. Harrod (1939) and Evsey D. 
Domar (1946). Basically, their analysis deals with the relationship between 
the growth of saving and investment and income under circumstances in 
which full employment would be maintained. They did not develop a full 
model of economic growth. Their aim was a limited one: to express a certain 
relationship that must be achieved if an economy is to grow smoothly with full 
employment. 
As classical economists did, Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) assign a crucial 
part in the process of growth to capital accumulation resulting from increased 
investment. But they emphasise that investment has a double role: on the 
one hand, investment generates income through the multiplier process; on 
the other, it increases the productive capacity of the economy by enlarging its 
capital stock. Classical economists gave attention to the productive capacity 
side of capital accumulation but took for granted adequate demand; in the 
earlier Keynesian literature, attention was given to the problem of adequate 
demand, but the problem of capital increase was ignored. Net investment is, 
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by definition, the rate of change of the capital stock per unit of time. The 
effects of net investment on the expansion of capital stock can be ignored in 
the short run, but the assumption of a constant stock of capital must be 
dropped in the long-run analysis. When the capital is expanded, it is 
essential that the increment in capital be utilized. Output must expand to 
absorb the enlarged capital stock into production; otherwise, idle capacity will 
emerge and act as a deterrent to future investment (Choi, 1983). 
The simplest versions of the Harrod and Domar models are outlined in 
equation in table 8.1 
Table 8.1: Harrod and Domar Growth Models 
I = M<. = C(~Y)(K = CV) (H.1) 
S = sY (H.2) 
I = S (H.3) 
G = ~YIY = sIC 
01b(~ Y) = sY (H.4) 
a = ~P/I or ~p = 0'1 
Y = (1/0')1 or ~Y = (1/a~1 
llY = llP 





Beginning with the concept of output, Harrod (1939) focuses on the nature of 
the conditions of equilibrium between planned saving through a consumption 
function and to net investment through the acceleration principle. Saving S is 
assumed to be a simple proportional function of the level of income, S = sY, 
in (H.2), whereas investment I is assumed to be a constant proportion of the 
absolute growth of income via the acceleration principle, I - C(~ Y), in (H.1); s 
is a constant average and marginal propensity to consume, and C is a 
technical or required capital that planned investment must be equal to 
planned saving, S = I, in (H.3); we have the equilibrium condition, C(~Y) = sY 
or Gw = ~YIY = sIC, in (H.4); the latter Harrod calls the "fundamental 
equation." Therefore, the condition for a continuous equilibrium between 
planned saving and investment requires that the output grow at a constant 
rate of sIC. The equilibrium growth rate varies directly with s and inversely 
with C. 
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Harrod (1939) calls the rate of growth Gw the "warranted" rate and defines it 
as that overall rate of advance. He distinguishes two other growth rates: Gn, 
the natural rate of growth, is the maximum rate allowed by the growth of the 





, the economy will move toward secular stagnation, the 
reason for this trend being that the inability of the actual growth rate to equal · 
the warranted one in the face of the growth ceiling implies an insufficiency of 
acceleration, so planned saving will persistently exceed planned investment. 
The excess of saving over investment will make for stagnation. If Ga > Gw , 
incomes will grow faster than is warranted by the capital investment, the 
economy is stimulated to further expansion, and Ga will move farther from 
G
w
' The situation where Ga = Gw = Gn is described as "The Golden Age" by 
Joan Robinson (1970). 
Oomar (1946) chooses to focus on the dull nature of the rate of investment in 
a capitalist economy. From the Keynesian theory of the multiplier, the level of 
income is determined by the level of investment or an increase in investment 
brings about an increase in national income, Y = (1/a)1 or IJ.. Y = (1/a) (IJ..I ), in 
(0.2), where 1/a is the multiplier. Oomar (1946) emphasizes the significance 
of the capacity-creating aspect of net investment and puts the relation 
involved in terms of 0' = (IJ..P)/1 or IJ..P = 0'1 in (0.1) in the table above, where a 
refers to the rate of change of the potential capacity for the production of 
output associated with a given level of output. (The coefficient 0' is a 
productivity ratio, the reciprocal of the technical capital-output ratio.) Equation 
(0.1), IJ..P = 0'1, represents a comprehensive description of the supply side of 
the economy. If initially, before the capacity-creating increment in investment 
occurred, aggregate demand Y and potential aggregate output P were equal, 
the full-capacity equilibrium after the change in the economy's capital output 
IJ..P is matched by the resulting change in aggregate demand IJ.. Y, so that we 
have equilibrium condition, IJ.. Y = IJ..P, in (0.3). 
By imposing full-employment equilibrium initially and successively, we get 
(IJ..I)/1 - aO' or 0'1 = (1/a)IJ..1 in (0.4). According to the final result in (0.4), given 
229 
the productivity of new investment and the multiplier, investment must grow at 
a constant rate of (la to assure the full capacity utilization of a growing capital 
stock. Two things stimulate growth: an increase in the productivity of capital 
and a higher multiplier through an increase in the propensity to consume. 
The attempt to do both at the same time leads to a conflict. 
The similarities and differences in the assumptions made and the major 
results obtained between the models of Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) can 
be summarised as follows. First, both models are fundamentally Keynesian 
in framework but extend the analysis to the long-run or dynamic relationships 
. In particular, the capacity-creating effect of investment is clearly recognized. 
Second, both the economy, which grows at a constant rate, and suggest 
long-run difficulties in maintaining the equilibrium growth at full employment. 
However, the reason for the long-run difficulty is different in the two models. 
For Domar, the problem arises because of underinvestment. In the Harrod 
model, the similar problem arises because there is no mechanism that will 
ensure that the labour growth rate and the warranted growth rate become 
equal. Third, both models depict instability of the equilibrium path. Fourth, 
while Harrod incorporates a theory of investment behaviour in his model via a 
simple accelerator hypothesis, Domar has no investment theory. Domar's 
main concern is with finding the rate at which investment would have to grow 
for expanding productive capacity to be fully absorbed. He is concerned 
primarily with the essentially technical question of the effect of present 
investment on future capacity. 
8.2.4 NEOCLASSICAL THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
The weakness associated with the Harrod (1939) and Domar (1946) models 
of economic growth in terms of the rigidities and instability problems led 
economists to explore more complex theories by relaxing the rigid 
assumptions of the Harrod and Domar models and making refinements to 
their simple models. The neoclassical approach to the analysis of a growing 
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economy has attracted substantial attention since R.M. Solow (1956), T.W. 
Swan (1956) and J.E. Meade (1961) worked out its implications. 
Solow's purpose was to examine and demonstrate the special nature of the 
fundamental opposition of warranted and natural rates. His paper was 
devoted to a model of long-run growth which accepts all the Harrod-Domar 
assumptions except that of fixed proportions. The assumptions are as 
follows: 
• assume a model economy in which only one good is produced: There 
is only one commodity, output as a whole, whose rate of production is 
designated as Y(t) . 
• a simple proportional savings function is assumed: S = sY (8.2) 
where 0<s<1 
• the capital stock does not depreciate. Investment is simply the rate of 
increase of the capital stock of the composite commodity: 
K = I (8.3) 
and given that investment is equal to saving, we can rewrite equation 
8.3 as K = S or K = sY 
• the labour force grows at an exogenous constant proportional rate, n. 
UL = n (8.4) 
• the technical possibilities of the economy are represented by a 
continuous, constant returns to scale, aggregate production function: 
Y = F(K, L) (8.5) 
The assumption of constant returns to scale implies that equation 8.5 can be 
written in the intensive form as: y = f(k), (8.6) 
where y = Y/L and k = KlL., Therefore, equation 8.6 states that output per 
labourer is a function of capital per labourer. Solow argued that constant 
returns to scale seems the natural assumption to make in a theory of growth. 
It is clear that the assumption of a continuous aggregate production function 
is totally different from that used by Harrod and Domar (Jones, 1975). 
The neoclassical economists postulate a "well-behaved" aggregate production 
function with flexible inputs that are smoothly substitute over the whole range 
231 
determined by current technology, and assume that all inputs will be fully 
employed all the time through complete flexibility in factor input prices. These 
postulates and assumptions enable neoclassicists to define a stable 
equilibrium growth rate in which the warranted growth rate is tied to the 
natural growth rate by factor price changes that induce appropriate variations 
in the input mix. In the neoclassical system, the economy, if left alone, seeks 
out a steady-state equilibrium growth path. Since full employment is 
assumed to be normally present, savings are continuously absorbed by 
employment. Unlike in the Keynesian world where investment generates 
saving, in the neoclassical model of growth the rate of saving governs the rate 
of investment. There is a similarity here to the monetarist approach to the 
economy's behaviour, for, like monetarists, the neoclassical theories are 
challenging the Keynesian notion that the economy is inherently unstable. 
The automatic equality between saving and investment in the neoclassical 
economy led Robinson (1971, p. 111) to protest that "the neoclassical seized 
upon Harrod's model and thrust it into a pre-Keynesian mould." 
The substitutability between capital and labour plays a central role in the 
neoclassical formulation. With variable factor proportions and flexible factor 
prices, the growth path is not inherently unstable. If the labour force outgrew 
the supply of capital, the price of labour would fall relative to the rate of 
interest, or vice versa. Price flexibility and factor substitution mitigate the 
terror of the rigidity and instability in the models of Harrods and Domar. 
Furthermore, the neoclassical production function satisfies the following 
cond itions27: 
• the marginal product of capital, denoted f(k) is positive for all levels of the 
capital-labour ratio. f(k) > 0 for all k. 
• the marginal product of capital diminishes as capital per labourer 
increases; mathematically this implies that f"(k) < 0 for all k. 
• as the ratio of capital to labour, k, tends towards infinity, the marginal 
product of capital tends towards zero. At very high levels of the capital-
27 Jones, W.G. (1975), The Modern Theories of Economic Growth. 
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labour ratio, the marginal product of capital becomes very small. In the 
mathematical terms this condition is written as: 
lim f(k) = 0 
k~oo 
• as the ratio of capital to labour, k, tends towards zero, the marginal 
product of capital tends towards infinity. It is expressed mathematically as 
follows: 
lim f(k) = 00 
k~O 
• no output can be produced without any capital, Le. f(O) = 0 
• an indefinitely high level of output per labourer is associated with an 
indefinitely large ratio of capital to labour, Le. f(oo) = 00 
An aggregate production function satisfying the above conditions (usually 
well-known as Inada-condition) is referred to as well-behaved. 
Neoclassical models certainly have dominated the areas of growth theory and 
exerted pervasive influence on the way economists think about economic 
growth. The attractions of the neoclassical growth model are "its great 
simplicity, its use of Keynesian macroeconomic aggregates on the one hand 
and microeconomic technique on the other.. . and the fact that it seems to 
lend itself readily to empirical tests and predictions" (Deane 1978, p. 201). 
The objections raised to the neoclassical growth model revolve around its 
choice of assumptions. The modern Cambridge school of economists are 
particularly critical of the measurement of capital and malleability of capital on 
which continuous substitutability between factors is postulated. The 
neoclassical vision of full employment and a smooth, long-run equilibrating 
process is inconsistent with the Keynesian short-run vision of the possibility of 
discrepancy between ex ante saving and ex ante investment does not exist in 
the neoclassical world. What is specific to the neoclassical approach to the 
theory of economic growth is the conception of growth as a ,form of 
adjustment to savings decisions and to factor supplies. Furthermore, it is 
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presumed that there always exists a unique state of steady growth with full 
employment to which a neoclassical economy will adjust, given enough time. 
8.2.5 NEO-KEYNESIAN THEORY OF ECONOMIC GROWTH 
While neoclassical growth theory has dominated the journals and discussions 
during the postwar period, a small group of theorists, especially at the 
University of Cambridge, have attempted to develop, on the basis of the 
models of Michael Kalecki and John Maynard Keynes, an alternative 
paradigm or view to the neoclassical traditions. Main contributions are by 
Nicholas Kaldor (1956, 1957, 1959), Joan Robinson (1953-54, 1962, 1970, 
1971), J.A. Kregel (1972) and many others. 
The neo-Keynesian paradigm is described by a vastly different set of 
metaphysical beliefs and assumptions, values, and choice of techniques and 
problems. Although the development of neo-Keynesian growth theory has 
been an uneven one and there is no rigid orthodoxy, certain common 
elements have emerged that allow one at least to outline this neo-Keynesian 
conception of economic growth. Before we move to the discussion of works 
by two prominent contributors, Robinson and Kaldor, certain common 
features shared by different versions of neo-Keynesian growth are 
summarized and the distinctive features different from those of the 
neoclassical paradigm are pointed out. 28 
First, neo-Keynesian growth theorists believe that the aggregate saving 
depends essentially on the distribution of income. For instance, a higher 
proportion of profits than wage income is saved. This is in sharp contrast to 
the neoclassical idea that the aggregate saving is independent of the 
distribution of income. Neo-Keynesian theory treats the distribution of income 
as a variable directly linked to the rate of economic growth, while in the 
28 Choi, K. (1983) unless stated otherwise. 
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neoclassical theory the distribution of income is ignored or assumed to be 
derived from the technical condition of the production relation. 
Second, neo-Keynesian growth theory avoids the use of a total stock of 
capital and objectives to the neoclassical production function. The debate 
involved is the well-known "capital controversy." Neo-Keynesian theory 
rejects the neoclassical assumptions necessary to treat capital and labour as 
continuously and smoothly substitutable, i.e., the assumption that real capital 
is like putty - homogeneous and malleable - as easily transformed from one 
use to another as putty. 
Third, in place of the relative price variable, which is the focal point of a 
neoclassical analysis, neo-Keynesian theory makes investment the key 
determinant in economic growth. These follow from an underlying belief that 
in a dynamic, expanding economy, the income effects produced by 
investment and other sources of growth far outweigh the substitution effects 
resulting from price movements. In neo-Keynesian theory, investment 
depends on decisions made by entrepreneurs based on their expectations, 
and it is independent of the propensity to save. 
A fourth major characteristic to note is the direction of causality between the 
important variables involved. Neo-Keynesian postulates that investment 
determines saving through the multiplier and adjustment in the distribution of 
income and that the rate of profit determines the marginal product of capital. 
If there had been some saving out of wages, in the neo-Keynesian model, the 
distribution and marginal product would have had to be determined by the 
rate of profit. 
The fifth distinguishing feature of neo-Keynesian theory is that it regains the 
fundamental approach to a monetised production economy outlined by 
Keynes. It is recognized that real commodity and labour flows are expressed 
in the system as monetary flows, the real aspects being reflected on the 
product side of the national accounts and thus monetary flows on the income 
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side. Neo-Keynesian theory describes an economic system with advanced 
credit and other monetary institutions, all of which play a fundamental role in 
the dynamic processes being analyzed. The role of financial institutions, the 
money wage rate independent of the real wage rate, distinction between 
discretionary and nondiscretionary expenditures, etc., all have been paid 
adequate attention in the neo-Keynesian models. 
A sixth important feature of the writings of neo-Keynesians is their rejection of 
theories that imply that the rationality of an individual is unbounded. The neo-
Keynesian paradigm also shifts emphasis toward the recognition of 
monopolistic and oligopolistic elements and other forms of market 
imperfections. J.E. Stiglitz and H. Uzawa (1969, p. 310) summarize the 
difference in fundamental philosophy between the neo-Keynesians and the 
neoclassicists as follows: "The neoclassicists are committed to an economic 
theory derived from some kind of rational behavior, while the Cambridge 
economists believe that individuals are not calculating - in particular in a 
world of imperfect competition and uncertainty - and that rules of thumb are 
used." In place of maximizing behaviour in neoclassical theories, neo-
Keynesians build behaviouristic models in which economic agents act 
according to some rules. The competitive conditions assumed in neo-
Keynesian theory are less restrictive than those in the neoclassical analysis. 
The individual firm may be a price maker with some ability to affect the 
prevailing price. The neo-Keynesian formulation of a pricing model is based 
on a certain markup or margin above costs. This discarding of some of the 
basic assumptions of neoclassical analysis is an effort by Keynesians of 
seeking to infuse the analysis with a "sense of history." 
Last, neo-Keynesians, particularly Robinson, concentrate on the comparison 
of alternative steady-growth golden age equilibria rather than on movements 
from one to another. For example, there is a range of profit rates consistent 
with a given technology, and corresponding to this and to the given saving 
rates, we have a range of possible warranted growth rates. 
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To construct a causal model Robinson (1962, p.34) starts "not from 
equilibrium relations but from the rules and motives governing human 
behaviour. We therefore have to specify what kind of economy the model 
applies to, for various kinds of economies have different sets of rules." 
Robinson presents an analysis of long-run accumulated growth beginning 
with a simple model and progressing to models of increasing complexity by 
varying or relaxing the simplifying assumptions. Since unlike her neoclassical 
counterpart, Robinson has carried through her argument in verbal , analytical 
terms, it is not easy to put her system in mathematical formulation and much 
harder to detect errors in logic that might have crept in at some state of the 
discussion. Listing the basic assumptions in her simple model may facilitate 
our discussion of her theory of capital accumulation. 
1. There are two classes of income: profits and wages. While wage earners 
spend all of their wage income on consumption, profit takers save and 
invest all their profit income. 
2. Capital and labour are combined in fixed proportions to produce a given 
output. 
3. Labour is homogeneous and there are no scarce natural resources. 
4. From one period to another the expected prices and rate of profits are 
always realized and confirmed by experience, i.e., tranquility. 
5. The economy is a closed economy, with no government. 
6. Labour costs are the only variable costs, and prices are determined by 
marking up unit prime costs. 
Robinson (1962, p. 35) isolates determinants of equilibrium and groups them 
under seven headings: 
• technical conditions, 
• investment policy, 
• thriftiness condition, 
• competitiveness condition, 
• wage bargain, 
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• financial conditions, and 
• initial stock of capital goods and state of expectations formed by past 
experience. 
At the core of Robinson's approach to the theory of economic growth is the 
importance of investment in the growth process and the "double-sided 
relationship between the rate of profit and the rate of accumulation." 
Investment is important in Robinson's model of growth because economic 
growth depends on investment to which savings adapt. Saving adapts to 
investment through its dependence on the share of profits, which rises with 
the level of investment in relation to income. The basic idea here is that there 
is within certain definite limits a distribution of income between profits and 
wages to ensure that saving matches investment and demand absorbs output 
produced with growing productive capacity. This idea is entirely that of 
Keynes because "firms are free, within limits, to accumulate as they please, 
and that the rate of saving of the economy as a whole accommodates itself to 
the rate of investment that they decree" (Robinson 1962, p. 83). 
The significance of the growth-investment or growth-profit relation is pointed 
out clearly by Donald J. Harris (1978, p. 183) when he writes: 
The growth-profit relationship viewed simply as an equilibrium 
condition is consistent with any theory of growth and distribution. What 
gives causal significance to this relation in the case of neo-Keynesian 
theory is the proposition that the rate of accumulation is an 
independent variable and there is a relation of dependence of the rate 
of profit on the rate of accumulation. This is one proposition about 
which all varieties of neo-Keynesian theory are in full agreement and 
one distinguishing that framework of analysis from others. 
The direction of causation from investment to saving (profits), not the other 
way around, can be discussed using the distribution equation pivotal to 
Robinson's growth theory. Net income per annum is exhaustively divided into 
wages and profits: 
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PY + W + P = wL + 1tpK (8.7) 
Where Y is real national income, p is the price of output as well as of capital 
equipment, W is total wages, P is total profits, w is the money wage rate, L is 
the amount of labour employed, 1t is the gross profit rate, and K is the amount 
of capital employed. Dividing both sides of (8.7) by the average price index p, 
we have the distribution equation in real terms 
Y = (w/p)L + 1tK (8.8) 
Equation (8.8) can be rearranged to yield the profit rate in the form 
1t = Y - w 1: = Y - (w/p)L = Y/L - w/p (8 .9) 
K P K K KlL 
Equation (8.9) shows that the profit rate depends on the technological 
condition, capital-labour ratio KlL, labour productivity Y/L, and the real wage 
rate w/p. 
On the assumption that all wages are consumed and that all profits are 
invested, it can be shown that the rate of capital accumulation is equal to the 
rate of profit. 
s = I = 1tK = ~K or 1t = ~KlK (8.10) 
To summarise our discussion of the Robinson model of economic growth, her 
chief contribution lies in her integration of classical value and distribution 
theory and modern Keynesian investment-saving theory in one coherent 
system. Robinson's theory brings to the forefront of analysis the 
expansionary drive of firms and their "technical dynamism" as basic forces 
governing the operation of the capitalist economy. Interrelationships among 
identified forces are clearly pointed out. Her theory emphasises: 
1. the causal role of investment decisions of entrepreneurs, 
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2. the interconnection between profits and accumulation, and 
3. the dependence of income shares on the rate of accumulation and saving 
propensities among classes or income categories. 
While her model is capable of yielding a stable equilibrium solution, there is 
no automatic equilibrating mechanism to bring about continuous expansion at 
full employment. Given the growth determinants mentioned above and their 
interactions, steady growth with full employment is unlikely and mythical. 
8.2.6 ENDOGENOUS GROWTH MODELS 
Given the empirical and policy difficulties associated with the Solow model a 
number of new models of economic growth have been proposed which 
attempt to endogenise the growth process. . These new models were 
developed by a group of growth theorists led by Paul Romer (1986), which 
became increasingly dissatisfied with exogenously driven explanations of 
long-run productivity growth. The two major approaches are to remove the 
fixed factor constraint of the Solow model by allowing constant returns to 
reproducible factors or to endogenise technological change by explicitly 
modelling the introduction of new technologies. 
The simplest model, which demonstrates the first approach, is one in which 
capital is linearly related to output as found in Rebelo et al (1987). In this 
model the production function takes the very simple form Y=AK where K may 
be considered a composite of physical and human capital and A is a positive 
constant that reflects the level of technology. It is easy to demonstrate that 
sustained per capita output growth is possible without resorting to exogenous 
technical change29 . Assuming maximization of a utility function exhibiting 
constant relative risk aversion by an infinitely lived consumer yields a 
perpetual growth rate of g= (A-p)/cr, where p is the discount rate and 1/cr is the 
inter-temporal elasticity of substitution. It -is ;apparent that economies where 
29 The view of Scott (1989) is similar since he argues all growth occurs through investment 
and changes in quality adjusted labour. 
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consumers are more patient (Iow p) and more willing to substitute over time 
(Iow 0-) will grow faster. 
However, it does not seem appealing to rely on differences in tastes to 
explain differences in growth. A more appealing explanation is that factors 
which affect the marginal product of capital will have sustained growth effects 
(Renelt, (1991). This approach may be extended to multiple sectors. Rebelo 
shows that sustained growth is possible as long as a core of capital goods are 
able to be produced without fixed factors. Jones and Manuelli (1990) 
demonstrate that technology need not be linear in capital for sustained 
growth, but that relaxing the Inada condition at infinity may be sufficient. A 
production function which may satisfy this condition is Y=aKClL 1-Cl+ bK so 
their approach is a similar one to assuming linear production. A problem with 
the linear production approach is justifying the constant returns to 
reproducible factors when fixed factors are observed3o. 
Romer (1986) resolved this difficulty by adopting Arrow's (1962) learning-by-
doing framework. The argument is that knowledge generation may be 
positively related to the scale of economic activity, which is assumed to be 
proportional to capital accumulation. In order to have sustained growth there 
must be at least constant returns to reproducible factors. This implies 
increasing returns overall which would violate a condition for competitive 
behaviour. Romer posits that there may be spillovers so that an individual 
firm faces constant returns (diminishing returns to capital) but there are 
increasing returns overall. The production function takes the form y=AkCl11-
<XKE (<X+E~1) where y, k and 1 represent firm level quantities and K is 
aggregate capital. Romershows that stable growth paths are feasible in this 
model without relying on technological change. One impiication of Romer's 
framework is that there will be too little capital accumUlation in a private 
economy due to the external effect (Renelt, 1991). 
30 See Mankiw, Romer and Weil (1990) on human-capital-augmented Solow model. Easterly 
(1990) presents models in which the fixed factor constant is endogenous. 
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A similar set-up is employed by Lucas (1988) who utilizes Uzawa's (1965) 
model of human capital accumulation. Lucas proposes an aggregate 
production function of the form Y=AKu (unh) 1-uh 7 where h is average 
human capital , u is the proportion of human use in final goods production, 
and n is population. This form allows for an externality to human capital, 
which helps to explain observed international flows of capital and workers. In 
order to have sustained growth there must still be linear production in the 
human capital-producing sector. The problem facing both the Romer and 
Lucas approaches is to find externalities which are empirically large enough 
to justify the functional forms employed. 
A problem with the externality approach is that there appears to be little 
incentive to produce knowledge in this framework as technology is not 
compensated, but one observes firms actively undertaking research and 
development. Some of these problems are avoided by explicitly modelling 
the accumulation of knowledge. Romer (1990) deals with this problem by 
recognising the need to introduce non-competitive behaviour in order to 
model the fixed costs nature of producing knowledge. He posits an 
aggregate production function of the form Y=L 1-ar:> x,udi where the x's are 
intermediate capital goods. At anyone time a given range of the intermediate 
goods are produced. Each intermediate good requires a fixed outlay to invent 
so that an equilibrium with monopolistic competition exists. In this model, it is 
possible to have sustainable growth through the continued introduction of new 
intermediate products. Thus, policies which affect capital accumulation have 
growth effects. 
Another model which introduces endogenous technical change is 
Schumpeterian model of growth through creative destruction by Aghion and 
Howitt (1989). They allow for learning-by-doing and the fact that new 
innovations may make old ones obsolete. Whereas in the Romer (1990) 
model the private equilibrium will generally have too little research, there may 
be too much research, in the Aghion and Howitt (1989) model. This approach 
can also be extended to account for copying of existing technologies by firms 
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in developing countries. These approaches seem preferable to relying on 
external effects which are difficult to observe and probably not of the 
magnitude necessary to generate sustained growth. A problem is that the 
empirical implications of these models are less clear as technological 
progress and the factors influencing it are difficult to measure (Levine and 
Renelt, 1991). 
8.3 POLICY APPLICATIONS OF GROWTH THEORY 
The above models provide the basic framework for considering endogenous 
growth in a general equilibrium framework. However, given the broad nature 
of the results there is still little information for policymakers. A number of 
models have been developed along the above lines to deal with more specific 
policy and empirical issues. Many of these issues have also been of concern 
to developing countries, especially in sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America. 
8.3.1 Physical and Human Capital 
Both the neoclassical and new growth models have emphasised the role of 
capital accumulation in the growth process. Since growth in the neoclassical 
models is a function only of the capital stock, labour and the exogenously 
determined technology, an increase in the capital stock is expected to 
promote growth. The new growth models, on the other hand, postulate that 
changes in capital stock (through changes in investment) have growth effects 
. because policies affect growth through the level and efficiency of the use of 
capital. Scott (1989) argues that the act of investment itself creates itself new 
investment opportunities. Therefore, increasing investment can have 
dynamic effects that raise an economy's growth rate. 
Endogenous growth models, such as Lucas (1988), allow for significance 
effects of human capital accumulation on economic growth. Azariadis and 
Drazen (1990) posit a threshold externally for human capital. In their model 
human capital becomes more productive once a certain level of human 
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capital accumulation is reached. They argue that growth rates will be 
positively correlated with the level of human capital relative to the income 
level. This allows for the existence of multiple growth equilibria and an 
explanation for non-convergence. A model by Becker, Murphy, and Tamura 
(1988) allows for interactions between human capital accumulation and 
population growth. They show it is possible for countries to become trapped 
in equilibrium with low human capital per worker and high rates of fertility, as 
there exist lower returns to investing in human capital relative to more 
children. Stokey (1990) presents a model with heterogeneous labour and 
goods with growth driven by human capital accumulation. She claims the 
model helps explain the East Asian experience of growth in education, growth 
in trade, and changing composition of output. Arrau (1989) discusses human 
capital and growth in a life-cycle model. He argues that if human capital is 
the engine of growth than tax policies, which more heavily tax human than 
physical capital, will adversely affect growth. 
Chamley (1990), argues that a low level of physical capital at initial stages of 
development may lead to a higher level of output on the balanced growth path 
as the returns to human capital will be higher, encouraging greater 
accumulation. Jones and Manuelli (1990) discuss an overlapping 
generation's model of endogenous growth and find that policies such as 
public education which redistribute income to the young may increase growth. 
These models suggest that government policies to promote education and 
human capital formation can have large impacts on long-run economic 
growth, and should be considered by policy makers in developing countries. 
Applying Leamer's Extreme Bounds Analysis (EBA) to their growth equations, 
Levine and Renelt (1991) arrived at the broad finding that the relationship 
between growth and almost every particular macroeconomic indicator other · 
than the investment ratio is fragile. Other studies (see for examples Savvides 
1995, De Gregorio 1991 and De Long and Summers 1990) have also 
reported high correlations between human capital and growth. 
On the empirical front many researchers have tried to investigate the 
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relationship between human capital and growth. Many proxies have been 
used to measure human capital. These include the secondary school 
enrolment ratio, primary school enrolment ratio, government expenditure on 
education, literacy rate, and the share of health sector in total government 
expenditure. The relationship between human capital and growth had mixed 
results. Using a sample of 98 countries (developed and developing) for the 
period 1960-1985, Barro (1991) finds that for a given starting value of per 
capita GDP, a country's subsequent growth rate is positively related to the 
initial level of human capital as measured by secondary school enrolment 
ratios. As well as holding constant a set of variables including human capital, 
initial per capita GDP is negatively related to per capital income growth. 
Romer (1990) finds no significant effect. Savvides (1995), however, reports 
that human capital accumulation (proxied by the secondary enrolment ratio) 
is not significant in a growth equation for 28 African countries of the period 
1960-1987. 
De Gregorio (1992) uses both primary and secondary school ratios and the 
literacy rate as proxies for human capital. School enrolment indices did not 
have a significant effect oh growth, while the literacy rate had the expected 
sign and was significant. In their study of African countries, Ojo and Oshikoya 
(1995) found that school enrolment indices did not appear to have significant 
effects on growth and in a few equations they appeared to be negatively 
correlated with growth. Romer (1989) also finds no significant effect for 
literacy rates. This is certainly an area in which measurement problems are 
very important and where investment in human capital impinges on growth 
but with very long lags. Otani and Villanueva (1990) used an endogenous 
growth model to explain the main determinants of long-term growth in 
developing countries. Their results support the positive relationship between 
economic growth and the share of educational expenditure in total revenue. 
Fischer (1992) finds a positive relationship between economic growth and the 
primary school enrolment ratio. Cashin (1995) uses the secondary school 
enrolment ratio as a proxy for human capital, and the results show a positive 
but insignificant correlation between growth. 
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Studies that have used the share of education in government expenditure 
also had mixed results. The main emphasis of these studies was to look at 
the relationship between public expenditure on education and growth. The 
studies that found a positive and significant relationship include Landau 
(1983), Romer (1987), Diamond (1989) and Kaakunga (1997), while 
researchers such as Deverajan et al (1993), Aschauer (1987), Kormendi and 
Meguire (1983), and Grier and Tullock (1989) classified public expenditure on 
education unproductive. 
8.3.2 Fiscal policy 
The role of government expenditure and taxation in economic growth has 
been regarded as an important issue in econoniics. Fiscal policy is a key to 
successful macroeconomic policy both because of its direct macroeconomic 
effects on the current allocation of resources and because all methods of 
financing a budget deficit have potential adverse macroeconomic 
consequences when used to excess. However, while it was clear that 
distortionary taxation and government spending could affect the level of gross 
domestic product in a given country, the theoretical link was not clearly 
established in the standard neoclassical model31 . That is, because the 
source of long-run growth in the early neoclassical models of Solow (1956) 
and Swan (1956) was exogenous technical change, fiscal stance had little 
effect on the rate of capital accumulation or the long-run rate of growth32• 
However, contributions to the recent endogenous growth and government 
literature have emphasized the role of the fiscal stance in influencing the rate 
of economic growth with government spending directly affecting the private 
31 More accurately, the standard neoclassical growth model assumes that the marginal 
product of each factor goes to zero as use of that factor increases, holding all other factors 
constant (the Inada conditions are assumed to hold). 
32 In the traditional optimal growth models of Ramsey (1928), Cass (1965), and Koopmans 
(1965), time-varying savings rates were derived from the optimization of an inter-temporal 
social welfare function. In this normative or (planning) use, these models were designed to 
calculate the required saving rate to achieve a given target rate of growth, rather than to 
provide guidance for the appropriate role for government in promoting growth. 
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production function (see Easterly, (1989) and (1990); Barro (1991) and 8ala-l-
Martin (1992) and (1995). The common element linking all endogenous 
growth models is that the marginal returns to the factor can . be accumulated 
to zero (Cashin, 1995). Unlike the early neoclassical growth models, it is not 
determined exogenously by technological innovations or population growth, 
but is rather determined by the parameters of the model, in particular the 
saving rate. 
Most studies have emphasized the importance of distinguishing between 
productive and non-productive spending. The basic argument is that an 
increase in government consumption may affect growth negatively by 
inducing a crowding out of private sector investment. This same argument is 
the main reason to expect a negative relationship between large budget 
deficits and growth. Barro (1990) includes productive government spending 
in a model of endogenous growth in which growth is increasing for low levels 
of government expenditure (and taxation) and then decreasing when size of 
the government sector increases beyond acceptable levels. The model also 
suggests that different types of government expenditure may have different 
impacts on growth. 
A number of fiscal variables have been used in empirical studies. Four 
commonly used variables are the share of government consumption in GDP, 
the share of public infrastructural investment in GDP, the share of public 
spending on health and education in GDP, and fiscal deficits. As a result of 
methodological, conceptual and statistical problems, the empirical relationship 
between growth and aggregate indicators of fiscal variables has yielded 
mixed results. The general finding, however, is that there is a negative 
correlation between growth and government consumption (Martin and 
Fardmanesh 1990, Barro 1991, Grier and Tullock 1989). 
Barro (1991) finds a negative relationship between government consumption 
(excluding defence and education) and per capita GDP. Diamond (1989) also 
finds overall government expenditlJre to be negatively related to growth with 
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some significant positive growth effects of directly productive current and 
capital expenditures for education, but no strong effects for general 
infrastructural spending. Kormendi and Meguire (1985), however, report that 
the average growth rate of the ratio of government consumption to GDP is not 
closely associated with growth. De Gregorio (1992) and Ojo and Oshikoya 
(1995) have found that government consumption is negatively related to 
growth. Barro (1989a) finds a positive correlation between government 
capital expenditure and growth but the effect is weaker than for total 
investment. Easterly and Rebelo (1993), in a cross-country study for the 
period 1970-88, conclude that public investment in transport and 
communication is significantly correlated with growth. Mosley and Weeks 
(1993) conclude that capital expenditure by the state and the growth of GDP 
show strong correlation. Other studies that have shown this strong 
relationship include Aschauer (1987), Grier and Tullock (1989), and 
Kaakunga (1997), while Devarajan et al (1993) found a negative relationship 
between public investment in transport and communications and growth. 
Attempts to capture the effects of taxes on growth have also produced mixed 
results. Trying to get an aggregate measure of the potentially negative 
implications of government activity, many researchers use government 
consumption spending as a proxy for the distortionary taxes that must be 
raised to support that spending33. Given the difficulty in data, some efforts 
have been also made to test for the impact taxes on growth. For instance, 
Koester and Kormendi (1989) try to examine the differential effects of 
marginal and average taxes. They use the tax:GDP ratio as a measure of 
average taxes and interpret the regression coefficient of GDP on taxes as a 
marginal tax rate. They find that taxes do not have growth effects. Skinner 
(1987) and Manas-Anton (1987) analyse the differential effects of direct vs. 
indirect taxation. The null hypotheSiS is that indirect taxes tend to fall more 
heavily on conservation and therefore have smaller growth effects. Skinner 
(1987) finds evidence that individual and corporate taxes have greater 
33 Total government expenditure is a concept that varies across countries depending on 
whether it includes all levels. of government, just the central government, various categories of 
state enterprises. etc. 
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negative growth effects than trade or sales taxes in Africa, but Mannas-Anton 
(1987) finds little support for a greater negative impact of direct vs. indirect 
taxes. Cashin (1995) supports the negative relationship between taxes and 
growth. The detrimental partial effect of distortionary taxes on growth has 
been observed and discussed by Marsden (1983), Barro (1989), Martin and 
Fardmanesh (1990), Rebelo (1991), Dowrick (1992), and Engen and Skinner 
(1992), among others. 
8.3.3 Monetary Policy 
An excessive increase in the rate of monetary expansion reduces growth in 
several ways. The theory suggests that high money-growth can elicit the 
behaviour that reduces growth. For instance, the unfavourable impact of 
inflation on the taxation of capital implies a negative association between the 
level of income and inflation, and through the new growth theory channels, 
between inflation and growth. An endogenous growth model to illustrate the 
relation between inflation and growth is presented in De Gregorio (1991 b). In 
that model, inflation is considered to be a result of an inefficient tax system. 
The model discusses the role of money in firms' operations and its effect on 
the investment rate. When money is required to buy capital goods, inflation is 
similar to a tax on investment. The model also shows how inflation can affect 
the productivity of capital. Inflation induces economic agents to divert 
resources from productive activities to other activities that allow them to 
reduce the burden of the inflation tax. The resulting reductions in 
employment in goods-producing sectors that are subject to scale economies 
may reduce the rate of investment and its productivity. Consequently, rapid 
money growth could be detrimental to growth. 
Monetary policy variability can impede the efficient allocation of resources. It 
has been argued that variable inflation or monetary policy uncertainty can 
interfere with the ability of agents to extract information from relative prices 
(Gelb 1989, Grier and Tullock 1989, Easterly and Wetzel 1989). Thus, wide 
swings in money supply could retard growth. In a study by Khan (1991) the 
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relationship between inflation and growth performance was examined in a 
sample of 69 developing countries during the period 1973-88. Cross-
sectional regression equations yielded significant negative effects of inflation 
on the growth rate of GDP. Kormendi and Meguire (1985) conclude that the 
average growth rate of inflation is negatively related with GDP growth, but that 
M1 growth has little relation to growth. Grier and Tullock (1989), however, 
find that the sign and significance of the inflation-growth correlation depend 
importantly on the sample chosen. Levine and Renelt (1991) demonstrate 
that the relationship between growth and inflation and domestic credit 
depends on the inclusion of other policy variables. In some studies, however, 
the inflation variable carried the unpredicted sign and has been found 
insignificant in some specifications. 
De Gregorio (1992) finds that a negative and significant impact of inflation 
and its variance on growth was maintained. After eliminated all observations 
with inflation rates higher than a specified cutoff point. Inflation rates of 50, 
40, 30, 20 and 10 were used as cutoff pOints. Again, the results were found 
to be robust. Fischer (1993) in his study on developing countries, finds a 
negative relationship between the inflation rate and economic growth. Similar 
results were found by Ojo and Oshikoya (1995). 
8.3.4 Financial Policy 
The McKinnon-Shaw hypothesis suggests that the degree of financial 
development should be closely related to the prevailing level of the interest 
rate, the reason being that the level of the interest rates, when held below 
their normal competitive levels, indicates the extent of financial repression. 
According to this view, a positive real interest rate stimulates financial savings 
and financial inter-mediation, thereby increasing the supply of credit to the 
private sector (Fry 1988). This, in turn, stimulates investment and growth. 
Since the seminal work of McKinnon and Shaw (1973), recent theoretical 
work has incorporated the role of financial factors in models of endogenous 
growth in an attempt to analyse formally the interactions between financial 
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markets and long-run economic growth. By focusing on cases where the 
marginal product of capital always remain positive, this literature provides a 
natural framework in which financial markets affect long run, and not just 
transitional, growth. 
Greenwood and Javanovic (1990) present a model in which the role of 
financial investible funds to investment activities yield the highest return. 
Since the activities performed by financial intermediaries involves costs, 
Greenwood and Javanovic show that there is a positive two-way causal 
relationship between economic growth and financial development. On the 
one hand, the process of growth stimulates higher participation in financial 
institutions. On the other hand, financial institutions, by collecting and 
analysing information from many potential investors, allow investment projects 
to be undertaken more efficiently, thereby stimulating investment and growth. 
Bencivenga and Smith (1991) present a model in which individuals face 
uncertainty about their future liquidity needs. In this framework, the presence 
of financial inter-mediation increases economic growth by channelling savings 
into activities with high productivity, while allowing individuals to reduce the 
risk associated with their liquid needs. Although individuals face uncertain 
liquidity needs, banks, by the law of large numbers, face a predictable 
demand for liquidity and can, therefore, allocate investment funds more 
efficiently. In the absence of financial intermediaries, individuals may be 
forced to liquidate their investment when liquidity needs arise. Thus, the 
presence of banks also provides the benefits of eliminating unnecessary 
. liquidities. 
Along similar lines, Levine (1992) analyses the effects of alternative financial 
structures on economic growth. In his model, financial institutions raise the 
fraction of total savings devoted to investment and avoid premature 
liquidations of capital. Bank and stock markets enhance growth by promoting 
efficient allocation of investment through various channels. From a different 
perspective, De Gregorio (1993) analyses the effects of financial 
intermediaries on the savings rate. Attention is focused on the effect of the 
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borrowing constraint on economic growth. The model has the implication that 
the full or partial inability of individuals to borrow against future income 
induces them to increase savings. This study suggests that, in general, 
financial deepening on the side of consumer credit is unlikely to increase 
savings. This result may be consistent with causal observation in some 
developing countries where episodes of financial liberalisation have not 
increased savings rates (Gregorio and Guidoti, 1995). 
Since the pioneering contribution of Goldsmith (1969), McKinnon and Shaw 
(1973), a number of researchers have tested the impact of both the size of 
the financial sector and financial repression policies on the rate of economic 
growth. Empirically, Gelb (1989) finds a positive relationship between 
measures of domestic financial market activities and growth for a sample of 
31 countries. In a sample of 77 countries with data averaged over 1960-89, 
King and Levine (1993) found that their financial indicators were closely 
correlated with each other as well as with measures of GDP growth, capital 
accumulation and total factor productivity. By extending Barro's (1991) cross-
country growth regressions (to include their proxy for financial development) 
De Gregorio and Guidotti (1995) find a positive effect of their measure of 
financial development (Le. credit: GDP ratio) on long-run growth of real per 
capita GDP for the period 1960-87. When panel data were employed to 
explore the relation between financial development and economic growth for 
12 Latin American countries during the period 1950-85, they, however, found 
a robust and significant negative correlation between them. They argue that 
the latter finding is the result of financial liberalisation in a poor regulatory 
environment. 
A number of studies · have examined the relationship between stock markets 
and economic growth. These include Demirguc-Kunt and Levine 1996, 
Bencivenga et al 1996, Levine and Zarvos 1996 and Levine 1991. Although 
stock market development is a common feature of finanCial and economic 
development, many analysts view stock markets in developing countries as 
casinos that have little positive- and potentially a large negative- impact on 
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economic growth (Oemirguc-Kunt and Levine 1996). Other analysts argue 
that because not much corporate investment is financed through issuance of 
equity (Mayer 1988), stock markets are unimportant for economic growth. 
Levine (1991) and Bencivenga et al (1996) have shown that stock markets 
may affect economic activity through the creation of liquidity. Many profitable 
investments require a long-term commitment of capital, but investors are 
often reluctant to relinquish control of their savings for long periods. Liquid 
equity markets make investment lees risky and more attractive because they 
allow savers to acquire on asset-equity and to sell it quickly and cheaply if 
they need access to their savings or want to alter their portfolios. Increased 
liquidity can deter growth by, first, increasing returns to investment: Greater 
stock market liquidity may reduce saving rates through income and 
substitution effects; secondly, by reducing the uncertainty associated with 
investment, grater stock market liquidity may reduce saving rates because of 
the ambiguous effects of uncertainty on savings; thirdly, stock market liquidity 
may adversely affect corporate governance (Oemirguc-Kunt and Levine 
1996). 
Stock markets may also affect incentives for investors to acquire information 
about firms. Larger, more liquid markets make it easier for an investor who 
has obtained information about a firm to trade at posted prices. Thus, 
information becomes widely available and prices change (Kyle, 1984). By 
contrast, Stiglitz, (1985, 1994) argues that developed stock markets quickly 
reveal information through price changes. This quick public revelation creates 
a free-rider problems, it reduces incentives for investors to expend lots of 
resources in obtaining information about firms because investors can get this 
information by observing prices. 
Levine and Zarvos (1996) construct aggregate indexes of overall stock market 
development that combine information on stock market size, liquidity and 
international integration. They use instrumental variables procedures and 
control for many other variables associated with economic growth and stock 
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market development. After controlling for the initial level of GDP per capita, 
initial investment in human capital, political stability, the level of banking 
development, and measures of monetary, fiscal and exchange rate policy, the 
predetermined component of stock market remains positively and significantly 
correlated with long-run economic growth. The results are consistent with 
theories and historical analyses that imply a positive relationship between 
stock market development and economic performance. Haber (1991) 
documents the positive impact of capital market development and capital 
market reform on competition and industrialisation using evidence from Brazil, 
Mexico and the United States during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries. 
8.3.5 Trade Policy 
Theory suggests that high levels of openness or increases in openness 
promote better economic performance. Static allocative efficiency gains 
suggest that greater openness yields unambiguously in terms of a higher level 
of output. Liberalisation in highly distorted economies improves existing 
resource allocation across sectors, across firms in a sector and within firms in 
a sector. In a dynamic sense, liberalisation is also intended to activities that 
are profitable under the new incentive system. Given that the static gains of 
removing even relatively large distortions have been shown to be modest, 
economists have turned to endogenous dynamic effects of outward-oriented 
. trade policies on productivity growth and externalities (Romer 1986, Lucas 
1988, Edwards 1991). In these models, openness to trade provides access 
to imported inputs, which embody new technology, increases the effective 
size of the market facing domestic producers, which raises the returns to 
innovation, and affects a country's specialization in research-intensive 
production (Edwards 1992, Helpman and Grossman 1991). 
Quah and Rauch (1990) have developed a model with intermediate goods 
where freer trade results in an acceleration of the equilibrium rate of growth. 
In their model a closed economy has to produce a large array of intermediate 
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goods and thus is likely to run into bottlenecks. Freer trade, then, allows the 
country to relax these bottlenecks and thus to grow faster than under autarky. 
Taking a different perspective, which perhaps is more relevant to LDCs, 
Edwards (1991) emphasized the role of freer trade in generating 
technological progress. In this model, a higher degree of openness allows 
small countries to absorb technology developed in the advanced nations at a 
faster rate and thus to grow, in equilibrium, more rapidly than with a lower 
degree of openness. Focusing on the negative effects of trade distortions, 
Krueger (1974) and Grossman and Helpman (1989) show that quotas may 
divert resources out of productive activities into rent seeking endeavour. 
These distortions can slow the rate of technological improvement and retard 
growth. 
Empirical research has generally found a positive relationship between 
greater openness, trade liberalisation and economic performance (Krueger 
1978, Bhagwati 1978, Balassa et al 1982, World Bank 1987 and Edwards 
1993). Several indicators of openness were included as explanatory 
variables in the growth regressions: the share of exports in GDP, the share of 
trade in GDP and an index based on the classification made by the World 
Bank in the World Development Report (1987). In the study by De Gregorio 
(1992) none of these variables was found to have significant effects on output 
growth. The reasons for this findings were (i) that the sample was inadequate 
to address the question of openness and growth, (ii) growth in Latin America 
countries during the sample period had taken place under the auspices of 
strong import substitution and (iii) lack of variability in trade policies across the 
sample countries. 
In a cross-country study covering the period 1967-87 on some 37 sub-
Saharan African (SSA) countries, Martin (1992) tests whether the finding that 
increased openness improves economic performance holds true for SSA. 
Econometric analysis using the augmented production function that includes 
labour, capital and a measure of openness, shows that trade reform exerts 
significant . impact on the economic performance of the countries of SSA. 
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Martin (1992) finds the evidence of a positive link between openness and 
performance surprisingly robust to different measures of openness, to 
different periods, and to the inclusion of other policy variables. 
Dollar (1992) obtains results which show that trade liberalisation and 
appropriate exchange rate management ~mprove growth performance. In a 
study on 12 Latin American countries for the period 1950-85, De Gregorio 
(1991) finds no support for the hypothesis that openness affects growth 
positively. Though empirical studies that attempt to relate continuous, 
objective and internationally comparable measures of trade policy with growth 
have thus far met with only mixed success (see Pritechett 1991 and Rodrick 
1988, Levine and Renelt 1991), recent studies using more appropriate price 
and policy-based measures of openness confirm the countries (Edwards 
1992, Dollar 1992 and Harrison 1990). 
Sachs (1987) compares the economic performance of newly industrializing 
countries in East Asia and the economies of Latin American countries when 
faced with similar shocks. He argues that the superior performance of the 
former was due to the greater export orientation. More recently Edwards 
(1993), in his study of Latin American countries, investigated the interaction 
between trade policy and productivity growth. It was found that countries that 
were more open to the rest of the world experienced faster growth in total 
factor productivity than countries with high trade barriers. 
Ojo and Oshikoya (1995) included the export growth rate, share of exports in 
GDP, the terms of trade, and index of volume of exports as measures of 
openness. The growth rate of exports was found to be significantly positive. 
The estimated regression coefficient indicates that a 10 percent increase in 
exports will raise per capita output by 1 percent per year. The share of 
exports in GDP was not very significant as an explanatory variable in the 
growth equation. The terms of trade were found to be negative and 
statistically insignificant with growth. In an export study, Feder (1983) 
examined the proposition that reallocation of resources into export activities 
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will accelerate growth if marginal productivities are higher in export goods 
sectors compared with other sectors of the economy. Fosu (1990), in his 
study on exports of African countries, finds a positive and significant 
relationship between exports and economic growth. A 10 percent increase in 
the growth of exports independently augments economic growth by slightly 
over 1 percent on average. A comparative study by Lussier (1994) has found 
a positive and significant relationship between growth and exports. 
Changes in the terms of trade have also been found to be important for long-
term growth. Easterly et al (1993) found that over the 1980s, for example, a 
negative terms-of trade shock averaging 1 percentage point of GDP a year, 
lowered growth by 0.8 percentage points a year in Africa. 
8.3.6 External Debt 
Several attempts have also been made by studies to look at the effects of 
external debt and interest payments on debt, on economic growth. Ojo and 
Oshikoya (1995) used share of external debt .in GNP in the analysis. Their 
results show that external debt is inversely related to growth. The coefficient 
was statistically significant. The findings by Otani and Villanueva (1990) show 
that the real interest rate on external debt affects growth negatively. The 
coefficient was statistically insignificant. 
8.3.7 Political Instability and Growth 
Political volatility and poorly enforced property rights create uncertainty as the 
ability of individuals to reap the benefits of investments in physical and human 
capital is discouraged. Thus, increased uncertainty associated with these 
phenomena will tend to lower investment and growth. Bromely (1991) has 
observed that 'getting the rules right' is as logically important as 'getting prices 
right'. Barro (1991) finds that social indicators of war, revolution and civil 
liberties are negatively related to growth. But, there is no significant 
relationship between these measures of political instability and measures of 
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monetary or exchange rate variability, thereby highlighting the difficulties in 
drawing causal links. Fosu (1992) shows his index of political instability to be 
a significant determinant of GDP growth across Africa. 
Kormandi and Meguire (1985) introduced an index of civil liberties into their 
cross-country growth equation. They find .a positive but insignificant impact of 
civil liberties on economic growth. Ojo and Oshikoya (1995) attempted to 
capture the influence of political instability on growth. The results were less 
successful. It was only the index of civil liberty that had the expected sign and 
was also significantly different from zero. 
8.3.8 Exchange Rate Policy and Economic Growth 
In recent years, exchange rate policy in developing countries has received 
considerable attention. A study conducted by Demeke (1992) on a sample of 
30 sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries for the period 1950-88 concluded 
that the effects of currency depreciation on output and exports was at best 
significant. However, using data for the period 1965-89, Balassa (1989) 
analysed SSA economic performance in general agricultural exports in 
particular. He found that a 1 percent change in the real exchange rate is 
associated with a 0.8 to 1 percent change in the exports-GDP ratio. 
Estimating a reduced-form real output equation using data for 12 countries, 
Edwards (1986) found that, with all things being equal, devaluation has a 
negative short-run effect on output. After one year, however, this negative 
effect on output was completely reversed and, in the long-run, devaluations 
were found to be neutral. 
8.3.9 Population Growth 
Several studies have also attempted to investigate relationship between the 
population growth rate and economic growth. These studies include Ojo and 
Oshikoya (1995), Otani and Villanueva (1990), and Becket et al (1990). In 
the pooled estimation by Ojo and Oshikoya (1995), the coefficient on 
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population growth rate is found to be negative and significant. The coefficient 
also tends to suggest that an increase in population growth more than offsets 
the growth rate of per capita output for an average country in the sample. In 
endogenous growth models, such as those of Secker at al (1990), an 
increase in net fertility, and by extension an increase in population growth, 
tend to reduce the desired saving rate with an adverse impact on per capita 
growth. 
In the study by Otani and Villanueva (1990) , the effect of the population 
growth rate on per capita income growth was highly significant and negative. 
The size of the coefficient was less than unity in absolute value, suggesting 
that an increase in population growth would reduce per capita income growth 
only partially for an average developing country. This implies that production 
in such an average economy takes place at a point where a decline in the 
capital-Iabor ratio leads to a small reduction in output per worker, i.e. marginal 
product of capital is relatively low (Otani and Villanueva, 1990). 
8.4 Investment-Led Growth Hypothesis 
The precise relationship between capital accumulation and economic growth 
has received a great attention in theoretical and empirical work in economics. 
There are both empirical and theoretical arguments for and against the thesis 
that capital formation is the key to economic growth and therefore that 
differences in growth rates among countries, developed and developing, lie in 
differences in their savings or investment ratios. In general, neoclassical 
growth theories, which incorporate the idea of savings providing a limit to 
investment, deny that the rate of growth . is directly dependent on the 
investment (savings) ratio. Since Solow's celebrated 1957 paper, technical 
progress has been accepted as the most significant source of economic 
growth. Many argued that a large portion of growth rates assigned to 
technical change must be ascribed to capital formation because it is through 
investment that new technologies are, in the main, introduced into the 
production process. When investment is married to technology, which is what 
Phelps (1962) calls the "new view" of investment, the role of investment is to 
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modernize as well as deepen and widen the capital stock. Many researchers 
attempted to switch back to the importance of capital accumulation by relating 
technical change to investment in the endogenous investment hypothesis. 
In his effort to elucidate the effects of capital accumulation, Hill (1964) 
examines the relation between the ratios ,of investment to GNP and the rate 
of growth of GNP on the one hand and GNP per person employed on the 
other. His regression, has shown that the rates of growth of GNP achieved by 
the United States and the four largest European countries - France, Italy, the 
United Kingdom, and West Germany - have been quite strongly associated 
with the shares of national product devoted to investment. When the 
correlation is obtained for the relation between investment ratios and growth 
rates of GNP per person employed, Hill finds much weaker or almost no 
relationship between growth and investment. 
In addition to showing that high growth rates might be associated with high 
investment ratios, Hill demonstrates the need to distinguish between different 
types of capital and output if much progress is to be made in understanding 
the relation between economic growth and investment at the level of the 
economy as a whole. There are reasons for expecting different types of 
investments to have different impacts on the growth of measured output. As 
between two projects with the same initial outlay on capital, but involving 
assets with very different lengths of life, the project with the longer lived 
assets will tend to yield a smaller flow of output over time. 
Pesmazoglu (1972) investigated the pattern of relationships between 
investment and economic growth by different groups of countries and by 
periods covered in the analysis. In an effort to take into account the effect of 
technical progress on economic growth, Pesmazoglu (1972) introduces rates 
of growth of real gross fixed capital formation into his equation, while most 
investigators before him used only average gross fixed capital investment 
ratios in their analyses. The general finding by Pesmazoglu (1972) is that 
investment is particularly important in the long run and that this is especially 
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true in economics at an intermediate stage of development. The regression 
results indicate that varying growth rates of GNP over the period 1957-1968 
appear to be more closely associated with the growth rate of investment or 
saving in GNP over the period, confirming the influence of investment as a 
carrier of technical progress on output growth. 
In his effort to examine the relationship between saving and inflation, Thirlwall 
(1974) takes up the relationship between economic growth and saving or 
investment. Using the sample of 20 developed countries, he finds a positive 
association between the growth rate of income and the saving rate. The 
association is slightly stronger when the growth rate of output is related to the 
investment ratio. The correlation of growth rates of total income with the 
savings or investment ratios is stronger than that of growth rates of per capita 
income with either of them. One possible explanation for the stronger 
association of saving or investment with the growth of total income than with 
the growth of per capita income, as found not only by Thirlwall but also by Hill 
OEeD, is that the use of capital depends on the availability of labour. 
Romer (1989) uses the share of both the private and government investment 
in GDP to investigate the correlation between the rate of growth and 
technological change. His findings support the positive and significant 
relationship between investment and the rate of growth in the long-run. 
Romer (1989) argued that the finding that the investment share is strongly 
related to the level of income, or more broadly to the general level of 
development, is not predicted by the theory. In particular, there is no reason 
to expect that a higher level of development is correlated with a higher rate of 
technological change. On the contrary, one would expect just the opposite 
since less developed countries can catch up with the level of technology in 
developed countries. Presumably, this relation reflects something about 
institutions or preferences that varies systematically with level of development 
and leads to a level of investment that is higher for reasons that have nothing 
to do with the rate of technological change (Romer, 1989). 
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In his study, Fischer (1993) incorporated the share of investment in GDP in 
the growth model. The results show a robust relationship between growth 
and investment. Ojo and Oshikoya (1995) also found similar results. In their 
study, the size of the coefficient of investment ratio suggests that a 10 
percentage point increase in the investment rate increases the long-term 
growth of per capita output by 2 percentage points for an average economy. 
De Gregorio (1992), in his study on Latin American countries, uses foreign 
investment in his equation. The results show that on average foreign 
investment is three to six times more efficient than total investment. He 
argued that the results should not be too surprising since total investment 
data includes several kinds of investment with large quality differentials. He 
further argued that the results not only reflect that the productivity of foreign 
investment is higher than that of domestic investment, but may also show the 
positive effect of capital inflows on growth. Barro (1991) finds also a positive 
correlation between growth and investment. 
The empirical tests reviewed above provide mixed results for the investment-
led growth hypothesis which maintains that differences in growth rates can be 
accounted for primarily by differences in the volume and structure of capital 
accumulation. Because of the limited availability of data, some who have 
wrangled in a sophisticated manner over the theoretical issues have used far 
standards when it comes to empirical tests of their theories. We can question 
comparability and consistency in data among sample countries even though 
each study used the best data available at the time of the empirical 
investigation. Given these and other limitations in the existing empirical tests, 
evidence based on small homogeneous samples confirms the investment-led 
growth hypothesis. However, when the sample is extended to include a large 
number of countries or to cover a longer period of time, the relationship 
between economic growth and capital formation becomes less close. The 
magnitude of the size of the regression serves as coefficient of the 
investment ratios, approximation of the marginal output-capital ratio or the 
marginal productivity of capital varies so much from study to study as to work 
against the hypothesis. 
262 
The investment-led growth hypothesis states that the rate of growth in 
national product depends on how fast real capital increases. This 
consideration has led policymakers aiming at economic growth to concentrate 
on actions designed to increase investment. The results of such policies 
have always not been up to expectations (Choi, 1983). 
8.5 Summary 
This review follows a thin and selective thread from the major classical 
economists to the neoclassical growth model to the neo-Keynesian growth 
model to the endogenous growth models of the last two decades of the 
twentieth century. We also note the contributions of development economists 
to the study of growth. Indeed many development economists moved away 
from the neoclassical growth model for the same reasons that the new growth 
economists modified it: the neoclassical growth model failed to explain 
important aspects of economic development (Easterly et ai, 1991). 
The neoclassical growth model provided a framework for the growth 
accounting literature's attempt to quantify the contribution to growth of each 
physical input and productiveness. Analyses by Norswothy (1984), Chenery 
et al (1986) and Maddison (1987) suggest that physical factor inputs account 
for only 50-70 percent of the growth rate of output. As there are arguments 
as to the precise percentage [see Jorgenson, Gollop and Fraumeni (1987) 
and Baily and Schultze (1990)]. A limitation of the neoclassical growth model 
is that the steady state per capita growth rate is zero if the exogenously given 
rate of technological change is zero. The investment share does not affect 
steady state growth in the neoclassical growth model. Therefore, economic 
policy does not influence steady-state growth, economic policy affects the 
level of economic output or the transition to the steady. 
Recent models seek to extend the neoclassical growth model such that 
growth is responsive t() policy. Building on work by Arrow (1962) and Phelps 
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(1966), Romer (1986) makes technological change endogenous by assuming 
that technology is a public good but that private investment in capital 
increases the level of technology available to all entrepreneurs. The 
externality associated with investment overturns the assumptions of 
diminishing marginal returns to investment and yields a production function 
with increasing returns to scale, such that there is steady-state growth wh~n 
there is sufficient investment. In Romer's (1986) study, a higher investment 
rate will accelerate economic growth. Therefore, economic policies that alter 
the investment rate will affect economic growth34. 
Similarly, Lucas (1988) builds a model based on Uzawa (1962) with 
increasing returns that arise from external effects associated with human 
capital. Lucas (1988) emphasizes that workers interact with colleagues such 
that every individual's productiveness depends on the human capital of 
others. Thus, private investment in human capital by an individual increases 
his own productiveness but also increases the human capital and 
productiveness of others. Consequently, alterations in the incentives to invest 
in human capital have long-run growth implications. In an attempt to 
understand the economic forces and public policies that influence 
technological advancement, recent work has also followed Schumpeter 
(1911, 1942) who argued that invention - the advancement of knowledge -
and innovation - the implementation of such knowledge - depend on the lure 
of profits. In terms of invention, the energizing role of monopolistic profits and 
market scale is the central component of Romer's (1987, 1990) recent 
characterization of economic growth. The invention of new technologies 
increases the productive capabilities of the economy, while the technology 
producer receives monopolistic profits. In terms of innovation, Schmitz (1989) 
formalizes the economic incentives behind the adoption of technology for 
productive endeavours and the adaption of the technology for particular 
environments. Since developing countries do not enjoy a comparative 
advantage in inventing new technologies, carefully studying the economic 
34 In a different model, Scot (1988) argues that the act of investment itself creates new 
investment"opportunities. Therefore, increasing investment can have dynamic effects that 
raise the economy's growth rate. . 
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incentives and public policies underlying the exploitation and adoption of 
existing technologies for domestic commercial purposes seems to be 
particularly relevant (Easterly et ai, 1991). 
These new growth models provide a rich environment in which to study the 
role of government. Not surprisingly, these models yield policy conclusions 
that are similar to many classical and development economists. Within the 
context of simple endogenous growth models, Rebelo (1991) exemplifies the 
effect of taxation on growth. However, modelling and measuring the full 
complexities of fiscal policy are difficult even within the sample model of the 
new growth literature. Barro (1990) and Easterly (1990) have captured some 
of these complexities. In the area of trade policy, Adam Smith (1776) argued 
that international trade may enhance productivity by allowing economic 
players to specialise in activities that would be unprofitable in smaller markets 
and by allowing countries to exploit economies of scale in their areas of 
comparative advantage. These ideas where further developed by Mill (1848) 
and Schumpeter (1911, 1942), and the relationship between trade, 
economies of scale, and growth has been studied extensively.35 
Direct foreign investment has received less attention than trade in the growth 
literature. Findlay (1978) studies the effects of policies restricting direct 
foreign investment and international capital flows in a standard growth model. 
Helleiner (1990) provides in the books by Wallace (1990), Cable and Persaud 
(1987) and Moran (1986) and in the survey more general discussions of 
policies toward direct foreign investment. The theoretical links between 
financial markets and growth are also strong. Schumpeter (1911) argued that 
well-functioning capital markets were necessary if entrepreneurs were going 
to raise capital for new technology-improving projects, and this theme was 
echoed and extended by Mackinon (1973) and Shaw (1973) and many 
others. Levine (1990, 1991) examines the effects on growth of taxing 
financial market activities. 
35 See Kuznets (1960), Balassa (1978). Denison (1967). Corden (1972), Holden (1997) and 
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In conclusion, the brief survey of the growth literature raises most important 
issues. First, the broad forces behind economic growth - accumulation of 
produced factors, specialization; Secondly by building on the insights of 
growth and development economists, the new theoretical literature on growth 
is also contributing models and show specific channels through which 
national policies may affect long-run growth rates. Finally, the empirical work 
on linking national policies to growth will be relevant for policymakers in the 




9 METHODOLOGY AND ESTIMATION OF RESULTS 
9.1 . Introduction 
In this chapter we specify and estimate the model linking macroeconomic 
policies to the growth of real GDP. This is very important because it will 
determine the extent to which the theoretical relationships involved in the 
endogenous growth framework surveyed in the previous chapter stand up 
against growth performance in the SACU countries. The most popular growth 
model that existed before neoclassical growth theory is the Harrod-Domar 
(1939, 1946). The model explained long-run economic growth by using the 
key features of Keynesian economics the multiplier of the stock of capital. 
The absence of a labour input in the production function implies that labour is 
always combined with capital in a fixed production. This then gave rise to the 
"razor's-edge" growth path. 
The neoclassical model such as Solow (1956) and Swan (1956) seeks to 
analyse the case where capital and labour can be combined in varying 
proportions, and demonstrated a way out of the "razor's-edge" growth path of 
the Harrod-Domar growth model. In these original neoclassical growth 
models, production is assumed to exhibit constant returns to scale in capital 
and labour but decreasing returns to capital alone. In this framework the only 
possible steady state growth is zero. The explanation of long-run growth is 
based on the assumption that the economy becomes (exogenously) more 
productive over time due to technological progress. The main shortcoming of 
the neoclassical growth theory is its implication that macroeconomic pOlicies 
that affect the savings rate can affect only the equilibrium level of output but 
not the rate of growth in GDP. 
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9.2 The model 
The endogenous growth theories hold the potential for explaining aspects of 
growth that the standard neoclassical growth models are not equipped to deal 
with. For instance, in most developing nations where stabilisation measures 
have been implemented, considerable levels of under-utilisation of capacity 
exist (e.g. in Ghana, the rate of capacity utilisation at the beginning of the 
Economic Recovery Programme (ERP) was 30 percent) . In such 
circumstances the appropriate macroeconomic policy mix could lead to 
growth (Jebuni et al 1991). Endogenous growth theory has therefore 
demonstrated that macroeconomic policies that affect savings and investment 
rates increase both the short-run and the steady state growth rates. Attempts 
to develop theoretical foundations for models in which policy affects the long-
run steady state have led to a large and growing body of theoretical literature 
(Grossman and Helpman 1989, Lucas 1988; Barro 1991; Rebelo 1991 and 
Romer 1986). 
The empirical growth model will always start with the neo-classical production 
function36: 
(9.1) 
where Y = total output, L, K = capital and labour inputs respectively, and A = 
autonomous technical change 
In growth terms, equation (9.1) becomes 
where 13z = (oY/oZ)(ZN) and Gz is the percentage growth in variable Z. If we 
assume constant returns to scale and perfect competition, 13 is the factor 
share in output. 
(9.2) 
36 This section has benefited from the wo~k of Ojo and Oshikoya (1995). 
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Elegant as this model is, particularly in permitting factor substitutability in 
growth models for the first time, this model and its variants have several 
shortcomings. In this model per capita income growth converges to zero in 
the steady state, and can grow in the long-run only at the rate determined by 
labour-augmenting technical progress. The most important shortcoming, at 
least from the point of view of developing countries, is that there is no scope 
for policies to influence the rate of growth of output in the steady state (Ojo 
and Oshikoya, 1995). 
Some authors such as Romer 1986; Lucas 1988 and Rebelo 1991, have 
endogenised the neo-classical growth models in such way that the 
shortcomings of the neo-classical models can be eliminated. One way was to 
remove the fixed factor constraint by allowing for constant returns to scale to 
the reproducible factor. Another approach is to endogenise technological 
change by explicitly modelling the introduction of new technologies. The 
works of Otani and Villanueva (1990, 1991) and Khan and Villanueva (1991) 
are illustrative of this approach. This approach formulates a general 
equilibrium model of an open economy. By making assumptions concerning 
the dependence of the rate of labour-augmenting technical change on 
expenditures on human capital, the model is then solved for its reduced form. 
These models are in the framework of general equilibrium theory, and have 
been less than useful to policymakers. But they have provided useful pOints 
of entry into growth models dealing with policy and empirical issues which are 
of direct interest to policymakers. The reduced-form model of Otani and 
Villanueva (1990) and its extensions are even capable of being estimated 
such that they can be rendered useful to policymakers. 
Consider a simple production function with capital (K) and labour (L) as 
factors of production. In the absence of data on capital stock, the growth 
equation can be rewritten as 
(9.3) 
where gy = growth rate of output, IIY = investment-output ratio, g1 = growth 
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rate of labour force, aj = coefficients. 
Empirical studies of economic growth usually start with this basic equation 
and then add on other explanatory variables. But according to Renelt (1991), 
in equilibrium framework there can be no justification for this type of 
formulation. Another way of adding other structural variables to equation 
(9.3) is to assume that SACU countries are not on the world production 
frontier (T). Then equation (9.1) can be modified such that the production 
function for SACU countries can be rewritten as 
(9.4) 
where qt represents a measure of SACU countries' productive technology 
relative to world technology. Downward or upward trends in growth in any 
country are caused by differences in economic policies, educational 
attainment, trade distortions, or political instability and other factors. 
9.3 Specification of the Model 
Equation (9.3) is our starting pOint. As we allow disequilibrium effects as 
proposed by Chenery (1986), then other variables will be added in succession 
to this equation in order to arrive at the equation that explains the growth 
process. 
(9.5) 
where gy = growth rate of output, IIY = investment-output ratio, g1 = growth 
rate of labour force, (lj = coefficients, u = error term 
The other explanatory variables include the following: 
TGDP = is the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a share 
of gross domestic product 
INF = inflation rate 
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POP = population growth rate 
GCGDP = government consumption share in GDP 
EXPRGR = export growth rate 
EXPRGDP = export share in GDP 
PER = primary school enrolment ratio 
SER = secondary school enrolment ratio 
MGDP = M2 as a share of GDP 
EXPR = export of goods and services 
SGDP = savings as a percentage of GDP 
DU = dummy variable for South Africa and BLNS countries 
IGRGDP = initial growth rate of real GDP 
IGDP = investment as proportion of GDP 
9.4 Estimation of the Model 
This section analyses the determinants of long-term growth by regressing the 
growth rate of real GDP on a set of relevant variables in the SACU countries 
for the period 1974-1997. It should be also noted that, for the determinants 
of the investment regression equations, we used the sample period from 
1980 to 1997. This is because the full sample period's results were not as 
robust compared to the results for the sub-period 1980-1997. A number of 
pertinent econometric issues are outlined prior to the estimation of the model 
and the presentation of the results. First, growth equations are estimated 
using panel data covering all (5) SACU countries. The countries are also 
sub-divided into two groups: leader and followers. Since, South Africa is a 
leading member in the customs union and determined all trade policies for the 
customs union, it has been regarded as a leader and BLNS countries are 
followers. When the dummy variable was introduced, South Africa was given 
1 and BLNS countries were given O. The inclusion of variables in various 
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equations was based on the performance of each variable and the analysis of 
a particular issue or environment. Political instability was included in various 
regression equations but due to its poor performance it has been deleted. 
Secondly, several econometric techniques have been used to estimate 
growth equations for which time series and cross-section data are available. 
The econometric software Eviews 3 was used to estimate the growth 
equations. The first technique is to combine all cross-section and time series 
data and perform Pooled Least squares (PLS) regression (see for example, 
Hsiao 1986; Pindyck and Rubinfeld 1992). The second estimation technique 
is the General Least Square (GLS) - (Cross-Section Weights). The last 
estimation method used is Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) for 
correcting both cross-section heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation. The discussion of the estimation results and the significance of 
the each variable are organised along the following lines: (a) growth 
convergence; (b) physical investment; (c) population growth; (d) human 
capital investment; (e) macroeconomic environment; and (f) external 
environment. 
9.5 Growth Convergence 
According to neoclassical growth theory, the convergence hypothesis pOSits 
that because of diminishing returns to capital, GDP growth is likely to be 
inversely related to the initial level of per capita income, with the implication 
that there is a tendency for poor countries to grow faster than rich countries 
(Ojo and Oshikoya, 1995). Ultimately, growth rates in both poor and rich 
countries would tend to converge. Several empirical studies have examined 
this hypothesis. Barro (1991: 1-2) found in a cross-section study that per 
capita growth rates have little correlation with the starting level of per capita 
income. Baumol (1986) also found that while there is no tendency toward 
overall convergence; less developed countries, OECD countries and middle-
income countries show a tendency towards convergence within groups. 
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Mankiw et al (1990) argue that the Solow model does not predict 
convergence, it predicts only that income per capita in a given country 
converges to that country's steady-state value. In other words, the 
determinants of the steady state, is a phenomenon that might be called 
conditional convergence. The new endogenous growth models, typically 
characterised by non-diminishing returns to factors of production, generally do 
not predict convergence. 
Empirically, an unconditional convergence will yield a negative coefficient on 
initial per capita GDP where this is the only explanatory variable in the 
regression of per capita GDP growth rate. Conditional convergence will also 
involve a negative coefficient on initial per capita GDP after controlling for the 
effects of other explanatory variables. Endogenous growth models will 
predict a coefficient of zero on initial per capita income in a regression 
involving other explanatory variables. The per capita GDP growth rate is 
independent of the initial level of per capita income in these models (Ojo and 
Oshikoya, 1995). 
The convergence hypothesis is tested in regressions of the growth rate of real 
GDP on the initial growth rate of real GDP. Table 9.1 indicates no evidence 
of unconditional convergence, that is, SACU countries show no tendency to 
grow together as a group. Therefore, the poorer countries in SACU do not 
tend to grow faster than the richer ones. In equation 1, the coefficient on the 
initial level of the growth rate of real GDP is positive, but its magnitude is 
(0.410) and its t-value are significant. This equation was estimated by using 
pooled least squares. In equation 2, the coefficient of the initial level of the 
growth rate of real GDP is also positive, but very highly significant. General 
Least Squares were used to estimate equation 2. 
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Table 9.1: Test for Unconditional Convergence 
1 2 3 
Dependent variable GRGDP GRGDP GRGDP 
C 2.796 1.717 1.546 
(2.681) (3.324) (3.390) 
GRGDP 0.410 0.512 0.651 
(2.908) (4.899) (8.930) 
AR(1) -.0765 -0.233 -0.307 
(-0.473) (-1 .890) (-3.307) 
R-square 0.112 0.008 0.077 
Adjusted-R2 0.097 -0.009 0.055 
D-W stat. 2.107 2.118 2.213 
Source: Regression Results. 
We have also attempted to estimate both equations by allowing fixed effects 
between SACU countries. The results were similar to Table 9.1 . Equation 3 
was estimated with Seemingly Unrelated Regression technique, the results 
also indicating no tendency to unconditional convergence in the SACU 
countries. The coefficient is also positive and highly significant at the 1 
percent level. 
Table 9.2 reports the empirical test of conditional convergence. The test is 
achieved by including other explanatory variables in the equation along with 
the initial growth rate of real GDP. It has been argued, however, that after 
controlling for variables that explain cross-country differences in the rate of 
technological progress, rates of output growth should converge (e.g. Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin, 1990). Regression 4 suggests that growth rates of real 
GDP tend towards convergence after controlling for variables that explain the 
main growth determinants. The coefficient of the initial real GDP growth rate 
is negative (-0.051) with t-value of -0.445. The results suggest evidence of 
conditional convergence, although the result is not statistically significant. 
The estimation method for equation 4 was Pooled Least Squares (PLS). 
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Table 9.2: Test for Conditional Convergence 
4 5 6 
Dependent variable GRGDP GRGDP GRGDP 
C 20.318 25.350 
22.269 
(4.543) (3.684) (3.725) 
INF -0.282 -0.163 -0.146 
(-2.282) -1 .175) (-1 .311) 
POP -0.1456 -0.156 -0.936 
(-0.187) (-0.949) (-0.139) 
GCGDP -0.357 -0.215 -0.364 
(-2.773) (-1 .733) (-2.627) 
EXPRGR 0.0915 ----------- ----------
(4.344) ----------- ----------
EXPR 0.001 ----------- ----------
(1.594) ----------- ----------
IGDP 0.038 --------- -----------
(1.327) ----------- --------
DU -0.649 1.246 -----------
(-0.306) (-0.677) ----------
IGRGDP -0.051 -0.150 -0.174 
(-0.445) (-0.804) (-1.270) 
MGDP -0.136 -0.236 -0.194 
(-3.162) (-4.253) (-3.254) 
SER -0.024 -0.059 -0.075 
(-0.815) (-1.668) (-1.600) 
PER -------- 0.128 0.052 
---------- (0.300) (1.235) 
AR (1) 0.013 0.247 0.353 
(0.11 ) (1 .257) (2.373) 
R-square 0.352 0.218 0.299 
Adjusted-R2 0.286 0.161 0.235 
Durban-Watson stat. 2.275 2.028 2.186 
Source: Regression Results. 
Equations 5 and 6 were estimated by General Least Squares (GLS) - Cross 
Section Weights and Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) respectively. 
The results also suggest evidence of conditional convergence in the SACU 
countries. In his study on Latin American countries, De Gregorio (1992) 
found that there is .no evidence of unconditional convergence. But after 
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controlling for variables that explain cross-country differences in the rate of 
technological progress and rates of GDP growth, the results confirm the 
hypothesis of conditional convergence in the Latin American countries. Ojo 
and Oshikoya (1995) find similar results. 
These results are consistent with the proposition that there are increasing 
returns to technology at low initial conditions. It also supports the findings of 
those who advocate that convergence is not a mechanistic inevitability as the 
physical and social infrastructure necessary to absorb new technology may 
not exist in all countries (Abramowitz, 1986). This is the case with the SACU 
countries, where we have South Africa as the leading member at a higher 
industrial development while the BLNS countries are very far from 
industrialisation. Although neither estimated coefficients are statistically 
significant, they seem to indicate that there is a rapid tendency towards non-
convergence as the growth rate of real GDP diminishes in the SACU 
countries. These results are supported by the growth performance in the 
SACU countries during the period under consideration. Botswana has been 
regarded as an economic giant because of the good economic performance 
that resulted from discoveries of mineral resources and sound economic 
management. Lesotho's economic performance was very weak and resulted 
in the implementation of the economic reform programme under IMF and 
World Bank Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) in 1988. Economic 
performance in Swaziland and Namibia was very low and at certain times 
these economies experienced negative growth. This has resulted in high 
budget deficits and increases in their debt external service ratio. South 
Africa's economy was characterised by high inflation and substantial capital 
outflows concomitant with weak economic performance. 
9.6 Investment 
The regression results in Tables 9.2, 9.4, 9.6 suggest that growth is positively 
related to the share of investment in GDP. From the equations estimated by 
panel data techniques the coefficient of the share of investment in GDP is 
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statistically insignificant in more than one regression equation but only 
significant in growth determinants equation 19. In Table 9.3. we look at the 
determinants of investment with the investment ratio in GDP as the 
dependent variable. The regression analysis of the determinants of 
investment was very highly sensitive to the estimation procedure and 
specification. The variables were insignificant or have wrong sign. The 
results in Table 9.3. which seem to be robust were obtained by analysing the 
data from 1980 to 1997. 
Table 9.3: Determinants of Investment 
7 8 
Dependent variable IGDP IGDP 
C -62.439 -10.157 
(0.254) (-0.116 ) 
INF -0.043 -----------
(-0.446) ---------
DU ----------- -89.525 
---------- (-0.355) 
MGDP 0.213 0.194 
(3.428) (3.884) 
SER 0.213 0.278 
(1 .716) (2.503) 
TGDP 0.056 0.063 





AR (1) 0.993 0.990 
(37.368) (34.698) 
R-square 0.955 0.968 
Adjusted-R2 0.951 0.992 
Durban-Watson stat 1.463 1.796 





































The coefficient of the share of exports and imports in GDP (TGDP) and the 
secondary school enrolment ratio are positive and significant in more than 
one regression equation in Table 9.3. The direct effect of the share of 
exports and imports in GDP on investment is very high. The secondary 
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school enrolment ratio significantly affects overall investment in a positive 
direction. The inflation rate and the South African dummy affect investment 
negatively and statistically insignificant in the SACU countries. Gross 
domestic savings as a ratio of GDP have shown a positive but insignificant 
relationship with investment. This variable was very highly sensitive to the 
estimation techniques and model specifications. This may be due to the very 
low savings rate in the SACU countries, especially Namibia, Swaziland and 
Lesotho, and the influence of multicollinearity. The share of broad money 
supply (M2) in GDP is positively and significantly related to the share of 
investment in GDP. M2 shows the role financial deepening in an economy. 
The results show how the financial sector has played an important role in 
promoting investment in the SACU countries for the period under 
consideration. The financial sector is vital in the economy through the 
mobilisation of savings for potential investors. 
9.7 Population Growth 
In our pooled estimation context, the coefficient on population growth rate is 
found to be negative and insignificant (see equations 4, 5, 6 in Table 9.2). 
Population growth rates averaged 2.2 percent in South Africa and Lesotho, 3 
percent in Namibia and Swaziland, and 3.3 percent in Botswana. The 
coefficient of population growth tends to suggest that an increase in 
population growth more than offsets the growth rate of real GDP for an 
average country in SACU. The combined impact of a high population growth 
rate and low investment tends to suggest low average capital-labour ratio. As 
mentioned in the previous chapter, in endogenous growth model, such as 
those of Becker et al (1990), an increase in net fertility, and by extension, an 
increase in population growth, tends to reduce the desired saving rate with an 
adverse effect on GDP growth. Similar results were found by Ojo and 
Oshikoya (1995) and Otani and Villanueva (1990), but their results were 
highly significant. 
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9.8 Human Capital 
The role of human capital in the development process has long been 
recognised in literature. The consensus in t literature is that investment in 
human capital accumulation increases the efficiency of labour and thereby 
promotes growth. The literature is also full of references to the development 
experience of East Asian countries where the governments invested heavily 
in education. In an overlapping generation's model, Jones and Manuelli 
(1990) found that policies, which redistribute income to the young, such as 
public education, might have increased growth. The general conclusion is 
that human capital formation can have a large impact on long-run economic 
growth. 
In our empirical study, human capital is accommodated by the inclusion of 
secondary and primary school enrolment ratios. These variables show mixed 
results. In most regression equations, the secondary school enrolment ratio 
affects growth negatively and insignificantly. In the investment equations the 
impact is positive and significant in two equations. The primary school 
enrolment ratio seems to affect growth positively and significantly in 
regression equations 19, 20, 21 and 22 in Table 9.6. In the investment 
determinants analysis, the primary school enrolment ratio seemed to have no 
impact on investment, and the results were not desirable, so the variable is 
excluded from the analysis of investment determinants. In the word of Renelt 
(1991), these variables do not show a strong positive effect on growth. This 
study experienced similar difficulties to a lesser extent. 
The poor performance of the indices for human capital can be traced to three 
factors (Ojo and Oshikoya, 1995). The first is the measurement problem. It 
is not clear if any of the proxies (school enrolment ratios, literacy rates, etc.) 
accurately accord with the theoretical concept of human capital. Second, the 
lack of a positive and significant relationship between these variables and 
economic growth could arise because of very long lags associated with 
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investment in education and economic growth. Finally, the definitions and 
measurements of these variables are likely to vary across countries and over 
time. In a cross-sectional study, therefore, these variations may significantly 
affect the results. 
In the Southern African Customs Union countries, education has been in 
crisis for many years, especially in Namibia and South Africa. As pointed out 
in Chapters 3 and 6, this was attributed to the apartheid policy that has 
discriminated between black and white education. More resources in the 
education sector have been allocated to white education to the neglect of the 
majority of the black population. In Botswana, the government has 
emphasised primary education for many years and more resources were 
allocated to this SUb-sector. It should be noted that only recently has the 
government adopted the policy of free education to the Batswana. In Lesotho 
and Swaziland the literacy rate was slightly higher than in other SACU 
countries. Especially in Lesotho, primary education enrolment is almost 
universal, the rate for girls being one of the highest in sub-Saharan Africa, at 
75 percent (EIU, 1998/99). But there have been no recent improvements in 
the availability of facilities, and pupil performance measured by examination 
has been declining. 
9.9 Domestic Environment 
Pindyck (1991) and Roderick (1991) have emphasised the importance of the 
unstable and uncertain macroeconomic policy environment in affecting 
aggregate investment and growth. High and unpredictable inflation, a proxy 
for macroeconomic instability, distorts the information content of market 
prices and the incentive structure. This could impact negatively on the level 
and productivity of investment and, hence, growth. The impact of inflation on 
growth is reported in most of the tables. Inflation is found to affect growth 
negatively, and is statistically significant in equations 11, 13, 14, 20 and 22. 
We have also introduced inflation in the investment determinants' equation. 
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The results show that inflation is negatively and insignificant related to 
investment. De Gregorio (1992), Ojo and Oshikoya (1995), and Easterly et al 
(1997) find similar results. The anti-growth effect of inflation appears to be 
very important in most model specifications. The highly negative coefficient 
for the inflation variable in Table 9.6 confirms the negative role played by 
macroeconomic instability on growth. As disclJssed in Chapter 6, South 
Africa experienced high inflation that has been exported to the BLNS 
countries because 80 percent of their imports are sourced from South Africa. 
The marked decline in real GDP growth in the 1980s and early 1990s can 
indeed be attributed in part to the particularly high inflation rate pertaining at 
those times. 
The share of broad money supply (M2) in GDP affects growth negatively and 
is highly significant in most of the equations. The results are not in line with 
the McKinnon-Shaw hypotheSiS that indicates the role of financial deepening 
in economic development. Except for Botswana, SACU countries are in the 
same Common Monetary Area (CMA). The national currencies of LNS 
countries are pegged to the South African rand on a one-to-one basis. The 
South African Reserve Bank is the sole authority that affects the exchange 
rate in the CMA. Therefore, monetary variables in the regression analysis 
might have some econometric problems such as multicollinearity and 
autocorrelation. In addition, Namibia was run as a fifth neglected province of 
South Africa before 1990, and the financial sector before 1990 was 
incorporated into the South African financial system. As reported earlier, 
investment affects growth positively but it is statistically insignificant. 
Kormendi and Meguire (1985), Ojo and Oshikoya (1995), De Gregorio (1992), 
and Easterly et al (1997) found similar results, but their results were highly 
significant. As a result of poor performance of investment in the growth 
equations, we have introduced the share of gross domestic savings in GDP in 
equation 13. The results show that savings affect growth positively and 
significantly at the 5 percent level. Similar results are found in Otani and 
Villanueva (1990). Equation 11 and equations 12 to 14 were estimated by 
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pooled least squares and seemingly unrelated regressions respectively. 
It has been observed that government consumption is an indirect measure of 
distortion in the economy. The negative relationship between government 
consumption and the growth rate of real GDP may arise because, according 
to Easterly and Wetzel (1989), higher spending requires either levels of 
distortion of resource use or more crowding out of private activities. 
Government consumption may also be associated with high implicit taxes on 
firms through regulation, so increased spending may signal distortions other 
than those implied by the taxes needed to fund the spending (Romer 1989). 
Government consumption is added in the domestic environment growth 
regressions 11 to 14. The share in GDP of government consumption affects 
the growth rate of real GDP negatively, and the coefficient is significant in all 
the equations. The coefficient suggests that an increase in government 
consumption from 30 percent to 50 percent causes a reduction in the growth 
rate of about 3 percentage points for an average economy. The issue of 
whether government consumption crowds out investment is analysed with 
regressions 12 to 14, where investment is excluded from the growth equation. 
The coefficient remains statistically negative at the 1 percent level. The 
results suggest that crowding out is negligible. When government 
consumption is introduced in the investment equation, it has a positive but 
insignificant effect on investment. Thus, it appears that the adverse impact of 
government consumption on growth is not through a crowding out of 
investment. This result should, however, be interpreted cautiously as 
government consumption may crowd out private investment while being 
complementary to public investment. Ojo and Oshikoya (1995) find the 
similar results. 
282 
Table 9.4: Impact of Domestic Environment 
11 12 13 14 
Dependent variable GRGDP GRGDP GRGDP GRGDP 
C 18.174 -0.132 17.110 17.508 
(3.293) (3.641) (3.758) (3.834) 
INF -0.287 -0.132 -0.1748 -0.230 
(-1.692) (1 .191) (-1.648) (-2.206) 
DU -6.628 --------- -7.838 -6.747 
(-2.854) ---------- (-6.146) (-5.800) 
MGDP ----------- -0.226 --------
----------- (-5.135) ----------
SER 0.001 -0.097 ---------
(0.011 ) (-2.377) ----------
PER 0.023 0.054 0.035939 0.013 
(0.451 ) (1.230) (1.118) (0.411) 
POP ----------- -0.8187 -0.573 
---------- (-0.818) ---------- (-0.554) 
GCGDP -0.514 -0.308 -0.477 -0.394 
(-2.952) (-2.628) (-3.783) (-3.200) 
IGDP 0.009 ---------
(0.231) --------
IGRGDP ---------- -0.204 .... _-----
---------- (-1 .620) 
SGDP ---------- 0.042 
----------- (2.212) ----------
AR (1) 0.175 0.389 0.215 0.228 
(1.956) (2.859) (2.451) (2.627) 
R-square 0.229 0.296 0.226 0.216 
Adjusted-R2 0.181 0.234 0.178 0.174 
D-W stat. 2.060 2.193 2.1081 2.133 
Source: Regression Results 
9.10 External Environment 
The external environment and the degree of openness are factors that affect 
economic performance in the sub-region. Several indicators reflect measures 
of openness, including the export growth rate, share of exports in GDP, and 
the sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share 
283 
of gross domestic product. The proposition that openness positively affects 
growth could not be supported by the data when the sum of exports and 
imports of goods measured as a share of GDP was used as an indicator of 
openness. One possible reason for this result may be that our measure of 
openness is a poor indicator of the trade regime . . We tried to use terms of 
trade for openness. The data were obtained from various sources and · was 
only from 1980. We have also tried to lag the terms of trade but the 
regression results were not robust. Hence, the variable is excluded from the 
analysis. The results are in appendix 7. We have also tried to collect the 
data on real effective exchange rate but the data obtained was not enough for 
regression analysis. The poor performance of the external environment might 
be due to the different effects of exports and imports. Because the BLNS 
countries have had an advantage of having access to other markets through 
Lome Convention while South Africa has had sanctions. 
Table 9.5: Impact of External Environment 
15 16 17 18 
Dependent Variable GRGDP GRGDP GRGDP GRGDP 
C 1.628 8.176 0.942 -0.782 
(0.54) (2.167) (0.451) (-0.708) 
IGDP 0.063 ---------- ---------- ----------
(1 .547) -----------
EXPRGR 0.081 0.081 0.095 0.079 
(3.739) (3.517) (3.704) (3.885) 
EXPR 0.001 -0.002 -0.0001 ----------
(0.919) (-1.430) (-0.166) ----------
EXPRGDP ---------- 0.024 -0.004 0.014 
--------- (0.674) (-0.118) (0.484) 
DU ---------- -5.593 -------- ----------
---------- (-2.005) --------- ---------
TGDP ---------- -0.029 0.022 0.032 
---------- (-1.003) (1.446) (2.344) 
AR(1) 0.153 0.113 0.132 0.193 
(1.782) (1.263) (148) (2.316) 
R-square 0.210 0.131 0.089 0.170 
Adjusted-R2 0.176 0.084 0.049 0.141 
D-W stat. 2.180 2.121 2.153 2.185 
Source: Regression Results. 
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The growth rate of exports is found to be significantly positive at the 1 percent 
level in all the equations. The share of exports in GDP itself is not very 
significant as an explanatory variable in the growth equations. Feder (1983) 
examined the proposition that a reallocation of resources into export activities 
will accelerate growth if marginal productivities are higher in export goods 
sector compared with other sectors of the economy. A possible interpretation 
of these results is that faster export growth contributes to the growth rate of 
GDP, particularly by increasing the supply of foreign exchange needed to 
support raw material and intermediate goods imports which are essential for 
rapid growth, while economic openness affects economic growth indirectly 
through its effect on total investment. The share of export and import trade in 
GDP shows mixed results in our analysis. It was very sensitive to the 
specification of the model. The level of exports does not affect output growth 
in the SACU countries. The coefficient is almost zero in the equations where 
exports have been added in regression, and is statistically insignificant. 
9.11 An Assessment of Growth Determinants 
The discussion in the previous section has concentrated on the evaluation of 
the statistical significance and the expected sign of the estimated coefficients 
of each variable. In this section, we shed some light on the statistical 
significance of some key variables, and devote the remaining part to the 
relative importance and the robustness of each variable in determining 
growth. The most important explanatory variables considered in most of our 
regressions include the inflation rate, broad money supply, government 
consumption, the sum of exports and imports of goods and services as a 
share of gross domestic product, the export growth rate, gross domestic 
savings, the primary school enrolment ratio, gross domestic fixed investment, 
and a dummy variable for SACU countries. These variables appear to be 
statistically significant in at least one regression equation and carried the 
same sign regardless of the estimation method or technique. The other 
variables considered include initial growth rate of GDP, secondary school 
enrolment ratio, population growth rate, exports, and the share of exports in 
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GDP. But these variables were sensitive to the estimation procedure and 
specification. 
On the other hand some variables have the expected sign but are statistically 
insignificant, especially the population growth rate. However, when we run 
regression without the human capital variables, the population growth rate 
turned out to be highly significant (see appendix 3). Regression equation 19 
was estimated by Pooled Least Squares (PLS) and equation 23 was also 
estimated by PLS, but we applied White's test for heteroskedasticity-
consistent standard errors and covariance. Regression equation 21 was 
estimated by Generalised Least Squares (GLS) - Cross-section Weights, and 
regression equation 22 was also estimated by GLS but we applied White's 
test for heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors and covariance. 
Equation 20 was estimated by Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) for 
correcting both cross-section heteroskedasticity and contemporaneous 
correlation. 
From Table 9.6, it can be seen that the primary school enrolment ratio and 
the growth rate of exports affect growth positively and significantly in most 
equations. The share of gross domestic savings in gross domestic product 
also affects growth positively. The t-values are at least significant at the 5 
percent level. The share of gross domestic fixed investment in gross 
domestic product relates positively to economic growth. The significance of 
these variables was sensitive to the estimation procedure and specification, 
although it is statistically Significant at 5 percent level in regression equation 
19. The government consumption share in GDP affects growth negatively, 
and the results show this effect is Significant in all the regression equations. 
As mentioned earlier the share of broad money supply affects growth 
negativell7. 
37 The detail of these results is discussed in section 9.9. 
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Table: 9.6 Determinants of Growth 
Dependent Variable 
GRGDP GRGDP GRGDP GRGDP GRGDP 
19 20 21 22 23 
C 27.272 19.206 20.703 22.620 28.486 
(4.570) (3.552) (2.903) (2.825) (3.496) 
INF -0.220 -0.231 -0.109 -0.171 -0.132 
(-1.575) (-2.470) (-0.894) (-1.715) (-1.426) 
TGDP -0.078) -0.417 0.027 0.008 -0.054 
(-3.351) (-0.471 ) (0.800) (0.240) (-1.928) 
GCGDP -0.582 -0.417 -0.450 -0.638 -0.405 
(-3.508) (-3.326) (-2.865) (-3.352) (-2.581) 
EXPRGR 0.094 0.061 0.080 0.089 0.091 
(4.519) (3.801) (3.513) (2.447) (2.302) 
MGDP -0.582 -0.102 -0.166 -0.133 -0.120 
(-3.508) (-2.343) (-3.382) (-2.316) (-2.244) 
EXPRGGDP 0.038 -0.109 -0.151 -0.133 0.011 
(1 .339) (-2.343) (2.521) (-2.097) (0.219) 
DU -9.543 -6.146 -6.032 -8.396 -7.446 
(-2.864) (-2.401 ) (-1.936) (-2.799) (-2.594) 
POP -0.543 -0.954 -1 .087 -0.367 -1.476 
(-0.597) (1.395) (-1.156) (-0.362) (-1.518) 
IGDP 0.069 -------- ---------- 0.018 
(2.139) ---------- ---------- (0.276) 
IGRGDP -0.157 0.176 -0.110 -0.207 -0.039 
(-1 .303) (1 .554) (-0.686) (-0.970) (-0.211 ) 
SGDP 0.075 0.104 0.093 ----------
(2.493) (2.795) (2.311) ----------
SER -0.025 -0.023 -0.044 -0.047 -0.019 
(-0.692) (-0.983) (-1.443) (-1.426) (-0.791) 
PER 0.057 0.072 0.095 0.117 0.021 
(1 .683) (2.282) (2.332) (2.655) 0.805 
AR (1) 0.059 -0.249 0.024 0.095 -0.021 
(0.480) (-1 .957) (0.137) (0.467) (-0.107) 
R-square 0.380 0.384 0.333 0.388 0.309 
Adjusted-R2 0.304 0.308 0.251 0.313 0.225 
D-W stat. 2.262 2.136 2.185 2.273 2.156 
Source: Regression Results. 
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Table 9.7: Relative Importance to Determinants of Growth 
Equation 1 Equation 2 Equation 3 
Inflation -0.0002 -0.0037 -0.0005 
Export Growth 0.0003 0.0002 0.0003 
Government Consumption -0.0126 -0.0088 -0.0163 
Broad Money Supply -0.0015 -0.0006 -0.0043 
Population -0.1814 -0.1100 -0.0843 
Initial GDP -0.0032 0.0003 -0.0032 
Savings 0.0007 0.0004 
Investment 0.0004 
DU -3.3351 -2.6561 -5.3677 
Primary School 0.0007 0.0004 0.0003 
Source: Author's calculation based on Table 9.6. 
Table 9.7 provides further insight into the relative importance of the variables 
in determining growth. The results are beta coefficients or standardised 
coefficients, which adjust the estimated slope parameters by the ratio of the 
standard deviation of the explanatory variables to the standard deviation of 
dependent. This coefficient measures the relative strength of regressors in 
affecting the dependent variable (Kennedy, 1992). Equation 1 is based on 
regression equation 21 which was estimated by GLS, equation 2 on 
regression equation 20 estimated by SUR, and equation 3 on 19 estimated by 
PLS. The results in Table 9.7 turned out to be surprising. The variables that 
were very highly significant and had the expected sign tend to show less 
importance in explaining economic growth in the SACU countries for the 
period under consideration. These include the growth rate of exports, primary 
school enrolment ratio, inflation rate, gross domestic savings and government 
consumption. While the growth rate of population was not significant, it 
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tended to have greater importance to economic growth in the SACU countries 
for the period under discussion. 
For instance, equation 1 in Table 9.7 suggests that a one standard deviation 
of inflation will lead to a -0.0002 change in the growth rate of real GDP. One 
standard deviation in government consumption will lead to 0.0126 standard 
deviations in output growth. A one standard deviation change in population 
growth rate will lead to a -0.181 standard deviations change in the growth rate 
of output. On average population growth, government consumption and the 
South African dummy appear to have more importance in influencing growth. 
Broad money supply, initial GDP, inflation, savings, investment, primary 




10 CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
10.1 Conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to investigate empirically the determinants of 
long-term growth in the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) countries. 
Using a simple, analytical endogenous growth model, we have identified 
some of the factors that have been affecting economic performance in these 
countries. The empirical investigation of the model, however, yielded some 
surprising results. In the first section of our conclusion chapter we 
concentrate on the results from the empirical study, while the second section 
sheds light on the constraints facing the economies of these countries 
surveyed in the background chapters. Section three suggests some policy 
guidelines. 
The main findings of the econometric estimation of the determinants of the 
growth rate of real GDP in the SACU countries can be summarised as 
follows. There is evidence of conditional convergence in the growth rates of 
real GDP, as convergence occurs only after controlling for variables that 
explain cross-country differences in the growth determinants. The results 
also provide support for those who advocate that convergence is not a 
mechanistic inevitability, as the physical and social infrastructure necessary to 
absorb new technology may not exist in all countries. Based on statistical 
significance and expected signs, gross domestic savings, primary school 
enrolment ratio, growth rate of exports, and government expenditure are 
major growth determinants in this study. Gross domestic savings as a share 
of GDP is positively related to growth. But the statistical significance of this 
variable was sensitive to the estimation procedure and specification as could 
be seen in Table 9.6. 
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There is evidence that human capital, as proxied by secondary school and 
primary school enrolment ratios affect growth. The results indicate that the 
primary school enrolment ratio affects growth positively, while secondary 
school enrolment is found to be negatively and statistically insignificantly 
related to growth. In this study the coefficient on human capital is not 
convincingly robust. This is probably due to measurement problems as 
indicated in Chapter nine, a problem inherent in the measurement of human 
capital. Macroeconomic instability proxied by the rate of inflation appeared to 
have had an adverse impact on the growth rate of the real GDP. The results 
show a statistical significance of inflation at 10 percent level in more than one 
regression equation. 
Because the population growth rate affects economic performance negatively 
and it was found to be statistically insignificant, this simply indicates the need 
for a population policy as a means of keeping the rate of growth rate of 
population within the limits imposed by resources and by gross domestic 
product growth. A negative and significant relationship between government 
consumption and economic growth was found in this study. The results show 
robustness, implying that the coefficient was statistically significant in the all 
growth equations. 
In this study, the impact of the external environment and openness was 
captured by exports, the growth rate of exports, the share of exports in GDP 
and the sum of exports and imports measured as a share of gross domestic 
product. The share of exports in GDP and the sum of exports and imports 
measured as a share of gross domestic product did not perform well in the 
regression and were sensitive to the estimation technique. The results of 
these variables were less robust. The variables were either not Significant 
and / or had unexpected signs. 
In order to capture the role of financial intermediaries in the SACU countries , 
we have introduced the ratio of broad money supply (M2) as a share of gross 
domestic product in our regreSSion equations. These results were surprising 
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in showing that the broad money supply affects growth negatively. The 
coefficient was highly significant in most of the regression equations. As cited 
in Chapter nine the countries were divided into two groups, namely the leader 
(South Africa = 1), and followers (BLNS countries = 0). The results show that 
the South African dummy related negatively and significantly to economic 
growth in the region. The results to some extent explain the impact of the 
events in the South African economy on SACU economies during the period 
under consideration. 
In the previous section we have discussed the main findings of our empirical 
study, while in this section we will highlight our survey from the background 
chapters of these countries. The SACU countries have faced many problems 
from the 1970s to mid-1990s. The major economic problems resulted from 
the political environment that prevailed in the leading member (South Africa). 
This was due to the apartheid policy that prevailed in South Africa for most of 
the period. Economic sanctions were imposed on South Africa, and affected 
the BLNS countries because their economies are directly linked to the South 
African economy. As mentioned earlier, except for Botswana, the LNS 
countries are in the Common Monetary Area (CMA) with South Africa. In 
terms of the agreement their national currencies are pegged to the South 
African rand. Economic crisis in South Africa started in the late 1970s, when 
the inflation rate reached double digits. In the early 1980s the economy 
declined further by reaching negative growth rates in 1985. This was 
attributed to low rates of increase in real private consumption expenditure, 
small increases in gross domestic fixed investment, a decline in gross 
domestic saving, and the sanctions imposed on South Africa. 
The economy deteriorated further from 1985 to 1993. Between 1985 and 
1993 a huge amount of foreign capital had left the country. The pattern was 
reversed after the constitutional change and in the wake of the gradual 
abolition of exchange control38. From 1994 to 1996 foreign capital to the tune 
of R27.4 billion flowed into the country. After 19 years of double digit of 
38 A detailed discussion on exchange control liberalisation can be found in chapter 6. 
292 
inflation, annual price increases went down to single digits in the early 1990s. 
Against this background of conflicting evidence the South African government 
released its macroeconomic strategy for growth, employment and 
redistribution (GEAR) in June 1996. 
Botswana's economy has experienced continuously strong growth since 
independence. Much of its growth can be attributed to the growth of the 
mining sector. Economic growth faltered in 1988/89 and the early 1990s, with 
a fall in output in 1992. This slowdown could be attributed both to domestic 
and international factors. On the international side, the world recession in the 
early 1990s adversely affected the demand for diamonds and value-added in 
mining fell in 1992/93. Domestically, drought and the contraction of the 
construction industry in 1992 had a negative impact on GDP growth. 
The economy has since recovered in 1993/94, 1994/95 and 1995/96. This 
recovery can be attributed to the recovery in the world economy and an 
improvement in commodity prices during 1993/94. The increased 
international demand for diamonds led to an improvement in the mining 
sector, and improvements in the international prices of metals in 1993/94 
encouraged the production of copper and nickel. On the fiscal front 
Botswana has gained an international reputation for the astute management 
of its financial surpluses in the government budget. The fundamental 
objective of Botswana's expenditure policy was to spend only where spending 
was productive and for projects whose recurrent costs could be substantial 
indefinitely in the future. The government has no domestic debt and has 
accumulated large balances at the Bank of Botswana. The financial 
environment was made more conducive to foreign investors with a major 
liberalisation of Botswana's exchange controls that took place on January 1, 
199539. 
The economic performance in Swaziland was impressive compared to 
Namibia and Lesotho. Although the inflation rate remained high in Swaziland, 
39 Chapter 7 discusses the exchange controls liberalisation in detail. 
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the country enjoyed high growth rates during this period benefiting from the 
increasing political pressure on and isolation of South Africa that resulted in a 
number of companies relocating from South Africa or establishing branches in 
Swaziland to escape the sanctions net. This trend reversed in the 1990s 
when real GDP growth dropped sharply. It slowed even further in 1992/93 to 
1.3 percent due to the onset of a drought which adversely affected agricultural 
output. Continued low demand for Swaziland's exports in South Africa also 
dampened growth. 
As in Namibia and Lesotho, the fiscal situation in Swaziland is highly 
dependent on SACU receipts which account for more than half of total 
government revenue. After experiencing positive fiscal balances during 
1987/88-1990/91 due to the strong economic growth fuelled by increased 
foreign direct investment, the fiscal situation worsened in 1991/92-1994/95. 
Thus, the fiscal balance shifted from a surplus in 1991/92 to a deficit in 
1994/95. Monetary policy in Swaziland is constrained by membership of the 
Common Monetary Area. Therefore, government has maintained a net 
creditor position with the domestic financial sector, largely financing deficits 
through external sources, and its focus, therefore, has been largely on fiscal 
policy. Given the importance of South African imports in the consumption 
basket of Swaziland, the consumer price index closely follows movements in 
South Africa's inflation. 
The economic constraints hampering the Swaziland economy include both 
internal and external factors. The main internal factors include the legal 
framework, including licensing constraints and the issue of work permits for 
expatriates, shortages of skills and infrastructural deficiencies, particularly the 
communication network and unreliable electricity supplies. The external 
factors include preferential trade arrangements with the European Union, 
world commodity prices (particularly for sugar and wood pulp) the South 
African political performance, and development and membership of the SACU 
and CMA. 
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Since independence the economic performance of Lesotho has been 
severely hampered by three factors: (i) domestic and regional political 
instability (the latter associated with South Africa's apartheid destabilisation), 
(ii) structural constraints such as poor agricultural performance compounded 
by soil erosion, and (iii) poor economic and financial management. Like other 
SACU members, · Lesotho relies on SACU revenue as a source of budgetary 
revenue. During the 1990s SACU receipts have accounted for more than 50 
percent of Lesotho's total budgetary revenue, and more than 70 percent of 
recurrent expenditure. These SACU revenues to Lesotho have been 
significantly influenced by LHWP-related imports. In terms of tax revenue, 
the share of SACU receipts in Lesotho is the highest among all the SACU 
members. This situation is obviously unsustainable. SACU revenues are 
likely to decline as SACU lowers its customs duties under its committed 
programme of trade reforms, and any change in the revenue formula, and in 
compensation to the BLNS countries is a central issue in the ongoing SACU 
renegotiations. 
Lesotho launched several Comprehensive Adjustment Programmes, which 
included the following policies 
• Deregulation of prices of goods, services and factor inputs 
• Fiscal policy including measures to reduce public expenditure and 
mobilise resources 
• The reform of institutions with an emphasis on building capacity for policy 
analysis, for implementing public investments and privatisation of public 
assets. 
In sum, the overall economic and financial performance of Lesotho under the 
SAPs has been satisfactory. The pattern of Lesotho's economic 
transformation is constrained by certain weaknesses which have placed a 
strain on domestic human and institutional' capacity. Lesotho is in need of 
entrepreneurs as well as of technical and managerial manpower. The 
general lack of an entrepreneurial class has meant that the manufacturing 
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sector is almost entirely foreign owned and characterised by weak linkages 
with the rest of the economy (Central Bank of Lesotho, 1996). The shortage 
of adequate managerial and technical personnel in the public sector has 
affected the quality of administration, absorptive capacity and ability of the 
sector to initiate, plan, implement and monitor projects (Government of 
Lesotho, 1995). On the other hand, the shortage of technical and scientific 
manpower has resulted in limited implementation of engineering projects and 
consequent absence of capacity to support the agricultural sector with the 
necessary inputs and the industrial and service sectors with appropriate 
technical know-how. 
At independence the Namibian Government inherited an oversized public 
administration as well as a budget that was too short on investment, 
excessively focused on a minority of the population and of questionable 
efficiency. The government has been facing four important economic 
challenges since independence: (a) reactivating growth, (b) redirecting and 
restraining the growth of public expenditure (c) reducing poverty and (d) 
generating employment. 
In Namibia, the central bank closely follows the bank rate set by its South 
African counterparts. This approach is consistent with Namibia's membership 
of the Common Monetary Area which allows for the free flow of capital 
between its members. In 1996, however, the nominal bank rate diverged 
from the South African rate by 0.25 percent points, when the Bank of Namibia 
took the decision not to follow the increase of 1 percentage point introduced 
by the South African Reserve Bank. 
In the mid-1990s, the exchange control regime in Namibia was charaCterised 
by a continuous liberalisation process which included divesting greater 
authority to authorised dealers. This move was clearly in conformity with the 
Bank of Namibia's objective of transforming from a regulatory to a monitoring 
authority. To this end, the liberalisation process was initially designed to 
address the South African financial rand system which, however, was 
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abolished during 1995. The second phase of the liberalisation process 
allowed institutional investors to acquire foreign assets by way of asset 
swaps. In addition, direct investment abroad by Namibian corporations was 
also sanctioned. A further liberalisation took place on 20 September 19964°. 
In conclusion there has been a recent improvement in the economies of these 
countries. In particular relatively low inflation rates have been achieved, with 
low budget deficits and external debt compared to other countries in sub-
Saharan Africa. Some of economies became more competitive by relaxing 
exchange controls, especially in Botswana, South Africa and Namibia. While 
on the other hand, there is a lack of technical skills, human resources and 
appropriate technology to promote industrialisation which will assist these 
economies to diversify from exporters of primary commodities to exporters of 
manufacturing goods. The BLNS countries are constrained particularly by 
their membership in SACU in promoting their manufacturing because South 
African products are more competitive than the local products. The cost of 
production is very high as the BLNS countries lack appropriate technology, 
economies of scale, market size and transport costs. The agricultural sector 
has declined tremendously. It is also very sad to note that the Southern 
African Customs Union countries are seriously affected by the HIV-Aids 
epidemic. In most countries 10 percent of the population is HIV positive or 
suffering from Aids. 
10.2 Policy Recommendations 
The policy implications arising from our study are straightforward. For LNS 
countries there are constraints imposed on them by virtue of their 
membership in SACU and CMA, that means fiscal policy is the main tool to 
promote growth. Therefore, expenditure rationalisation and streamlining of 
the public sector must be at the centre of public finance reform to ensure 
sustainability in LNS countries. In particular, the constitutionally mandated 
reorganisation of the public administration should contribute significantly to 
40 Chapter 3 sheds more light on recent exchange control liberalisation. 
297 
restraining expenditure relative to GDP. Restraining public expenditures 
would require a reduction in the wage bill, a rationalisation of expenditure in 
the social sectors and a redirection to sectors of social and economic priority. 
The positive relationship between education and economic growth, 
established in this study, suggests a possible positive relationship between 
the quality of labour and growth in real GDP. In this direction there is the 
need for careful evaluation and the intensification of investment in education 
and training. This will impact positively on growth by improving the marginal 
productivity of labour. It must, however, be recognised that, with the growing 
importance of science and technology, emphasis should be placed on those 
aspects of education as well as vocational training. The latter will go a long 
way to improving future employment for any growth in population. 
As noted above that HIV-Aids epidemic has affected these countries, and 
there is also a shortage of technical skills and manpower. It would be 
advisable, therefore, that fiscal policy should be modified to take into account 
the need to allocate funds for current expenditure in priority sectors such as 
health and education. This is not to say that investment in physical assets 
should be neglected, but to exercise caution in its choice of investment 
projects and take into account (i) available financial resources and 
implementation capacity, (ii) the opportunity cost of capital and (iii) the 
recurrent costs inevitably generated by investment programmes. Accordingly 
investment programmes need to be maintained within limits that ensure 
recurrent costs do not become excessive and threaten the envisaged fiscal 
balance. 
Given the resource constraints, the key to acceptable health strategies should 
remain a commitment to sustain preventive activities. Although great 
progress has been made with the extended programme of immunisation and 
the provision of potable water supplies, much remains to be done to improve 
coverage. At the same time, curative facilities will need to be expanded. 
Three related measures are needed to ensure that curative health does not 
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continue to absorb an excessive share of resources: the introduction of 
appropriate and relatively low-cost treatment protocols, cost-recovery charges 
for in-patient and other curative services, and improvements in management 
especially making more efficient of human resources. 
The most serious epidemiological problem is the rapid spread of HIV among 
the sexually active population. It is necessary i) to change the behaviour of 
sexually active persons to minimise the spread of HIV and (ii) to develop an 
affordable treatment protocol for helping those who become infected. The 
SACU countries should also try to implement an active health programme in 
schools, heightening Aids awareness in out-school youths, improving the 
quality of blood screening, enhancing the health service's clinical and 
laboratory diagnostic capacity in Aids, and other measures that will help to 
reduce the burden of this epidemic on the population. The countries should 
also implement population growth rate pOlicies that will take into account both 
the limited resources and the impact of HIV-Aids. 
SACU membership has been identified as a constraint on the development of 
industry in BLNS. It would be also advisable to speed up the current 
renegotiations of the customs union. Particularly, a secretariat should be 
established where all. member countries will be represented and can influence 
trade policies and the revenue-sharing formula. 
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Appendix 2: Key Aspects of the Monetary Agreement 
Article 2: Legal Tender 
No currency other than currency referred to in sub-article 2 shall be legal 
tender in the common monetary area. 
The contracting parties shall each have the rights to issue currency in the 
form of-
• National notes and coin, and 
• Commemorative coin 
Article 3: Transfer of Funds within the Common Monetary Area 
A contracting party shall not apply any restrictions on the transfer of funds, 
whether for current or for capital transactions, to or from the area of any other 
contracting party, save that a contracting party may apply restrictions resulting 
from investment or liquidity requirements which may from time to time be 
prescribed by it for its financial institutions. 
Article 4: Access to the South African Capital and Money Markets and 
Related Matters 
The Governments of Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland, corporations and 
statutory bodies owned or controlled by these Governments and local 
authorities, public utilities, financial institutions and business enterprises in the 
areas of these governments shall, subject to the relevant financial laws and 
policies applicable to their counterparts in South Africa, have a right of access 
to the South African capital and money markets. 
In order to promote the orderly management of the South African capital and 
money markets, the Government concerned shall, in respect of the issue or 
conversation, statutory body, local authority or public utility, reach agreement 
with the Government of South Africa on the conditions, timing, amounts and 
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other relevant terms of such issue or conversation and the Government of 
South Africa shall not withhold its agreement without reasonable cause. 
Article 5: Gold and Foreign Exchange Transactions 
Each contracting party shall be the sole authority responsible for authorising 
gold and foreign exchange transactions relating to its area and for appointing 
authorised dealers. The contracting parties shall exercise their authority in 
respect of gold and foreign exchange transactions in accordance with the 
policies from time to time adopted for the management of gold reserves and 
foreign exchange reserves of the Common Monetary Area. 
Each Contracting Party shall require that the gold and foreign exchange 
accruing to its residents, shall subject to its exchange control provisions be 
sold to an authorised dealers appointed by it. 
Article 6: Compensatory Payments 
The Government of South Africa shall, subject to the remaining provisions of 
this Article, make compensatory payments to the other contracting parties, 
which payments shall represent a return on the Rand currency circulating as 
legal tender in their respective areas. 
Article 7: Collection and Exchange of Monetary Statistics 
The Contracting Parties shall cooperate with one another in the collection and 
prompt exchange of such statistical and other data shall be required for the 
efficient administration of this agreement and for the formulation and 
implementation of monetary and exchange control policies. 
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Article 8: Consultations and the Common Monetary Area Commission 
In order to facilitate and ensure the continued compliance with this 
agreement, the Contracting Parties shall hold regular consultations with a 
view to reconciling their respective interests in the formulation, modification 
and implementation of the monetary and foreign exchange policies for the 
Common Monetary Area and in regard to any other matter arising under this 
agreement and shall for these purposes establish a Common Monetary Area . 
Commission. 
Article 9: Settlement of Disputes 
Should any disputes arise between any of the Contracting Parties concerning 
the interpretation, application or conditions on termination of this agreement, 
they shall make every effort to settle the dispute amicably and in good faith 
and any dispute which can not be so settled shall be submitted to an arbitral 
tribunal as hereinafter provided. 
The arbitral tribunal shall consist of three arbitrators; one to be appointed by 
each of the Parties to the dispute and the third, who shall be president of the 
tribunal, to be appointed by agreement of the Parties to the dispute. 
Article 10: Entry into Force, Accession, Amendment, Termination and 
Withdrawal 
This agreement shall enter into force upon the date of its signature by all the 
Contracting Parties, and may be amended by agreement of all the 
Contracting Parties. 
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Article 11: Notices and Requests 
Any notice, advice or request required to be given or made under this 
agreement shall be in writing and such notice, advice or request shall be 
deemeq to have been duly given or made to the Contracting Party to which it 
is required or permitted to be given or made at such Contracting Party's 
address set out below, notice to the Contracting Party giving such notice or 
advice, or making such request-
• If posted by express mail on the sixth day after the date of posting thereof, 
• If communicated by telegram, facsimile or telex on the day following the 
date of dispatch thereof and 
• If delivered by hand at the time and date of such delivery. 
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